Durant v. Department of Educ.

• Citation: 15 Ed. Law Rep. 911,342 N.W.2d 591,129 Mich.App. 517
• Decision Date: 15 December 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 63901
• Parties: Donald DURANT, Leander Picard, Jack Kennedy, Hilary Kutella, Douglas Holbrook, Verna Rasmussen, Edward Rishavy, and the Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Department of Management and Budget, and State Treasurer, Defendants. 129 Mich.App. 517, 342 N.W.2d 591, 15 Ed. Law Rep. 911
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 591

342 N.W.2d 591

Donald DURANT, Leander Picard, Jack Kennedy, Hilary Kutella Douglas Holbrook, Verna Rasmussen, Edward Rishavy and the Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Department of Management and Budget, and State Treasurer, Defendants.

Docket No. 63901.

129 Mich.App. 517, 342 N.W.2d 591, 15 Ed. Law Rep. 911

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 22, 1982.

Decided Oct. 10, 1983.

Released for Publication Dec. 15, 1983.

[129 MICHAPP 520] Clark, Hardy, Lewis, Fine & Pollard, P.C. by Dennis R. Pollard and Gary Pollack, Birmingham, for plaintiffs.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen. and Gerald F. Young and James E. Riley, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and CAVANAGH and MacKENZIE, JJ.

[129 MICHAPP 521] CAVANAGH, Judge (On Remand).

Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the defendants to fund the Fitzgerald Public Schools in the same proportion as those schools were funded in the fiscal year 1978-1979, pursuant to the so-called Headlee Amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Secs. 25-34. We denied mandamus on the basis that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies because they had not presented their claims to the local governmental claims review board under M.C.L. Sec. 21.240; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3194(610). Durant v. Dep't of Education, 110 Mich.App. 351, 313 N.W.2d 571 (1981). The Michigan Supreme Court in lieu of granting leave to appeal reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, instructing us to consider the merits of the case since the plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to our resolution of the legal issues involved. Durant v. Dep't of Education, 413 Mich. 862, 317 N.W.2d 854 (1982).

Plaintiffs allege that the reduction in state funding to the Fitzgerald School District violated the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution, Const.1963, art. 9, Secs. 25-34, especially Sec. 29, which reads:

"The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency or units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18." (Emphasis added.)

[129 MICHAPP 522] Under the foregoing section, the state must continue to finance, at least at the same level, whatever portion of a state-mandated service or activity the state was financing for units of local government at the time the Headlee Amendment went into effect, i.e., December 22, 1978. School districts are defined as units of local government by Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 33. See also M.C.L. Sec. 21.233(5); M.S.A. Sec. 5.3194(603)(5).

Thus, we must decide the following issues: (1) whether "education" is an existing activity or service required of school districts by state law, within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment, (2) whether the costs that the plaintiffs seek to have the state pay are "necessary costs" of what the school district is required to provide, and (3) whether we should grant the writ of mandamus and compel the defendants to finance any such necessary costs.

We begin by noting that this is a case of first impression, requiring an interpretation of a constitutional amendment without significant precedential guidance. We are aided in our interpretation by M.C.L. Sec. 21.231 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3194(601) et seq., an act passed by the Legislature in 1979 to implement Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 29, which is that portion of the Headlee Amendment most pertinent to this case. However, although the interpretation of constitutional provisions by the Legislature is entitled to weight in determining the proper construction of those provisions, it is well established that such interpretations are not controlling. The interpretation derived from established rules of constitutional construction must ultimately decide the issue. Smith v. Auditor General, 165 Mich. 140, 144, 130 N.W. 557 (1911); Reed v. Civil Service Comm., 301 Mich. 137, 3 N.W.2d 41 (1942). Therefore, as [129 MICHAPP 523] Justice Williams stated in Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 405, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971):

"The primary rule [of constitutional construction] is the rule of 'common understanding' described by Justice Cooley:

" 'A constitution is made for the people and by the people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. * * * (Cooley's Const Lim 81)' (Emphasis added.) * * *

"A second rule is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered."

With respect to the first issue we must decide, the plaintiffs basically argue that education is a constitutionally-mandated service which this state must provide for its citizens and that, in order to discharge this duty, the state created state agencies called "school districts" which are required to provide for the education of those students within their jurisdiction. See Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 1 and Sec. 2, School Code of 1976, M.C.L. Sec. 380.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 15.4001 et seq., and Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289 (1902). Although the school districts have wide discretion to manage their own affairs, the plaintiffs argue that their activities are still required by state law and thus the financing requirements set forth in Sec. 29 of the Headlee Amendment are applicable.

We agree with the plaintiffs that not only is it the policy of this state to encourage the cause of education but the state is also required by the constitution to provide some form of education. Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 2 provides in part:

[129 MICHAPP 524] "The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin."

We further agree with the plaintiffs' contention that, despite Michigan's system of decentralized public education which gives the local school districts broad discretionary authority over the educational process, school districts are still carrying out a delegated duty to provide the citizens of this state with an educational program. As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Lansing School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 367 Mich. 591, 595, 116 N.W.2d 866 (1962):

"Control of our public school system is a State matter delegated and lodged in the State legislature by the Constitution. The policy of the State has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies organized with plenary powers to carry out the delegated functions given to it by the legislature."

However, the fact that the state has delegated to local school districts its constitutional duty to provide education does not result in the conclusion that all the functions performed by a school district are required by state law within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment. The problem with the plaintiffs' argument is that they have misconstrued the term "state law" and have erroneously assumed that the term encompasses both legislative enactments and administrative regulations as well as the state's constitution. It is based on this assumption that the plaintiffs have made the foregoing argument that school boards are merely agents of the state, fulfilling the state's constitutional[129 MICHAPP 525] obligation to provide an educational program, and thus that the state should continue to finance that program at the same level it was financing it at the time the Headlee Amendment went into effect.

We disagree with the plaintiffs' contention that the term "state law", as used in Sec. 29 of the Headlee Amendment, encompasses the state's constitutional requirements. The Legislature defined the term as:

"(4) 'State law' means a state statute or state agency rule * * *." M.C.L. Sec. 21.234; M.S.A. Sec. 5.3194(604).

Furthermore, to interpret the term "state law" to include the constitution would be inconsistent with the plain language of Sec. 29 and with the intent behind those who ratified the amendment. The plain language of Sec. 29 specifically refers only to the acts of the Legislature and regulations of state agencies when it discusses "state law". The intent behind those who ratified the Headlee Amendment was to prevent the state Legislature from enacting ever-increasing state laws and regulations which created financial burdens on local units of government, unaccompanied by any financial support to alleviate those burdens. By specifically enacting Sec. 29, the voters sent two messages to the state Legislature: (1) if the state Legislature required local units of government to provide a certain activity or service and the state was financing a certain portion of the necessary costs of that activity or service, the state could not reduce its share of the necessary costs after Sec. 29 became effective, and (2) if the state Legislature wanted to pass a new law or regulation which either required local units of government to provide a new activity or service, or to provide an increased level in an [129 MICHAPP 526] existing required activity or service, the state was required to pay for any resulting increased costs which were necessary for the...