Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-3165,91-3165
• Citation: 948 F.2d 187
• Parties: Stanley DUPLANTIS and his wife, Melissa Duplantis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELL OFFSHORE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 187

948 F.2d 187

21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 519

Stanley DUPLANTIS and his wife, Melissa Duplantis Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELL OFFSHORE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-3165

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 6, 1991.

Perrin C. Butler, Robert C. Stern, Butler & Stern, Metairie, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Michael Mossy Christovich, John K. Leach, Christovich & Kearney, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

In this case we examine the propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Shell Offshore, Inc. ("Shell"), and against plaintiffs Stanley and Melissa Duplantis. Plaintiffs allege that Stanley Duplantis ¹ was injured when he slipped on a grease-covered board while working on an oil platform owned by

                Shell on the Outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast in the Gulf of Mexico.   For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the district court
                

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought this suit against Shell on June 21, 1990. Plaintiffs sought to recover damages for personal injuries that Stanley Duplantis alleges he sustained on March 28, 1990, while employed by Grace Offshore Company, formerly Booker Drilling Company ("Grace/Booker"). Stanley Duplantis was working as a roustabout aboard Grace/Booker's Rig 950 situated atop a platform owned by Shell in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast. Plaintiffs allege that Stanley Duplantis was injured as a result of Shell's negligence when he stepped on a piece of two-by-four covered with grease after his supervisor, Grace/Booker crane operator Roland Boudoin, instructed him to pick up and carry a piece of wood and place it on an existing wood stack in a particular area of the platform. Stanley Duplantis fell on the padeye of the cover of a pedestal crane belonging to Shell. Shell answered on August 1, 1990, denying all allegations of negligence.

On January 8, 1991, after discovery was to have been completed according to the Minute Entry, Shell moved for summary judgment. After receiving Shell's motion, plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cutoff date. Shell opposed the motion, but discovery was extended until February 1, 1991. In the interim, plaintiffs moved to continue the hearing date on Shell's summary judgment motion. Shell opposed plaintiffs' motion, which was nevertheless granted and the hearing was continued from its original date of January 23, 1991 until February 6, 1991.

On February 7, 1991, the district court issued a Minute Entry granting summary judgment in favor of Shell and dismissing all claims asserted by plaintiffs with prejudice and with all parties to bear their own costs. On February 15, the district court entered Judgment in accordance with the Minute Entry. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal four days later.

ANALYSIS

After reviewing the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Duvall v. The Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., 946 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1991), a district court shall grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Moreover, "this Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria used by the district court in the first instance." Abshire v. Gnots-Reserve, Inc. (In re Cooper/T. Smith), 929 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 190, 116 L.Ed.2d 151 (1991) (citing Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.1988)).

A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Moreover, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. Having reviewed the record, we are persuaded that the district court correctly determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Shell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists Regarding the Board or the Crane Cover.

Plaintiffs claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding who is responsible for the greased board on which Stanley Duplantis allegedly slipped and whether Shell positioned the crane cover negligently. If Shell was negligent, plaintiffs claim that it would be liable under Louisiana law. See LA.CIV.CODE ANN. arts. 2315 and 2317 (West 1979 and 1991 Supp.).

Shell submitted several affidavits of Grace/Booker personnel to supplement the record in support of its motion for summary judgment. The affiants were subsequently deposed. As the district court noted,

none of the affidavits or deposition testimony submitted indicates that Shell Offshore owned the board in question or placed it in area [sic] where the plaintiff allegedly was injured. On the contrary, witnesses have testified either that the board was owned by Grace, or that it was unknown who owned the board. In addition, there was testimony that it was the responsibility of Grace employees, including the plaintiff, to perform housekeeping duties such as cleaning the rig floor area of hazards.

Most of the witnesses could not say where the board came from. Crane operator Roland Boudoin testified that "it [was] one of the boards that belong[ed] to Grace." None of the witnesses, including Stanley Duplantis, testified that Shell was responsible for the board. Additionally, Shell's affiants testified that the crane cover was stored under the crane pedestal, while Stanley Duplantis testified that part of the crane cover extended beyond the crane. All witnesses testified that the crane cover had not been moved since Booker/Grace began working and Stanley Duplantis admitted that he knew where the crane cover was and that it had been in the same position since he had started working on the rig eight months prior to the accident.

Plaintiffs contend that "[a] review of the affiants' deposition testimony demonstrates Shell has failed to produce any competent evidence by which the ownership and placement of the board by it could be negated." Plaintiffs have misconstrued Shell's burden on summary judgment according to Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). While it is true that, even if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, "[s]imply filing a summary judgment motion does not immediately compel the party opposing the motion to come forward with evidence demonstrating material issues of fact as to every element of its case," Russ v. International Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir.1991), it is also true that, if the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial, "[e]ver since if not before Celotex, '[t]he moving party need not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case.' " Saunders v. Michelin Tire Corp., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting Latimer v. Smithkline & French Laboratories, 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir.1990)).

We have recently noted that

[t]he party that moves for summary judgment bears the burden to establish that its opponent has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant may either (1) submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some material element of the opponent's claim or defense, or (2) if the crucial issue is one on which the opponent will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that the evidence in the record insufficiently supports an essential element of the opponent's claim or defense. Id.

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 939 F.2d 1293, 1299 (5th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have confused Shell's burden with the burden which they would have had to shoulder had they moved for summary judgment.

Shell, by virtue of its motion supported by affidavits, has adequately pointed out that there is no indication that it was responsible for the grease covered board. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) states, in pertinent part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is Plaintiffs claim that even if Shell has adequately met its burden according to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), that they, in turn, have met their responsibility under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) by attaching a letter from their expert witness, Mr. Edward B. Robert, Jr. ("Robert"), to their memorandum to the district court in opposition to Shell's summary judgment motion. Robert explicitly states that his analysis was based on statements by Stanley Duplantis, that he had not read other descriptions of the events, and that therefore his analysis was of a preliminary nature. He stated that:

                a genuine issue for trial.   If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party
                

1. It was unsafe and substandard housekeeping practice to leave the grease covered wood piece in or near a walkway where workers were required to traverse. This contaminated two by four should have been disposed of properly or stored in such a manner as to leave the working area free of slipping hazards.

2. The cover with padeye attached, when removed...