Dunn v. City of Elgin, Illinois, 02-4187.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-4187.,02-4187.
• Citation: 347 F.3d 641
• Parties: Natasha A. Dunn, individually, and Katia S. Dunn, a minor by her parent and next friend, Natasha A. Dunn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ELGIN, ILLINOIS, Jason A. Lentz, Keith B. Chrastka, and Mona S. McKinley, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

347 F.3d 641

Natasha A. Dunn, individually, and Katia S. Dunn, a minor by her parent and next friend, Natasha A. Dunn, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ELGIN, ILLINOIS, Jason A. Lentz, Keith B. Chrastka, and Mona S. McKinley, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-4187.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 26, 2003.

Decided October 20, 2003.

Rehearing Denied November 18, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James T. Harrison (argued), Harrison Law Offices, Woodstock, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James L. DeAno (argued), Norton, Mancini, Argentati, Weiler & Deano, Wheaton, IL, for Defendant-Appellees City of Elgin and Mona S. McKinley.

Michael W. Condon, Hervas, Sotos, Condon & Bersani, Itasca, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Jason A. Lentz and Keith B. Chrastka.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

In February 2000 fifteen-month-old Katia Dunn was seized by City of Elgin police officers acting pursuant to an out-of-state custody order. Katia and her mother, Natasha Dunn, brought suit against the City of Elgin and the officers in the district court alleging that the seizure violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and caused serious emotional distress. The district court granted the Defendants summary judgment on all counts, and Plaintiffs now appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 7, 1996, Natasha and Christian Dunn were married in North Carolina. Less than two years later, Christian abandoned Natasha while she was pregnant with his child. Natasha gave birth to Katia Dunn in November 1998. Because Christian failed to provide support for Natasha or Katia, they moved from North Carolina to Illinois to be closer to Natasha's parents.

Prior to leaving North Carolina, Natasha and Christian appeared in a North Carolina court to adjudicate Katia's custody. The North Carolina court entered an order providing that Christian would receive visitation during Easter, Christmas, and the summer. Christian was also ordered to pay child support and contribute to Katia's medical expenses. Furthermore, the order stated that the North Carolina court would retain jurisdiction over future custody determinations.

Christian failed to pay child support or medical expenses for Katia. Christian also did not appear for his first visitation during Easter 1999. Natasha filed for divorce in Illinois in December 1999, and refused to allow Christian to see Katia when he came to Illinois that Christmas. As a result, Christian filed a motion in North Carolina seeking sole legal and physical custody of Katia.

Natasha received notice of Christian's motion in January 2000. She retained a North Carolina attorney for the sole purpose of obtaining a continuance and did not attend the hearing on February 2, 2000. The North Carolina court denied Natasha's motion for a continuance and granted Christian temporary exclusive care, custody, and control of Katia. The court's order contained the judge's signature, the date, and a file stamp for Rowan County, North Carolina. It directed any and all law enforcement officers to serve and render any possible assistance to aid and assist Christian in locating the minor child and delivering custody to Christian.

Early on the morning of February 6, 2000, Christian went to the City of Elgin police department. Christian showed the North Carolina order to Sergeant Mona McKinley. The order displayed no sign of having been filed in an Illinois court. In fact, Christian did not file the North Carolina order in an Illinois court because he did not want Illinois to assert jurisdiction. After examining the order, Sergeant McKinley informed Christian that the Elgin police could not enforce the order. Sergeant McKinley also stated that the police would not physically remove the child from the home but that they could act in a peacekeeping capacity. Sergeant McKinley then dispatched two officers to provide "peacekeeping standby service" for the child custody exchange.

Pursuant to Sergeant McKinley's request, City of Elgin Police Officers Keith Chrastka and Jason Lentz reported to Natasha Dunn's home in Illinois. Officer Chrastka examined the court order, realized it was not issued by an Illinois court, and suspected it might not be enforceable. Despite their instructions to provide standby service, Officers Chrastka and Lentz told Christian to wait in the driveway while they proceeded to the house. The officers repeatedly rang the doorbell and pounded on the door. When Natasha came to the door, the officers told her that they were there to take Katia pursuant to a North Carolina custody order. Natasha was told that if she refused to hand Katia to the officers, they would take Katia from her. Although Natasha told the officers that they could not enforce an out-of-state order, Officer Chrastka replied that they were going to do it. Officer Chrastka further stated that there was nothing Natasha could do to prevent Katia from being taken. At that point, Officer Chrastka reached out and took Katia. Officer Chratska carried Katia outside and gave her to Christian, who then drove away.

City of Elgin police officers are told during training that standby service requires officers to keep the peace but to not take any other actions. Furthermore, Standard Operation Procedure (S.O.P.) Number 74.2 states that Elgin police officers will not generally serve or enforce documents of civil process and that civil process is typically to be referred to the Sheriff's Department. All S.O.P.s were reviewed by all Elgin officers during training prior to February 2000. Sergeant McKinley understood S.O.P. 74.2 to mean that Elgin police officers should not serve or enforce process documents. Officers Chratska and Lentz also understood that Elgin officers generally do not enforce civil documents.

Natasha brought suit in the district court on her own behalf and on behalf of Katia against the City of Elgin and Officers Jason Lentz, Keith Chrastka, and Mona McKinley individually and in their official capacities. Plaintiffs sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law on the basis that Defendants violated their constitutional rights and caused them severe emotional distress. The district court granted the Defendants summary judgment on all counts. Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment on three grounds. First, Plaintiffs allege that the district court erred in finding that the Plaintiffs could not show that the City of Elgin violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to train its officers. Second, Plaintiffs allege that the district court erred in finding that the officers were entitled to immunity from prosecution. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the district court erred in dismissing their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based upon the finding that the Defendants' conduct did not amount to extreme and outrageous behavior.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.2001). In doing so, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. A grant of summary judgment is proper if there no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir.1998).

A. Section 1983

The Plaintiffs first challenge the district court's finding that the City of Elgin is not liable under § 1983 because there was no pattern of constitutional violations. We agree that Plaintiffs were not required to prove a pattern of constitutional violations, as the district court held. However, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim still fails because they did not prove that the City of Elgin failed to adequately train its officers.

A municipality can be found liable under § 1983 if the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). One example of this is where the municipality fails to provide adequate police training. However, "inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Deliberate indifference may be shown in one of two ways. First, a municipality shows deliberate indifference when it fails to train its employees to handle a recurring situation that presents an obvious potential for a constitutional violation and this failure to train results in a constitutional violation. See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir.1997). Second, a municipality shows deliberate indifference if it fails to provide further training after learning of a pattern of constitutional violations by the police. See Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1346 (7th Cir.1997).

Plaintiffs contend that the City of Elgin showed deliberate indifference by failing to provide any training regarding standby service. They argue that because child custody disputes implicate protected constitutional rights, the City had a responsibility to instruct its officers on how to proceed with regard to custody orders. However, Plaintiffs' argument cannot succeed because the City did adequately train its officers regarding standby service. First of all, the words "standby service" could arguably be considered clear on their face. If an officer is charged with merely standing by for peacekeeping purposes, extensive training should not be needed to educate the officer that he is not supposed to...