Dupont v. United States

• Decision Date: 23 June 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 15-3752 (JBS/AMD)
• Parties: Versie L. DUPONT, general administrator and administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Lakeisha R. Mayner-Dupont, deceased, and Versie L. Dupont, individually, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

197 F.Supp.3d 678

Versie L. DUPONT, general administrator and administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Lakeisha R. Mayner-Dupont, deceased, and Versie L. Dupont, individually, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15-3752 (JBS/AMD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed June 23, 2016

Michael S. Berger, Esq., ANDRES & BERGER, P.C., 264 Kings Highway East, Haddonfield, NJ 08033, Attorney for Plaintiffs.

Paul J. Fishman, United States Attorney, By: Jordan Milowe Anger, Assistant U.S. Attorney, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, 970 Broad Street, 7th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Attorney for the United States.

OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

After Lakeisha Mayner-Dupont died from cervical cancer

, her husband, Versie Dupont, filed a wrongful death suit against the United States for the allegedly negligent actions of CAMcare Health Corporation ("CAMcare"), the federally-funded hospital that diagnosed and treated her, bringing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), filed by Defendant the United States. [Docket Item 10.] Because CAMcare is a federally qualified health center, CAMcare and the employees who are named in this suit are considered employees of the Government for purposes of the FTCA, and the United States answers for the actions of CAMcare.

The United States argues that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this suit because CAMcare, a corporation with IRS section 501(c)(3) status which serves the underprivileged population of Camden, qualifies as a "charitable organization" under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act ("NJCIA"), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–7(a), and is therefore absolutely immune from liability. Alternatively, Defendant seeks partial summary judgment and asks the Court to find that CAMcare is a qualified entity under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–8, which caps recovery against "nonprofit hospitals" at $250,000. Plaintiff Versie Dupont contends in opposition [Docket Item 14] that CAMcare is not entitled to immunity because it is not truly a nonprofit organization within the meaning of the NJCIA and seeks additional discovery on the issue of whether CAMcare is a "nonprofit hospital."

For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that CAMcare is not a charity under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–7(a). As such, the United States is not absolutely immune from suit, and the motion to dismiss will be denied. Because Plaintiff has not had any chance to seek discovery to investigate CAMcare's nonprofit hospital status, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is premature and will be denied without prejudice to renewal at a later stage in the litigation.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket Item 1] is straightforward. On or around December 11, 2009, the decedent, Lakeisha R. Mayner-Dupont entered treatment at CAMcare Health Corporation ("CAMcare"), a federally-supported health facility and community health center located in Camden, New Jersey. The doctors and nurses who treated her, who are named as defendants in the Complaint, allegedly failed to perform appropriate tests and delayed in diagnosing Mayner-Dupont with cervical and/or vaginal cancer

. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) By the time she was diagnosed, Mayner-Dupont's cancer was already at stage III-B. (Id.¶ 13.) The Complaint alleges that the delay in diagnosis and treatment fell below the applicable standards of care, caused Mayner-Dupont to undergo extensive medical treatment, and ultimately caused her death on September 16, 2014. (Id.)

On June 4, 2015, approximately nine months after Mayner-Dupont's death, Mayner-Dupont's husband, Versie L. Dupont, as the general administrator and administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Lakeisha Mayner-Dupont, filed this Complaint against six named doctors and nurses at CAMcare¹ and against the United States for the actions of CAMcare. Various unidentified John Doe and Jane Roe employees and employers are also defendants. (Id. at 1.) Dupont brings claims against each defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), for wrongful death, pain, and suffering under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3 & 2A:31-1 et seq.(Id. Counts One to Ten.) Dupont also brings a claim for himself for loss of consortium. (Id. Count Eleven.)

The United States, which answers for the actions of CAMcare and its employees, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting absolute charitable immunity under the NJCIA. Alternatively, the Government seeks partial summary judgment on the question of whether CAMcare is a "nonprofit hospital" entitled to a damages cap under NJCIA. Plaintiff contends that the immunities and defenses under the NJCIA are not available to the United States, and that even if they were, CAMcare does not qualify for its protections.²

The Court must decide: (1) whether the United States, as the defendant in this suit, can assert defenses and immunities available to CAMcare under the NJCIA; (2) if so, whether under the NJCIA, specifically N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–7(a), CAMcare is a "charitable organization" entitled to absolute immunity; and (3) if not, whether partial summary judgment may still be granted in Defendant's favor on the issue of whether CAMcare is entitled to a damages cap as "nonprofit hospital" under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–8.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW³

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) must be granted if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir.2012). When a defendant files a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for the sake of remaining in federal court. Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.2000).

The parties do not contest that Defendant has presented a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. (Def. Br. at 3 n.1.) See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir.1982) ("Northwest's motion was supported by a sworn statement of facts. It therefore must be construed as a factual, rather than a facial attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction."). Unlike a "facial attack," which considers the Complaint on its face for a jurisdictional defect, see Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir.2014), a factual challenge presents an argument that the facts of the case do not support the asserted jurisdiction. Id.; see also Cunningham v. Lenape Reg'l High Dist. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.Supp.2d 439, 447 (D.N.J.2007) ("[I]n a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the defendant argues that the allegations on which jurisdiction depends are not true as a matter of fact.")

In a factual attack, "the court accords the plaintiff's allegations no presumption of truth." S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 343 (3d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 752 (3d Cir.2000). The district court looks beyond the allegations in the complaint and weighs evidence outside the pleadings. Thus, "[i]t is incumbent upon the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's sworn factual assertions" with something more than conclusory responses. Northwest Airlines, 673 F.2d at 711.

Citing to a Fifth Circuit case, Defendant asserts that the jurisdictional question should be reviewed under the summary judgment standard. (Def. Br. at 5 (citing Tindall v. United States, 901 F.2d 53, 55 & n. 5 (5th Cir.1990) ).) Plaintiff does not directly address the applicable standard of proof but adopts Defendants' position. (Pl. Br. at 43 (arguing that summary judgment should not be entered on the question of whether CAMcare is entitled to a damages cap under the NJCIA).) In the Third Circuit, however, courts use a more "relaxed standard of proof." S.R.P., 676 F.3d at 344. "By requiring less of a factual showing than would be required to succeed at trial, district courts ensure that they do not prematurely grant Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss claims in which jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits and could be established, along with the merits, given the benefit of discovery." CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir.2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Under the FTCA, the United States is Liable to the Same Extent as a Private Individual Under State Law and May Assert Defenses Under the NJCIA

The long-standing doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that "the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Sovereign immunity shields the United States and its agencies from suit and acts as a jurisdictional bar which deprives the courts of subject matter jurisdiction. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ; Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 933 (3d Cir.1996). The United States may waive immunity and consent to be sued. The terms of its waiver, however, must be "unequivocally expressed," United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992), for "[t]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language." Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986) ; see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Additionally, our courts have said that waivers should not be liberally construed; rather, they must be "construed strictly in favor of the sovereign ... and not enlarged beyond what the language requires." Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951) and ...