Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1953
• Docket Number: MORRISON-KNUDSEN,No. 7947,7947
• Parties: DUNN v.CO., Inc.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 398

260 P.2d 398

74 Idaho 210

DUNN v. MORRISON-KNUDSEN CO., Inc.

No. 7947.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 7, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 11, 1953.

Carroll F. Zapp, Boise, and Brown & Peacock, Kellogg, for appellant.

Lyons & Greene, Sandpoint, for respondent.

KEETON, Justice.

In a proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board, dependent minor children of deceased, Ralph E. Dunn, were awarded compensation.

At the time of deceased's death he was in the employ of appellant as an iron welder. He was an able bodied man, thirty-four years of age, in good health; and during his lifetime had no known physicial weaknesses or imperfections. At the time of his death he was climbing an enclosed ladder to a place where welding was to be done and collapsed. His death was apparently instantaneous. There was no evidence of violence or recent damage, by force or otherwise, to the body. Dr. Wendle, attending physician, conducted a post mortem and attributed the probable cause of death to coronary occlusion. Another physician, Dr. Tyler, expressed the opinion that death was caused by ventricular fibrillation. After a detailed analysis of the testimony, the Board concluded that the exact cause of death was unknown; was probably due to coronary occlusion which occurred quickly and left no mark of violence on the physical structure of the body other than the stoppage of the heart; and found that death was hastened by the character of the work deceased was doing 'and while deceased was accustomed to such work as a part of his regular job, it nevertheless was strenuous work which brought on an unexpected cardiac standstill'. The Board concluded that death was due to an accident. This conclusion is supported by no fact or facts whatsoever developed by the testimony. Doctors and physicians could not, and did not, determine the cause of death, and their testimony and opinions failed to show there was an accident. So far as the record discloses testimony tending to prove an accident is a vacuum.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the dependents of a person who dies suddenly on the job, from no known or determinable cause, and no accident being shown which resulted in death, are entitled to an award for compensation for such person's death under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Under the provisions of the Act, Sec. 72-201, I.C. and death benefits which result from death caused by accident, Sec. 72-301 I.C., compensation is payable only where there is injury caused by accident. Death to be compensable under the Act must have occurred because of an 'injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of * * * employment * * *.' Sec. 72-1013, I.C. provides:

"Injury' or 'personal injury' includes death resulting from injury * * * but is not to be construed as being synonymous with accident. An 'injury' or 'personal injury' to be compensable must be the result of an accident.'

Death itself is simply a termination of life. It may happen anywhere or at any time and may be caused by an accident, but without something more than death while on the job being shown, it is not compensable in an industrial accident proceeding.

A detailed examination of the transcript of the evidence produced cannot be construed by inference or otherwise as establishing that there was 'an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event,' connected with the industry causing an injury. Sec. 72-201 I.C.

The word 'accident' as used in the Act, Sec. 72-201, I.C. refers to the cause of the injury, and an undesigned, unexpected, unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, must first occur and result in injury to give an employee, or in case of his death his dependents, a right to compensation. One performing the usual, ordinary, customary work of the occupation in which he is engaged, even though the work be hard and strenuous, and who suffers a fatal heart attack, not caused by an accident, or who dies on the job from natural or unknown causes, does not suffer death due to injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Hence the death for which compensation is here claimed, under the circumstances presented, is not compensable.

Similar situations as are here presented were held to be noncompensable in Wade v. Pacific Coast Elevator Co., 64 Idaho 176, 129 P.2d 894; Walters v. City of Weiser, 66 Idaho 615, 164 P.2d 593; Carrie v. Carrie, 73 Idaho 503, 254 P.2d 410; In Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho ----, 257 P.2d 552; Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017; Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delivery Lines, Inc., 50 Ariz. 349, 72 P.2d 432.

The burden of proving that an accident occurred, as defined by the Law, is on the claimant. Brooke v. Nolan, 59 Idaho 759, 87 P.2d 470.

