Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 11404

• Decision Date: 25 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 11404,11404
• Citation: 151 Mont. 76,438 P.2d 660
• Parties: Margaret DUNPHY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The ANACONDA COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 660

438 P.2d 660

151 Mont. 76

Margaret DUNPHY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The ANACONDA COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 11404.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted March 8, 1968.

Decided March 25, 1968.

Eugene Tidball (argued), Krest Cyr, Butte, for appellant.

Roe, Kiely & Joyce, Thomas J. Joyce (argued), Butte, for respondent.

HASWELL, Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation Act appeal by the employer from a judgment of the district court of Silver Bow County awarding $3,000 to the nonresident, nondependent, surviving mother of an employee killed in a mine accident.

The facts are undisputed. James Dunphy, the employee, was killed in an industrial accident on May 2, 1966, in the Leonard Mine of his employer, The Anaconda Company, in Butte. At the time of his death he was single and left surviving him only his mother, Margaret Dunphy, the claimant in the case. At the time of her son's death, claimant resided in County Kilkenny, Ireland, was a native of that country, and was not dependent on her son.

Claimant filed her claim with the Industrial Accident Board under the provisions of the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act. The Board's order awarded her $3,000, the employer appealed to the district court, and the district court entered judgment affirming the Board's order. The employer appealed the district court judgment to this court.

There is only one issue presented for review upon this appeal, viz: Where an employee killed in an industrial accident leaves no beneficiaries or major or minor dependents, is his nondependent surviving parent residing outside the United States at the time of his death entitled to payment of $3,000 under the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act?

The basic statute involved is section 92-704, R.C.M.1947, as amended, which governs payment of death claims due to industrial accidents. This statute first provides for payments to beneficiaries residiang within the United States followed by a provision for lesser payments to beneficiaries residing outside the United States. Next, the statute provides that if the decedent leaves no beneficiaries, then payments are to be made to major dependents residing in the United States and if there are none, then lesser payments to minor dependents residing in the United States. The next paragraph of the statute states: 'If the decedent leaves no major or minor dependents a lump sum in the amount of three thousand and no/100 dollars ($3,000.00) shall be payable to his surviving parent or parents.' In the instant case we are called upon to interpret the meaning of the quoted words and whether they authorize the award in the instant case.

At the outset it should be noted that the statute in question, excluding the quoted words added by legislative amendment in 1957 which we are called upon to construe here, provides (1) for payment of lesser amounts of compensation to nonresident 'beneficiaries' than to resident 'beneficiaries' and (2) where there is no 'beneficiary', for payment of compensation to 'major' or 'minor dependents' residing in the United States without provision for any payment to 'major' or 'minor dependents' residing outside the United States. Speaking in general terms, 'beneficiaries' under the Act are the surviving spouse and minor children, 'major dependents' are surviving parents, and 'minor dependents' are brothers and sisters under 18 years of age.

The substance of the employer's argument in the instant case is that the fundamental consideration in construing the quoted words of the statute in question is the determination of legislative intent; that in determining legislative intent, this court must look not only to the literal meaning of the words used, but also must read such words in context with the Act as a whole, in pari materia with other provisions in the Act, and in light of the legislative history of the statute itself and the Act as a whole; that when so read and considered, a consistent legislative intent to discriminate against nonresidents is apparent; that this legislative intent is paramount and requires this court to imply these words at the end of the quoted portion of statute relating to payment of $3,000 to surviving parents, 'if residing within the United States at the time of the injury'; that otherwise an absurd result would follow in direct conflict with legislative intent, viz., that the Legislature intended to grant benefits to nondependent, nonresident parents and to deny benefits to dependent, nonresident parents. The employer then goes on the contend that therefore the Legislature must have intended to deny benefits to nondependent, nonresident parents, the statute should be so construed, and benefits denied to claimant in this case.

Claimant, on the other hand, while agreeing that legislative intent is the controlling consideration in construing the statute in question, contends that where the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, as is the case here, the court cannot add words that have been omitted, at least where there is no compelling reason for doing so, as in the instant case. Claimant proceeds to argue that the statute does not produce an absurd result because a dependent, nonresident parent is entitled to receive $3,000 as well as a nondependent, nonresident parent; that if the statute unjustly penalizes a nonresident parent, that question is not involved in determination of this case, and in any event is a matter for the Legislature and not for the courts. Claimant goes on to suggest that the reason the Legislature excluded dependent, nonresident parents may well have been because of practical problems involved in determining dependency of persons...