Durakovic v. Colvin, 3:12-CV-6 (FJS)

• Decision Date: 31 March 2014
• Docket Number: 3:12-CV-6 (FJS)
• Parties: MINA DURAKOVIC, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

MINA DURAKOVIC, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

3:12-CV-6 (FJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: March 31, 2014

APPEARANCES

HINMAN HOWARD &

KATTELL, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF REGIONAL GENERAL

COUNSEL - REGION II

Attorneys for Defendant

OF COUNSEL

JACQUELINE A. BAIN, ESQ.

JEREMY A. LINDEN, ESQ.

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 8,10.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income benefits and a period of disability and disability insurance under Title XVI and Title II of the Social Security Act, respectively. See Dkt. No. 6, Administrative Record ("AR") at 123-35. The Social Security Administration denied these applications by Notice of Disapproved Claim, dated April 15, 2010. See id. at 45-46, 48-53. On April 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge to challenge the denial. See id. at 54-55.

On March 9, 2011, Plaintiff appeared in Binghamton, New York, for a hearing via video conferencing before Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Tielens ("ALJ"), who conducted the hearing in Syracuse, New York. See id. at 11, 29. Also present were Plaintiff's attorney, Eugene Faughnan, Mr. Filan, an interpreter, and Lorraine Perez, a hearing monitor. See id. at 29. By decision dated May 29, 2011, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's applications for a period of disability, disability insurance, and Supplemental Security Income benefits. See id. at 8-26.

In reaching his decision, the ALJ made the following findings.

1. Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011.

2. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 21, 2008, the alleged onset date.

3. Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic right knee pain s/p arthroscopy; carpal tunnel syndrome of the left wrist; and chronic left shoulder pain s/p injury.

4. Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), with the exception of occasional overhead reaching with the left

upper extremity.

6. Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a machine operator.

7. Plaintiff was born on October 17, 1971, and was thirty-seven years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.

8. Plaintiff has a limited education and is able to communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because Plaintiff's past relevant work is unskilled.

10. Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform.

See AR at 13-19.

Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 21, 2008, through May 19, 2011, the date of the ALJ's decision. See AR at 19-20.

By letter dated July 19, 2011, Plaintiff made a timely request to the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration to review the ALJ's decision. See id. at 220-29. By Notice of Appeals Council Action, dated November 4, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. See id. at 1-6.

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking review of Defendant's final decision. See Dkt. No. 1. In support of her motion, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ failed to develop the administrative record and that this constituted reversible error. See Dkt. No. 8 at 7-8 (citations omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that the ALJ had failed to request opinions regardingher RFC from treating sources. See id. at 8. Furthermore, she contended that the ALJ had summarily dismissed the opinion of Dr. Ellison, as well as the opinions of the independent medical examiners for her worker's compensation carrier. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

1. Correct legal principles and substantial evidence

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court employs a two-prong test. First, the court must decide if the ALJ applied the correct legal principles. See Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation and other citation omitted).

The court must determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards because

[w]here there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.

Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).

Accordingly, the court will not uphold an ALJ's decision if it is based on an erroneous view of the law. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).

If the court determines that the ALJ applied the correct legal principles, the court mustthen decide whether "substantial evidence" supports the ALJ's findings. See Johnson, 817 F.2d at 985 (citation omitted); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). "Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "'more than a mere scintilla,'" defined as "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ's conclusion. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). If there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings, the court must sustain those findings "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In other words, the court must afford the ALJ's determination considerable deference and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

2. Five-step determination of disability

To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must show that she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuousperiod of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, a claimant's

[p]hysical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. . . .

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

In evaluating disability claims, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process:

First, the [ALJ] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [ALJ] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [ALJ] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience[.] . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [ALJ] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. "[T]he claimant bears the burden of proving disability at the first four steps." Berry, 675 F.2d at 467. If the claimant meets his burden, then the Commissioner has the burden of proof at the fifth step. See id.

B. Whether the ALJ failed to develop the record

In light of the remedial purpose underlying the Social Security Act and the non-adversarial nature of the administrative proceedings, an ALJ is under an obligation not only to develop a claimant's...