Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara

• Decision Date: 25 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. B175149.,B175149.
• Citation: Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 135 Cal.App.4th 1281 (Cal. App. 2006)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: David J. DUNN, as Trustee, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, Defendant and Respondent.

38 Cal.Rptr.3d 316

135 Cal.App.4th 1281

David J. DUNN, as Trustee, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B175149.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6.

January 25, 2006.

Hatch & Parent, Diane M. Matsinger; Bornholdt, Peron & Pratt and Kenneth C. Bornholdt, San Luis Obispo, for Appellant.

Stephen Shane Stark, County Counsel, Alan L. Seltzer, Chief Assistant County Counsel, Kelly A. Casillas, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

PERREN, J.

The owner of a six-acre parcel in Summerland filed an application to subdivide that property, which is zoned for a single-family residence, into two 3-acre parcels. As presently configured, two residences could conceivably be developed on the parcel. The County of Santa Barbara determined, however, that the property was subject to development restrictions pursuant to state laws and local regulations enacted for the protection of wetlands and environmentally sensitive habitat areas. After identifying two artificially created wetlands totaling approximately one-fifth of an acre, the County concluded that only one residence could be built on the property, and accordingly denied the subdivision application. Appellant David J. Dunn, as trustee of a family trust that owns the subject property, thereafter filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), combined with a complaint alleging, among other things, that the County's regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Dunn subsequently moved for summary adjudication of his writ petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f), and alternatively moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094, on the grounds that the County had not proceeded in the manner required by law and that the County's decision was not supported by the evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b)). The trial court denied Dunn's motion for summary adjudication of the petition on procedural grounds, denied the motion for judgment, and accordingly denied the writ petition. The court also granted the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the complaint, concluding that Dunn could not state a claim for a physical taking, that his regulatory takings claims were not ripe for adjudication, nor were the remaining causes of action derived from the takings claims.

We agree with the trial court that the summary adjudication procedure was improperly invoked. Where, as here, an administrative mandamus proceeding purportedly presents no triable issue of fact or is based solely on the administrative record, the proper procedure is a motion for judgment on the writ pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094. We also concur in the trial court's conclusion that the County proceeded in the manner required by law as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b). The challenged regulations pursuant to which that decision was made are consistent with the Coastal Act's stated goal to "[p]rotect, maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial resources." (Pub. Resources Code¹, § 30001.5, subd. (a).) Moreover, substantial evidence supports all of the findings essential to the County's decision.

We agree with Dunn, however, that his regulatory takings claims are ripe for adjudication because the County issued what amounts to a final decision that it lacks discretion to grant any subdivision of his property, and the permissible use of the property — the development of one single-family residence — is known to a reasonable degree of certainty. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of the County on those claims, as well as the constitutional and civil rights claims that were deemed not ripe on the same ground. In all other respects, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 31, 1995, Dunn (as trustee of the Dunn Family Trust) submitted an application to subdivide his 6.05-acre parcel of property into two separate lots of 3.025 acres. The property, which is located on a sea cliff on Padaro Lane in the unincorporated area of Summerland, is zoned for single-family residential use with a minimum parcel size of three acres. The original parcel, one of four lots created by a 1986 parcel map, had two potential building envelopes located on each side of an active earthquake fault that diagonally bisects the property. The two building sites were intended to identify alternative sites for one building, and not necessarily to facilitate further subdivision.

Because the property is located within the coastal zone, it is under the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) and is subject to the provisions of the California Coastal Act (§ 30121), as well as the County's Local Coastal Plan (LCP). In applying for the subdivision, Dunn submitted a biological report prepared by LSA, Inc. (LSA), which indicated the presence of "a small, isolated and artificial/degraded wetland" of approximately 0.16 acres (Area A). (Fn. omitted.) The report concluded that Area A qualified as a wetland "because it has wetland hydrology, hydrophytic vegetation, and hydric soils as those terms are generally and broadly understood."² LSA subsequently supplemented its report to address another small area of approximately 0.005 acres which also had wetland features (Area B).

In reviewing Dunn's application, the County retained Padre Associates to independently evaluate the property. That evaluation also identified Areas A and B as wetlands, and concluded that those areas were of significant existing and potential value to wetland plant and animal species. The County also concluded the wetlands were entitled to protection as environmentally sensitive habitat areas (ESHA) under the LCP.

The County determined that required building setbacks applicable to the property included a 100-foot "buffer" from the boundaries of the wetlands, 75 feet from the coastal bluff, and 100 feet from the proposed septic system to the edge of the arroyo. The environmental impact report (EIR) prepared pursuant to the application subsequently noted that "[t]he project site wetlands are entirely located on Parcel 1, with 0.16 acres within the designated building envelope. Although 0.02 acres would remain following full development within the building envelope, alteration of topography and soils associated with grading would likely result in the loss of wetlands in this area."

In reliance on the EIR's conclusions, the County Planning Commission denied Dunn's application. The County Board of Supervisors subsequently denied Dunn's appeal on the ground that it could not make the findings required to grant the application in that approval of the proposed lot split would be inconsistent with various regulations, including the LCP (which was certified by the Commission) and the Summerland Community Plan.

After the board of supervisors denied Dunn's appeal, he filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, along with a complaint for damages alleging violations of constitutional and civil rights and causes of action for regulatory and physical takings of his property. The writ petition alleged that the County had abused its discretion by failing to proceed in the manner required by law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b)), and by issuing findings that were not supported by the evidence (ibid.). By stipulation, the administrative mandamus proceedings were bifurcated and heard first.

On July 19, 2002, Dunn filed a self-styled "motion for summary adjudication of issues or, alternatively, motion for judgment on peremptory writ of mandate/mandamus." The summary adjudication procedure was invoked pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1). The motion for judgment was brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094 "on the basis that the writ filed presents no triable issue of fact and is based solely on the Administrative Record...."

On July 18, 2003, the trial court filed its statement of decision denying Dunn's writ petition and his motion for summary adjudication. The court found that Dunn had failed to meet his initial burden of proof on his summary adjudication motion, and that substantial evidence supported the County's findings and its decision to deny Dunn's application for a subdivision of his property. The County thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings on the causes of action alleged in Dunn's complaint for damages. The County contended, among other things, that Dunn's constitutional claims failed as a matter of law in light of the court's denial of the writ petition, that Dunn had failed to state a claim for a physical taking, and that his claim for a regulatory taking was not ripe for review because he had not yet sought a final determination from the County regarding the extent of development that will be allowed on his property. The court granted the County's motion on January 30, 2004, finding that "since there can be no possible physical taking of property under the facts alleged in the complaint, and ... all remaining causes of action are not ripe for adjudication, the motion must be granted."

DISCUSSION

I. Administrative Mandamus

A. Standard of Review

"Because this matter came to the trial court on a petition for a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, that court was required to determine whether substantial evidence supported the [County's] findings and whether those findings supported its decision. [Citation.] Our role is identical to that of the trial court. [Citations.] In determining whether substantial evidence supports the [County's] decision, we look to the `whole' administrative record and...