Dunne v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1895
• Citation: 32 S.W. 641,131 Mo. 1
• Parties: DUNNE v. KANSAS CITY CABLE RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

32 S.W. 641

131 Mo. 1

DUNNE v. KANSAS CITY CABLE RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 7, 1895.

SPECIAL LAWS — CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTIES — DRAWING OF JURORS.

Act April 1, 1891, providing a method for the selection of jurors in counties containing a city of a certain population, different from the general jury law, does not violate Const. art. 4,

§ 53, prohibiting the passage of special laws regulating the affairs of counties, or the summoning or impaneling of jurors, though, when enacted, it applies to but one county in the state, and the basis of classification is the "last preceding national census," as it may apply to other counties when some future national census shows a sufficient population.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; John W. Henry, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth Dunne against the Kansas City Cable Railway Company for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Karnes, Holmes & Krauthoff, for appellant. J. W. Snyder and C. O. Tichenor, for respondent.

MACFARLANE, J.

This suit is for damages for personal injuries, and was tried in the circuit court of Jackson county. Before the jury was sworn, defendant's counsel filed a motion to quash the panel, for this with other reasons: "That said county court had no authority under the laws of the state of Missouri to draw or select a panel of jurors for the trial of causes in this court, and the pretended authority under which said court acted is contrary to the constitution of the state of Missouri, and the judge of this court had no authority, under said laws, to order a panel of jurors to be drawn or selected by said county court or the clerk thereof." This motion was overruled, and defendant excepted. The case was tried by the challenged jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

The jury was selected under an act of the legislature providing for the selection of jurors in certain counties, which was approved April 1, 1891. Defendant insists that said act is unconstitutional, and its motion to quash the panel should have been sustained. The record presents no other question. The first and second sections of the act in question are as follows:

"Section 1. In every county of this state now containing or which may hereafter contain a city having, according to the last preceding national census, more than fifty thousand inhabitants and less than three hundred thousand inhabitants, petit jurors for the circuit courts and for the court having jurisdiction of felony cases shall be selected as hereinafter provided.

"Sec. 2. In every county in this state to which this act may apply, the county court of said county, at its first regular term after it is ascertained from the last preceding national census that said county contains a city of more than fifty thousand inhabitants and less than three hundred thousand inhabitants, shall cause to be made under its supervision, by the clerk of the county court of said county, a complete list as near as they can, alphabetically arranged, of all the qualified jurors in the county and their residences; and in compiling said list said county court may have access to the books of the county assessor and to any registration of voters required by law to be made."

The other sections provide in detail the qualification of jurors, and the manner in which they shall be selected. The provisions differ materially from those of the general jury law. The objection made to the law is that it violates the provisions of section 53 of article 4 of the state constitution, which prohibits the general assembly from passing any local or special law "regulating the affairs of counties * * * regulating the practice * * * before courts or summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries." Since the adoption of the constitution containing these limitations upon legislative power, this court has passed upon numerous laws to determine whether they fell within the legislation prohibited by this section of the constitution. In these decisions the distinction between general and special legislation has been very clearly drawn. The governing rule has been that a statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to persons or things of a class is special. State v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 650; State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 354; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 163, 24 S. W. 774; State v. Marion County Court (Mo. Sup.) 30 S. W. 103. Numerous statutes relating to cities and counties of a designated population have been upheld though only one, or a very few, cities or counties then in existence fell within the class named. Such legislation is held not to be special for the reason that it applied to all of a class; not alone to those then existing which had the prescribed population, but to all such as might thereafter attain to it. State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; State v. Bell, 119 Mo. 70, 24 S. W. 765. But statutes which were restricted in their application to one or more counties or cities, with no provision by which those subsequently attaining the specified number of inhabitants might enjoy the benefits or powers conferred by the act, have been held to fall under the prohibition. State v. Herrmann, supra; State v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 68, 25 S. W. 851; State v. County Court, 89 Mo. 237, 1 S. W. 307. But mere form of legislation, without regard to its operation, will not suffice to relieve it of its...