The facts presented here do not fall within the class of cases where a pre-existing injury, disease or ailment is suddenly accelerated by an accident or extraordinary or unusual circumstance, happening in the course of employment. Hence cases cited by respondent, In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087; Cook v. Winget, 60 Idaho 561, 94 P.2d 676; Bishop v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 64 Idaho 806, 137 P.2d 963; Smith v. Sunshine Mining Co., 72 Idaho 8, 236 P.2d 87; Teater v. Dairymen's Co-op. Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 are not authority in conflict with the conclusion here reached.

We conclude that the order of the Board awarding compensation should be reversed and set aside, and the proceeding dismissed, and it is so ordered. Costs to appellant.

GIVENS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, Justice (dissenting).

In order to set forth in a proper light my reasons for dissenting, it is deemed advisable to add to the statement in the majority opinion in so far as some particular facts seem important.

Decedent was employed as an iron welder and had been thus engaged from April 12, 1951 to July 23rd, the same year, in connection with the construction of the Cabinet Gorge Dam on the Clarks Fork River. On the particular day, decedent was climbing a ladder on the head tower which was 125 feet high; the ladder rungs were 14"' to 16"' apart and made of 2 X 4s; the ladder was enclosed on the sides and back and was almost perpendicular; the construction of this tower, as well as the tail tower, was completed in June; decedent had previously done welding on the concrete mixing plant which was 80' high and also on the cement silo which was 50' in height, in each instance climbing to the top by the use of such a ladder; about one-half of decedent's work required him to climb such ladders.

At about 9:30 a. m. on the morning of decedent's death, he climbed the ladder, carrying two lugs tied with a string and thrown over his shoulder, and was followed by two other workmen to a height of 40' where he stopped for a breather and the other workmen, reaching such height, likewise stopped and rested; thereafter decedent continued climbing the ladder followed by the other two workmen, each separated a few feet from the other; when decedent had reached a height of 95' he collapsed and, in falling, was caught by the fellow employee below him and held until he could be lowered to the ground. From all that appears in the record, death was instantaneous. The fall occurred at 10:00 a. m., some one-half hour after the climb commenced. The period of 30 minutes, exclusive of the time taken out for the rest at the 40' level, the time of which rest period is not disclosed, was consumed in the effort and exertion of climbing a distance of 95' on a ladder which was almost perpendicular, by hand over hand method.

The Board, after making some preliminary findings, stated that there was but one issue in the case and that was whether decedent's death was due to an accident arising out of his employment. With this observation I am in full accord. The Board then, after making findings with reference to decedent's personal characteristics, occupational background and medical history and other related matter including the circumstances surrounding the death, made the following additional findings:

'The Board finds that Dunn's death was instantaneous; that from the standpoint of medical certainty the exact cause of death is unknown, but that it probably was due to coronary occlusion, which occurred so quickly that it left no mark of violence upon the physical structure of the body other than the stoppage of the heart; that death was hastened by the character of the work decedent was at that time performing, namely, climbing a high ladder with two lugs thrown over his shoulder. While decedent was accustomed to such work as a part of his regular job, it nevertheless was strenuous work and it was routine for him and fellow workers while so engaged to stop at intervals to rest and catch their breath. That decedent had some slight evidence of previous damage to his heart and some enlargement of the left ventricle due to his previous hard labor, which combined with the exertion involved on the first climb of the day brought on an unexpected cardiac standstill.'

'The Board finds as an ultimate fact and rules as a matter of law that Dunn's death was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by defendant.'

Conceding, although it is very doubtful, that there is a conflict in the medical testimony that the exertion in climbing the ladder to a height of 95' served to aggravate or accelerate a pre-existing weakened heart condition thereby bringing about and precipitating a coronary occlusion, such conflict was resolved by the Board. All the doctors testified that considerable effort, strain and energy would be involved and required to climb the ladder such a distance; the doctor for appellant was of the opinion that such strain would not be too severe for the decedent who was accustomed to such climbing even though he had a diseased heart. The doctors for claimant expressed their opinion that the precipitating causal factor of the sudden...