Duperry v. Solnit

• Decision Date: 13 August 2002
• Docket Number: (SC 16618)
• Citation: 261 Conn. 309,803 A.2d 287
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ADAM DUPERRY v. ALBERT SOLNIT, COMMISSIONER OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES

261 Conn. 309

803 A.2d 287

ADAM DUPERRY v.ALBERT SOLNIT, COMMISSIONER OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES

(SC 16618)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 11, 2002.

Officially released August 13, 2002.

Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.Jo Anne Sulik, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James Thomas, state's attorney, Vicki Melchiorre, senior assistant state's attorney, and George Ferko, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant(respondent).

William W. Fick, certified legal intern, with whom were Brett Dignam and, on the brief, Scott L. Shuchart, law student intern, for the appellee(petitioner).

Monte P. Radler,public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Gerard A. Smyth, for the office of the chief public defender, as amicus curiae.

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The principal issues in this appeal are whether the habeas court: (1) improperly established a new constitutional rule in a collateral proceeding in contravention of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane,489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334(1989), by concluding that a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty with the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect¹ must be canvassed as though he is pleading guilty to ensure that his plea is made knowingly and voluntarily; and (2) improperly concluded that the petitioner in the present case was not barred from raising for the first time in the habeas proceeding the claim that he had not waived his right to a jury trial knowingly and voluntarily.The respondent, Albert Solnit, the commissioner of mental health and addiction services (state), appeals from the judgment of the habeas court granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.We conclude, with respect to the plea canvass, that the habeas court improperly declared and applied a new constitutional rule in contravention of the principle enunciated in Teague.In the exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, however, we conclude that, in future cases when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and the state substantially agrees with the defendant's claim of mental disease or defect, with the result that the trial essentially is not an adversarial proceeding, the trial court must canvass the defendant to ensure that he or she fully understands the consequences of his or her plea, particularly with respect to the length of time the defendant could be confined.With respect to the second issue concerning the jury trial waiver, we conclude that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner had satisfied the "cause and prejudice" standard for procedural default announced in Wainwright v. Sykes,433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594(1977), and therefore improperly reached the merits of the petitioner's claim that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.In April, 1988, the petitioner, Adam Duperry, was arrested and charged with arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111² and manufacture of bombs in violation of General Statutes § 53-80a³ in connection with the explosion of a pipe bomb at the Institute of Living in Hartford.Dennis O'Toole, an assistant public defender, was appointed to represent the petitioner.O'Toole engaged in plea negotiations with Kevin McMahon, then the assistant state's attorney assigned to the case, who offered to recommend a sentence of thirty-five years incarceration suspended after twelve years in exchange for a guilty plea.

In light of the petitioner's background of mental illness and the nature of the crime charged, O'Toole had the petitioner examined by Walter A. Borden, a psychiatrist, to evaluate the petitioner's mental health and, thus, determine whether a defense of mental disease or defect was viable.After examining the petitioner, Borden concluded that at the time of the alleged offense, the petitioner had suffered from severe mental illness, which significantly impaired his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.O'Toole shared the results of Borden's evaluation with McMahon, who requested that the petitioner be examined by another psychiatrist, Donald R. Grayson.Following his examination of the petitioner, Grayson ultimately also concluded that at the time of the alleged offense the petitioner was suffering from severe mental illness and lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and to conform his conduct to the law.In light of these evaluations, McMahon agreed to not oppose a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and O'Toole agreed to waive a jury trial and to not contest the state's prima facie case regarding the underlying charges.On December 20, 1988, the petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and opted for a court trial, which began immediately.In accordance with their prior discussions, the parties presented their respective cases without opposition.First, the parties presented evidence with respect to the petitioner's mental state, and, second, the state introduced evidence regarding the underlying charges.The entire proceeding was completed in less than two hours, and the trial court immediately rendered its judgment, finding the petitioner not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.Following the petitioner's acquittal, the trial court ordered, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582,⁴ that the petitioner be committed to the custody of the psychiatric security review board (board) to be confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities for a maximum term of twenty-five years.

In 1995, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking his continued detention in the custody of the board.The petitioner alleged that his confinement was illegal because, first, he was no longer mentally ill, and, second, he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel when he elected to pursue the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.The habeas court, Hodgson, J., found no merit in either claim and dismissed the petition.In 1998, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment of the habeas court to present additional claims.The motion was granted and the petitioner amended his petition to allege, inter alia, that: (1) his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect violated his due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions because he was not made aware of and did not fully understand the consequences of his plea; and (2) his waiver of his right to a jury trial was not knowing and voluntary.

After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court, Spallone, J., concluded that the petitioner had proven his allegations by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The court concluded, first, that "[t]he requirements governing the taking of a guilty plea also apply to the acceptance of a plea [of] not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. . . ."Noting that the record was void of any indication that the trial court had canvassed the petitioner in a manner analogous to the requirements of Practice Book§ 39-19,⁵ which prescribes the required canvass of a defendant who pleads guilty, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner had not, at the time of his plea, understood the consequences of pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, thereby rendering his plea involuntary.The habeas court further concluded that the petitioner did not waive his right to a jury trial knowingly and voluntarily because the record was devoid of any evidence demonstrating that the trial court had conducted the required canvass of the petitioner to ensure that he knowingly and voluntarily had waived that right.Accordingly, the habeas court rendered judgment granting the petition.The state's subsequent request for certification to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (b)andPractice Book§ 80-1 was granted by the habeas court.The state appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c)andPractice Book§ 65-1.

In this appeal, the state challenges both grounds on which the habeas court granted the habeas petition.The state first claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that the trial court was required to canvass the petitioner to ensure that his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect had been made knowingly and voluntarily, and, even if the habeas court properly concluded that such a canvass is required, that conclusion established a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure in a collateral proceeding in contravention of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane,supra, 489 U.S. 288.The state also claims that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner's claim with respect to whether he knowingly and voluntarily had waived his right to a jury trial was not procedurally barred by the petitioner's failure to raise the claim prior to the habeas proceeding.We reverse the judgment of the habeas court.

I

The state first claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that the trial court was required to canvass the petitioner to ensure that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.Specifically, the state argues that a criminal defendant, such as the petitioner here, who pleads not guilty and asserts the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, forfeits none of the rights waived by a defendant who pleads guilty and therefore does not have the same due process right enunciated in Boykin v. Alabama,395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274(1969), to be canvassed...