Duplisea v. Maine Central Railroad

• Decision Date: 31 October 1958
• Docket Number: No. 5368.,5368.
• Citation: 260 F.2d 495
• Parties: Leslie A. DUPLISEA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

260 F.2d 495 (1958)

Leslie A. DUPLISEA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 5368.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

October 31, 1958.

Oscar Walker, Bangor, Me., for appellant.

Arnold L. Veague, Bangor, Me., with whom John W. Conti and Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague, Bangor, Me., were on brief, for appellee.

Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal is taken from an order dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The complaint is conveniently vague as to the basis of federal jurisdiction. Clearly it is not diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, for the complaint alleges that plaintiff is a citizen of Maine and that defendant Railroad is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Maine. Nor is there any allegation of a breach of a duty imposed or the violation of a right given by the Constitution, the Railway Labor Act, or any other federal statute. Compare Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 1944, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187. Nor does the complaint raise any question as to the validity, construction, or effect of the Constitution or of any law of the United States. On the contrary, under the terms of the complaint, plaintiff seeks damages for an alleged wrongful discharge in violation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the Railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.

No doubt the Railway Labor Act is an "Act of Congress regulating commerce" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1337. It would have been within the power of Congress to provide a federal cause of action for damages based upon a wrongful discharge of a railway employee in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Cf. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 1957, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed. 2d 972. If such a federal cause of action had been created, presumably the federal district court would have had jurisdiction, either under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, or under the more general provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since more than $3,000 was involved.

But counsel for appellant was unable to point to any provision of the Railway Labor Act creating such federal cause of action. Nor have we been able to find any such provision. What seems to come nearest to the present case is found in the terms of 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, under which a railway employee having a grievance because of alleged wrongful discharge in violation of a term of the collective bargaining agreement is permitted to submit his case to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. It is provided further in 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153(m), that any resulting awards by the Railroad Adjustment Board, or a division thereof, "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award." In subsection (o) of the same section, it is provided that when such an award is made, the Railroad Adjustment Board "shall make an order, directed to the carrier, to make the award effective and, if the award includes the requirement for the payment of money, to pay to the employee the sum to which he is entitled under the award on or before a day named." The following subsection provides that if the carrier does not comply with such order, then the aggrieved employee "may file in the District Court of the United States * * * a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated * * *. The district courts are empowered, under the...