Dunn v. Folgers Coffee Co.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-1452 |
| Parties | MELINDA DUNN v. FOLGERS COFFEE COMPANY d/b/a THE J.M. SMUCKER CO., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION “B” (2)
Before the court are defendants International Union of the United Automobile, Aerospace and the Agricultural Workers of America, Local 1805's (“Union” or “Local 1805”), and Ricky Silva's (“Silva”) motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 10) plaintiff Melinda Dunn's (“Dunn” or “Plaintiff”) response in opposition (Rec. Doc 15), and defendants' reply in support (Rec. Doc. 19). For the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, dismissing plaintiff's claims against Ricky Silva and the Union; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen days of the issuance of this order plaintiff may seek leave to amend the complaint to provide relevant factual support, if any, for Title VII and ADA claims against the Union to comport with noted findings further below.
On or about August 26, 2019, plaintiff began employment with defendant Folgers Coffee Company d/b/a J.M. Smucker Co. (“Folgers”) as a technician. Rec. Doc. 1-1. Around that same time, plaintiff's membership with Local 1805 also began. Id. During the first several weeks of training, she was trained by Moe Smith, her supervisor. Id. Plaintiff progressed normally and was not subject to any “bad” or “unacceptable” evaluations during training with Smith. Id. However, partway through training, plaintiff was reassigned to a new supervisor and trainer, Wayne Bordonaro. Id. According to plaintiff, she was informed by Folgers that Moe Smith was being trained in a new set of skills with the company, and a new trainer had to be assigned. Rec. Doc. 1-1.
During training with Bordonaro, plaintiff claims that he repeatedly undermined, belittled, and silenced her in front of other co-workers. Id. Bordonaro also refused to refer to plaintiff by her name; instead, Bordonaro called her using gender-based nicknames such as “boo.” Id. Bordonaro also reportedly blamed his mistakes on plaintiff and refused to listen to her admonitions on proper procedures. Id. Further, Bordonaro would allegedly provide inconsistent and unintelligible instructions, often in rapid succession, and reprimanded her for asking questions when she was confused. Id. He allegedly told plaintiff that “what happens on this line stays on this line” and “don't ever let me hear that my name crossed your lips.” Rec. Doc. 1-1.
On or about October 11, 2019, plaintiff scheduled a meeting with Union President and Folgers employee Ricky Silva. Id. At this meeting, plaintiff reported to Silva that she was being harassed and discriminated against by Bordonaro. Id. Plaintiff sought Silva's help because he was the Union President and Folgers' procedure designated Silva to receive reports of sexual harassment and discriminatory conduct. Id. Shortly after reporting noted conduct, plaintiff was informed that Folgers was terminating her employment. Id.
On or about May 7, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for damages in state court, alleging unlawful discrimination based on sex and disability. See Rec. Doc. 1-1. Plaintiff also brought claims for retaliation under Title VII and breach of duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Id. She claims the Union failed to investigate but actively supported her harasser, Bordonaro. Id. On or about July 30, 2021, defendant Folgers removed the action to this court based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rec. Doc. 1 (Removal Action).
Plaintiff also seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act because she has been diagnosed and received treatment for Attention Deficit Disorder. Rec. Doc. 1-1. The complaint asserts that Folgers and the Union were aware of plaintiff's disability because she disclosed that information in her new hire paperwork. Id. As part of defendants' hiring practices, she was required to submit to a pre-employment drug test. Id. It was at this drug test that she disclosed taking methylphenidate for her disability. Id.
On or about August 24, 2021, defendants Union and Silva filed the instant motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 10. As basis, defendants assert failures by plaintiff to state a cause of action against the Union under Title VII and the ADA and a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. Additionally, defendants argue that claims for breach of duty and Louisiana Employment Discrimination Laws (LEDL) are prescribed; and must be dismissed. Id. Silva's dismissal motion asserts claims under Title VII and ADA are not applicable to him in his individual or official capacity. Rec. Doc. 10.
On or about September 28, 2021, plaintiff filed a timely memorandum in opposition. Rec. Doc. 15. First, she contends administrative remedies were exhausted before filing suit. Id. Next, she asserts the breach of duty claim is not prescribed because the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of her EEOC charge. Id. Regarding Title VII and ADA claims, plaintiff contends those claims were adequately pled in her petition. Id. Lastly, she does not contest the dismissal of Ricky Silva as a party defendant. Id.
On or about October 4, 2021, defendants filed a reply memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 19.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint “must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Varela v. Gonzalez, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (internal quotes omitted)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, the court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, a complaint may be dismissed when it appears “beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts” that would entitle him to prevail. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-61, 127 S.Ct. 1955; First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 178 F.Supp.3d 390, 399 (E.D. La. 2016). However, the Fifth Circuit has stated that motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are “viewed with disfavor and [are]...rarely granted.” Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in federal and private employment. Title VII grants an aggrieved employee the right to file suit in federal district court, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), but before suing, an employee must exhaust administrative remedies against their employer. See Francis v. Brown, 58 F.3d 191, 192 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967-68, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). If an employee fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the district court cannot adjudicate the employee's Title VII claim. See Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir.1981) (). Therefore, a claimant must first file a timely claim with the EEOC and receive a right to sue letter before a lawsuit on the claim can be filed.
Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC on October 11, 2019, asserting sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Rec. Doc. 15-2. Defendants argue that plaintiff did not file the EEOC charge against the Union; instead, she only filed the charge against Folgers. However, on the charge of discrimination application, plaintiff Dunn expressly typed out the name of the Union as the discriminating party. See Id. Moreover, plaintiff received her right to sue the Union on February 10, 2021. Rec. Doc. 15-3. Accordingly, plaintiff properly exhausted Title VII administrative remedies.
It is well-settled that a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies before an action can be brought under the ADA. See, e.g., Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787 788-89 (5th Cir.1996); Adams v. Columbia/HCA of New Orleans, Inc., No. CV 20-3030, 2021 WL 5178286 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2021). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory right-to-sue notice. Dao, 96 F.3d at 788-89. The Fifth Circuit has held there is no jurisdiction for a court to consider an ADA claim when the aggrieved party has not exhausted all administrative remedies. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n v. City of Public Service Board of San Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir.1994). After the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, any subsequent lawsuit under the ADA is restricted to the scope of the plaintiff's administrative charge and the EEOC investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006). However, if a plaintiff fails to exhaust her administrative remedies, the...
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