Duran v. Lollis
| Decision Date | 19 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-01580-DAD-SAB |
| Parties | JOHN DURAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN LOLLIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND CONTINUING INITIAL SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
John Duran ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action against John Lollis and the City of Porterville ("Defendants") alleging he has been deprived of his right to vote and to run for public office. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.
On November 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action alleging violation of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965; and denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.) The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 8, 9-6.)
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on January 7, 2019. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on January 22, 2019. (ECF No. 12.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him the right to run as a write-in candidate in the November 6, 2018 election. (Compl. 2,1 ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff had previously filed suit in state court against Defendants alleging unconstitutional at-large elections practices. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a joint stipulation in case no. VCU 271986 and judgment was entered on December 19, 2017. (Compl. 3.) The parties' stipulation included an agreement that the Defendants would convert to a by-district voting system. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff contends that around mid-August 2018 the members of the Porterville City Counsel violated the agreement by appointing a sitting at-large councilman to represent the newly created 2nd District of the City of Porterville without providing proper notice to all registered voters of the 2nd District. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff was denied the ability to participate in the race for City Council. (Compl. 4.)
Plaintiff placed numerous phone calls to the City Clerk's Office and County Elections Office inquiring as to the date to pick up nomination forms to exercise his right to seek public office. (Compl. 5.) The City Council appointed the councilman to the 2nd District seat at a regular city council meeting after asking those in attendance if anyone present had an interest in running for the seat. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. (Compl. 7.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that a complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovingparty." Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require " 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. To avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, the Ninth Circuit has found that two principles apply. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth the allegations in the complaint "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, so that it is not unfair to require the defendant to be subjected to the expenses associated with discovery and continued litigation, the factual allegations of the complaint, which are taken as true, must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. "Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)).
Any party may move for summary judgment, and the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. . .." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit in federal court because he has not suffered an injury in fact. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff's claims in this action are nonjusticiable because they require this court to adjudicate political questions that are best suitedto legislative action. Defendants further assert that they properly filed the legislative vacancy by appointment in lieu of an election pursuant to California law. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's federal voting rights claim on the ground that he has not pled any of the prima facie elements of the claim.
Plaintiff counters that Defendants cannot dispute that his voting rights were violated. Plaintiff argues that he does have standing to assert his rights in this action. Plaintiff contends that the mandates of 52 U.S.C. § 10101 require that citizens are entitled to and must be allowed to vote in elections regardless of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have conspired to use and abuse the system of district voting for their own purposes and by appointing a councilman to the seat they discriminated against non-English speaking voters and citizens. Plaintiff argues that the city officials should do everything possible to provide the best information to uphold the citizen's constitutional rights.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff has not alleged an injury in fact to provide him with standing. Defendants contend that Plaintiff is seeking to assert the rights of all voters. Defendants argue that Plaintiff sets forth a generalized grievance and, while purporting that he was denied the ability to run for a city council seat, the gravamen of the compliant is that all voters were disenfranchised when an appointment was made for the open seat.
Plaintiff counters that he does have standing to seek damages. Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not adequately inform the public of their intent to circumvent and steal the election of 2018 under the newly settled voting system and discriminated against non-English speaking voters and citizens.
a. Standing Legal Standard
Standing derives "[f]rom Article III's limitation of the judicial power to resolving 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' and the separation-of-powers principles underlying that...
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