Dupree v. State, 37199

Citation277 S.E.2d 18,247 Ga. 470
Decision Date15 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 37199,37199
PartiesDUPREE v. The STATE.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

James L. Wiggins, Eastman, for Silas Dupree, Jr.

Phillip R. West, Dist. Atty., Eastman, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MARSHALL, Justice.

The appellant, Silas Dupree, Jr., was convicted of the felony murder of Wade Berry Hampton during the commission of a robbery perpetrated by the appellant and an accomplice against the deceased. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment, and this is his appeal.

The deceased was 71 years old, and he was a double amputee who was confined to a wheelchair. He shared a house in Ailey, Georgia, with Essie Mae Hamilton, age 70. Ms. Hamilton testified that on the night of September 23, 1978, two men wearing masks over their faces entered their house and demanded money from the deceased. She overheard one of the men say he was going to get the "Cadillac."

After the men had left, she found the deceased lying on the floor next to his overturned wheelchair. A broken crutch was found in the vicinity. The deceased had sustained a head injury and a deep cut in his finger. A snakeskin pocketbook in which he kept his money was missing.

Expert medical evidence established that the deceased was suffering from coronary occlusion and myocardial infarction; and he died from a heart failure brought on by the stress caused by, and the injuries incurred during, the robbery.

On the morning of January 9, 1979, GBI agent Martin Moses and Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff Gene Deese had occasion to visit the appellant in Vidalia, Georgia, in connection with a complaint he had filed concerning attempted damage to his automobile. Their suspicions were aroused, because the appellant owned a Cadillac and because he fit the general description of one of the perpetrators of the Hampton homicide. They asked the appellant if he had any knowledge of the Hampton homicide. He stated that he was not involved, and he agreed to have a polygraph examination administered to him to confirm his lack of involvement.

The GBI agent and deputy sheriff made arrangements for the appellant to take a polygraph examination in Douglas, Georgia, on January 9. The three of them left to go to Douglas at approximately 10:30 a. m. The polygraph examination was administered to the appellant, and he and the two law enforcement officials ate lunch together. They returned to Mount Vernon at approximately 5:00 or 5:30 p. m. En route to Mount Vernon, the appellant was informed that he had not passed the polygraph examination. Upon arriving in Mount Vernon, the appellant accompanied the GBI agent and deputy sheriff to the law library in the courthouse. He was given Miranda warnings, and he subsequently gave an oral statement to the GBI agent admitting his involvement in the Hampton homicide. Although the appellant refused to sign the statement after it was reduced to writing, testimony by the deputy sheriff shows that the appellant later repeated the statement to the county sheriff. At no time during the day did the appellant ask to use the telephone, or to speak with an attorney, or to leave. However, the GBI agent did testify that after he was informed that the appellant did not pass the polygraph examination, the appellant probably would not have been permitted to leave if he had so requested. 1

The appellant was indicted for robbery and malice murder of the deceased by striking his head with an unknown blunt object. As previously stated, the appellant was convicted of felony murder.

Prior to trial, a Jackson v. Denno hearing was conducted outside of the presence of the jury. The trial judge ruled that the appellant's oral statement was made by him freely and voluntarily and that it was not the product of an illegal arrest. Accordingly, the trial judge ruled that testimony concerning this oral statement was admissible in evidence.

1. In the first two enumerations of error, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in overruling his motions for directed verdict of acquittal and new trial on evidentiary grounds.

Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the evidence authorized a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a robbery was perpetrated against the deceased, that the appellant was one of the perpetrators of the robbery, and that the conduct of the appellant in perpetrating the robbery constituted the proximate cause of the death of the deceased. See generally, Redfield v. State, 240 Ga. 460(1), 241 S.E.2d 217 (1978).

These enumerations of error are without merit.

2. In the third enumeration of error, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in permitting the GBI agent to give testimony of the oral statement allegedly made by the appellant. The appellant contends that this statement was the product of an illegal arrest and thus inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).

It is true that even though proper Miranda warnings may have been given prior to a defendant's making an incriminatory statement and even though the statement may have been "voluntary" for Fifth Amendment purposes, the statement is nonetheless inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment if it is the product of an illegal "seizure." Dunaway v. New York, supra. However, in this case, the trial judge was authorized in finding that the appellant had never been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in that he had voluntarily agreed to accompany the police to Douglas to take the polygraph examination. Cf., Dunaway v. New York, supra. The appellant did nothing prior to making the incriminatory statement, such as requesting to leave or speak with an attorney, that would require a finding that the appellant had been placed involuntarily in police custody. Therefore, we hold that the trial judge did not err in ruling that the statement made by the appellant was not the product of an illegal arrest.

This enumeration of error is without merit.

3. In the fourth enumeration of error, the appellant argues...

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19 cases
  • The State v. Jackson, S10A0070.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • June 28, 2010
    ...incidental, probable consequences of the execution of the design to commit the robbery.” (citations omitted)); Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 470-471, 472, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981) (holding, where the victim died of heart failure brought on by stress and injuries incurred during a robbery, that ......
  • Brown v. the State.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • December 14, 2010
    ...2. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 21, 334 S.E.2d 691 (1985). 3. Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982). See also Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981) (defendant who robbed elderly victim found guilty of felony murder when victim died of heart failure brought on by str......
  • Sabel v. State, 37184
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • June 30, 1981
    ...have been conveyed to the defendant, United States v. Mendenhall, supra at 554, fn. 6, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, fn. 6; Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, fn. 1, 277 S.E.2d 470 (1981). Here there was probable cause to arrest the defendant whether the seizure occurred before or after black paint was fou......
  • Smith v. State, S06A1451.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • December 11, 2006
    ...to find that that confession was voluntary and was not the product of an illegal detention. Bolden v. State, supra; Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 472(2), 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981). Compare Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985) (police "transport[ed] a suspect......
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