Durakool, Inc. v. Mercury Displacements Industries, Inc., 3-1179A322

Decision Date29 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 3-1179A322,3-1179A322
Citation422 N.E.2d 680
PartiesDURAKOOL, INC., Appellant, v. MERCURY DISPLACEMENTS INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Appellees.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

David R. Melton, Thornburg, McGill, Deahl, Harman, Carey & Murray, South Bend, for appellant.

Vincent P. Campiti, May, Oberfell, Helling, Lorber, Campiti & Konopa, South Bend, for appellee Joseph Witcher.

STATON, Judge.

Durakool, Inc. filed an action against Mercury Displacement Industries, Inc. (Mercury), George H. Elenbaas, Ben Brewers and Joseph B. Witcher, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. After a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, made by both Durakool and Witcher, the court granted Witcher's motion and denied Durakool's motion for partial summary judgment. It found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact "with reference to the plaintiff's contentions as against the defendant, Joseph Witcher." Because Durakool's claims as to the other defendants remained pending, the court "certified" 1 its judgment as to Witcher.

On appeal, Durakool raises two issues for our consideration:

(1) Did the court err in its granting of Witcher's motion for summary judgment?

(2) Was the agreement between Durakool and Witcher a valid and enforceable restrictive covenant?

We affirm as to Counts I through VI and reverse and remand as to Count VII.

I. Summary Judgment

When reviewing the granting of a summary judgment, we may only look to see whether the trial court correctly applied the law and whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. Tekulve v. Turner (1979), Ind.App., 391 N.E.2d 673. The party seeking the summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and any doubt must be resolved against the movant. Ang v. Hospital Corp. of America (1979), Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 441. The evidentiary matters before the court are, therefore, construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tekulve, supra. Only if no issue as to any material fact is raised may the court grant a summary judgment. To defeat such a motion, the opposing party need only to show that a material fact is genuinely in issue. Brandon v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 177, 340 N.E.2d 756.

In the case at hand, Durakool vigorously argues that Counts I through V of its seven-count complaint set out five separate causes of action. Our reading of the complaint persuades us otherwise. In essence, Durakool charges Witcher 2 with conspiracy to commit and with the commission of acts which constitute unfair competition. 3 These charges are based upon the alleged appropriation of Durakool's confidential engineering drawings, data, secret processes and designs.

Initially, we note that there is no cause of action for conspiracy as such. The proper cause of action is for damage resulting from a conspiracy. Indianapolis Horse Patrol, Inc. v. Ward (1966), 247 Ind. 519, 217 N.E.2d 626; Miller v. Ortman (1956), 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17. A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more who, by a concerted action, seek to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some lawful purpose by unlawful means. Bottoms v. B. & M. Coal Corp. (1980), Ind.App., 405 N.E.2d 82, 90. If the complaint is to state a valid cause of action, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants conspired to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Indianapolis Horse Patrol, Inc., supra. Clearly, the actions of Brewers, Elenbaas and allegedly Witcher in the formation of Mercury Displacement Industries, Inc., 4 a company which manufactures mercury relays and switches, did not involve an unlawful purpose. There could be no unlawful purpose in their decision to form a company which would be in competition with Durakool for certain product lines.

The sole question, therefore, is whether they agreed to accomplish the lawful purpose of forming Mercury by unlawful means, i. e., the appropriation of confidential engineering drawings, data and secret processes belonging to Durakool. See Koehring Company v. National Automatic Tool Co. (Ind.S.D.1966), 257 F.Supp. 282, 290. We have reviewed the record and conclude that there is no evidence to support the claim that Witcher appropriated any trade secrets, confidential engineering drawings or design data. There is also no evidence to indicate that he encouraged others to do so.

