Dupuy v. McEwen

Decision Date13 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 97 C 4199.,97 C 4199.
Citation648 F.Supp.2d 1007
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
PartiesBelinda DUPUY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Erwin McEWEN, Director, Illinois Department of Children & Family Services, in his official capacity, Defendant.

Andrew L. Mathews, M. Marshall Seeder, Reed Smith LLP, Diane L. Redleaf, Family Defense Center, Edward W. Feldman, Miller Shakman & Beem LLP, Robert E. Lehrer, Lehrer & Redleaf, Jeffrey Bensley Gilbert, Johnson, Jones, Snelling & Gilbert, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Barbara Lynn Greenspan, Danielle Jenkins Steimel, James C. Stevens, Jr., Kimberly Soo Miller, Nancy K. Hall-Walker, Attorney General's Office, Beth Ilyse Solomon, Department of Children and Family Services, Office of Legal Services, Jack J. Carriglio, Meckler, Bulger & Tilson, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, a class of child care employees, initially filed this action against Defendant, the Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), in 1997. Plaintiffs alleged that DCFS violated their due process rights when it issued "indicated" reports concluding that credible evidence supported allegations charging Plaintiffs with child abuse or neglect. Over the course of the next decade, the case traveled from this court to the Seventh Circuit several times. The substantive litigation having come to an end, Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorneys' fees for time spent on those claims on which they prevailed.

More complete recitations of the facts and procedural history are available elsewhere. See, e.g., Dupuy v. McDonald, 141 F.Supp.2d 1090 (N.D.Ill.2001). For the purposes of deciding the pending petition for fees, the court focuses on the first of three separate sets of claims that Plaintiffs advanced during the litigation. The initial set of claims ("Dupuy I") "challenge[d] the constitutionality of certain DCFS policies and procedures for investigating allegations of child abuse and neglect and for issuing `indicated' reports." Id. at 1092. In 2001, this court issued an opinion finding that certain DCFS policies did deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Specifically, the court found that Plaintiffs were deprived of their due process rights by DCFS's failure to consider any exculpatory evidence when indicating a report of abuse or neglect; by failing to provide indicated persons with adequate notice and the opportunity to contest the adverse finding; and by the disclosure of these procedurally deficient reports to licensing agencies and potential employers. Id. at 1134-40. After several months of negotiations between the parties, the court entered a preliminary injunction enforcing the substance of its 2001 opinion by mandating certain changes in DCFS practice. Dupuy v. McDonald, No. 97 C 4199, 2003 WL 21557911 (N.D.Ill. July 10, 2003). Both parties appealed that injunction order, but the Seventh Circuit largely affirmed it, extending its reach only by requiring that the amended processes be made available to persons seeking to enter the child-care field, as well. Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 512 (7th Cir.2005).

Plaintiffs now seek fees for the Dupuy I litigation. Previously, in 2004, this court awarded Plaintiffs interim attorney's fees for their work on Dupuy I, but the Seventh Circuit reversed that award on the ground that the claims were not yet finally resolved and Plaintiffs therefore were not "prevailing parties" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir.2005). In the fee petition now before the court, Plaintiffs initially sought more than $6.1 million in fees and $81,124.51 in costs. After Defendant filed his opposition, Plaintiffs agreed that certain line items were improperly included in their initial petition, and revised their requests downward to $5,892,826.10 in attorney's fees and $65,329.17 in related costs and expenses.1 Plaintiffs also claim they are entitled to interest on their fee award since the filing of their fee petition in 2007. Defendant objects in large part to these numbers, arguing that Plaintiffs are in fact entitled only to $1,803,590,56 in fees and $12,421.08 for costs and expenses. While the court sustains certain of Defendant's objections, the court nevertheless awards Plaintiffs the majority of the fees they have requested.

DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction

Defendant initially challenges this court's jurisdiction to rule upon Plaintiffs' fee petition. On March 9, 2007, the court entered an order declaring, "This case is terminated, but the court retains jurisdiction as provided by the parties' stipulation." (3/9/07 Minute Order [969].) In support of his argument that jurisdiction is nevertheless lacking, Defendant relies principally upon language in the Seventh Circuit's 2007 opinion affirming this court's dismissal of the Dupuy II claims. See Dupuy v. McEwen, 495 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2007). In that opinion, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that this court was attempting to retain "jurisdiction to enforce the stipulation" despite having dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 809. The Seventh Circuit recognized "that when a suit is dismissed with prejudice, it is gone, and the district court cannot adjudicate disputes arising out of the settlement that led to the dismissal merely by stating that it is retaining jurisdiction." Id. Defendant argues that in order for this court to reach the fee issue, the court would need to retain jurisdiction over a case it has already dismissed with prejudice, which it cannot do.

Plaintiffs contend that the Seventh Circuit did not clearly hold that the court's retention of jurisdiction in this case was improper. In order to retain jurisdiction over some provision of a settled case while at the same time foreclosing a repeat suit by the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit suggested an alternative procedure to dismissal with prejudice: "The obvious alternative . . . is for the court to dismiss without prejudice but the parties to include in the settlement a release of the defendant." Id. at 810 (citing Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.2006)). The Seventh Circuit noted that such a procedure was in fact followed in this case, as the stipulation approved by the court contained a release of the Defendant, "making dismissal with prejudice redundant." Dupuy, 495 F.3d at 810. Plaintiffs argue that this statement by the Seventh Circuit, that dismissal with prejudice was redundant since the stipulation released from liability for future claims, "meant that this court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Stipulation." (Pl.'s Protective Mot. [985] at 5-6.)

Should the court disagree with this analysis, Plaintiffs have also moved to amend the March 9, 2007 order pursuant to Rule 60(b) to clear up any ambiguity in that order. The Rule permits a court to

relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable . . . .

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Generally speaking, "relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances." Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1277 (7th Cir.1990)). In their reply brief, Plaintiffs also argue that they may be entitled to relief under Rule 60(a). That Rule permits the court to correct "a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment [or] order."2 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a). This provision is similar to Rule 60(b)(1); as the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[t]here is some overlap between Rule 60(a) and Rule 60(b)(1) for correcting errors . . . of oversight. . . ." Smith v. Peters, No. 89-3180, 1991 WL 100822, at *2 (7th Cir. June 10, 1991). "If the flaw lies in the translation of the original meaning to the judgment, then Rule 60(a) allows a correction; if the judgment captures the original meaning but is infected by error, then the parties must seek another source of authority to correct the mistake." United States v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1396-97 (7th Cir.1986).

The parties' dispute essentially comes down to this: does the "dismissal with prejudice" trump the court's purported retention of jurisdiction, or does the court's retention of jurisdiction demonstrate that the case was not actually dismissed with prejudice? Given the understanding of the parties as well as the court at the time the March 9 order was entered, the court concludes the latter interpretation must be correct. The March 9 order stated that "the court retains jurisdiction as provided by the parties' stipulation." The Stipulation, in turn, expressly preserves Plaintiffs' right to seek fees for Dupuy I in this court, and preserves Defendant's right to "contest the extent to which plaintiffs have prevailed and the amount and reasonableness of the attorneys' fees, expenses and costs." (Stipulation ¶ 18.) Other provisions of the Stipulation also contemplate that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Stipulation. For example, Paragraph 15 of the Stipulation states: "The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce plaintiffs' right to have in place such Rules, Procedures, notices and other written policies. . . ." The parties appeared to share the court's expectation, expressed in the March 9 order, that the court would retain jurisdiction after the termination of the litigation; specifically, the Stipulation states that, "except as...

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