Two of Mercury's founders were defendants Brewers and Elenbaas, both former employees of Durakool. Elenbaas, a registered electrical engineer, and Brewers, a sales manager, had been employed by Durakool for a number of years. Witcher, who had been employed as the company's general manager prior to his resignation, had no engineering background and knew nothing about the complexities of design engineering. As such, he was hardly in a position to knowledgeably disclose or encourage the disclosure of any trade secrets, confidential engineering drawings or secret design data to a third party or, for that matter, to Elenbaas and Brewers to benefit them in the development of Mercury. Witcher cannot be held chargeable with the knowledge that Elenbaas and Brewers had acquired during their lengthy employment with Durakool. We agree with the trial court that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact with reference to Durakool's claims that Witcher had conspired to commit or had committed unfair competition by the appropriation of "confidential engineering drawings and data and secret processes and designs." The summary judgment, therefore, as to Counts I through V was properly granted.

In Count VI, Durakool charges that Witcher has "intentionally interferred with business and contractual relationships between plaintiff and its customers" and has "attempted to induce and persuade customers of plaintiff to cease doing business with plaintiff." 5 We note that the tort of interference with contractual relationships by inducing a breach of contract has been recognized in Indiana. In order to recover under such an action, five essential elements must be proven: 1) existence of a valid and enforceable contract, 2) the defendant's knowledge of the existence of this contract, 3) the defendant's intentional inducement of a breach of the contract, 4) the absence of justification, and 5) damages resulting from the defendant's wrongful inducement of the breach. Monarch Indus., Etc. v. Model Coverall Service (1978), Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d 1098; Daly v. Nau (1975), 167 Ind.App. 541, 339 N.E.2d 71.

On appeal, Durakool complains that the court's granting of the summary judgment was in error because "there is no evidence of record with regard to the existence of a contract between Joy" one of Durakool's distributors "and Durakool." As such, the company claims, "it is patently obvious that the grant of summary judgment on Count VI is clearly premature." Despite its assertion to the contrary, there is evidence in the record regarding the relationship between Joy and Durakool. According to the retired president of Durakool, there was apparently no written contract involved in the establishment of the Joy account. He explained:

"Q. The Joy account, approximately when was that set up or established?

"A. I can't say that, but many years back."

"Q. And there was a contractual arrangement then set up between Durakool and Joy for the purpose of furnishing these time delay relays?

"A. I am not sure that we ever had a contract. I think we developed with them, and I don't think that there has ever been a contract. Now, there might have been.

"Q. In other words, you don't recollect anything in writing that "A. No.

"Q. A formal written agreement?

"A. No, I don't."

In its complaint, Durakool has impliedly alleged the existence of a contract in its allegations of tortious interference with business and contractual relationships. The existence of such a contract is not only refuted by the evidence, but unsupported as Durakool has failed to introduce any evidence of the very contract upon which its claim is based. The opponent of a motion for summary judgment may not rely upon the bare allegations made in the pleadings to avert judgment where the motion's proponent has established his entitlement to the requested relief. Ind. Rules of Civil Procedure, Trial Rule 56(E); Bell v. Horton (1980), Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 648. Because Durakool has failed to offer any evidence in opposition, as to the existence of the contract, to support its action for tortious interference with contractual relationships, we are persuaded that there was no error in the court's finding that there was no genuine issue as to the existence of the contract and in its granting of the summary judgment thereon.

II. Restrictive Covenant

In Count VII, Durakool charges Witcher with breaching the terms of a restrictive covenant. 6 Because it has failed to challenge the granting of the summary judgment as to Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the agreement in its motion to correct errors, Durakool has waived our consideration of any alleged errors therein. Krueger v. Bailey (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 665, 669. We will limit our discussion to Paragraphs 1 and 3. 7

On appeal, each party devotes a substantial portion of its brief to a discussion of the proper interpretation of the restrictive covenant. Both ask that we construe the covenant and make a determination as to the reasonableness of its terms. Each focuses upon the geographic limitations set forth in Paragraph 1 as being the key to its enforceability. 8 ] Witcher urges that the covenant should be declared void because it does not contain reasonable, definite, geographic limits. Failing our finding the agreement unenforceable, he then suggests that we consider it to be valid and urges that he is entitled to the summary judgment as there are no genuine issues of material fact. Durakool, of course, contends that the covenant is enforceable and claims that there are genuine issues of...

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