Durant v. Saturn Corporation, No. M2003-00566-WC-R3-CV (Tenn. 4/30/2004)

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: John A. Turnbull
• Decision Date: 30 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. M2003-00566-WC-R3-CV.,M2003-00566-WC-R3-CV.
• Citation: Durant v. Saturn Corporation, No. M2003-00566-WC-R3-CV (Tenn. 4/30/2004) (Tenn. 2004)
• Parties: Brian Durant v. Saturn Corporation.

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

Brian Durant v. Saturn Corporation.

No. M2003-00566-WC-R3-CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, at Nashville.

December 17, 2003 Session.

Mailed February 26, 2004.

Filed April 30, 2004.

A Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court of Williamson County; No. 27700; The Honorable Chancellor Russ Heldman.

Judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and case is remanded.

Larry R. Williams and A. Allen Smith, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant, Brian Durant.

Thomas H. Peebles, IV, Tennessee, for Appellee, Saturn Corporation.

John A. Turnbull, Sp. J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Frank Drowota C.J., and Howell N. Peoples, Sp. J., joined.

Opinion

JOHN A. TURNBULL, Sp. Judge.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-225(e)(3) to hear and report to the Supreme Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Employee brought this action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident on employer's premises after leaving the plant, but before arriving at the control gate to the Saturn complex. The trial court held that the injuries did not arise out of the employment and granted Saturn's Rule 41 motion to dismiss. We reverse the trial court and hold that the premises rule announced in Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., includes roads provided by the employer inside the access gate to the employer's industrial complex. We further hold that the injury arose out of the employment. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our holdings.

This case requires us to interpret the "premises rule" laid down in Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989) as extended by the Supreme Court in Copeland v. Leaf, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1992). To be compensable under our workers' compensation statute, an injury must be one "arising out of and in the course of employment." T.C.A. 50-6-102(a)(5) (1991). In Lollar, the Supreme Court examined the substantial body of case law governing workers' compensation liability when an employee is injured en route to or from work, and concluded that the previous set of guidelines as set down in Woods v. Warren, 548 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1977) "had not proved workable" and had resulted in inequities. Lollar at p. 150. The court re-evaluated its previous adherence to the "unique minority rule" and instead adopted a premises liability standard employed by nearly all jurisdictions, see 1 Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 15.11 (1994). The Supreme Court held "that a worker who is on the employer's premises coming to or going from the actual work place is acting in the course of employment [and] that if the employer has provided a parking area for its employees, that parking area is part of the employer's premises regardless of whether the lot is also available to customers or the general public." 767 S.W.2d at 150. In Copeland, the Supreme Court extended the holding in Lollar and held "that employees who must cross a public way that bisects an employer's premises and who are injured on that public way while traveling a direct route between an employer's plant facility and parking lot are entitled to workers' compensation benefits." Copeland, 829 S.W.2d, at 144. The court in Copeland pointed out that the employer was responsible for creating the necessity for the employee to encounter the particular hazards of the trip between a non-contiguous parking lot and the working plant itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court felt that an extension of the "premises rule" announced in Lollar was warranted. Id.

Facts and Procedural Background

Saturn maintains an industrial complex in Maury County where the corporation assembles Saturn motor vehicles. Saturn built and maintains roads in the complex leading from the entrance gate to the work plant. Saturn had posted a thirty-five mile speed limit on Ephlin Parkway as a safety regulation.

On December 5, 2000, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Brian Durant was leaving work from the power train plant, one of three main plant locations in the Saturn complex. Although Saturn had constructed other roads over which Durant could have traveled to reach the main Saturn gate and the public highway (U.S. 31), he chose to go his normal shortest route along Ephlin Parkway, one of the main traffic arteries within the complex. Durant, who had worked at Saturn for more than eight years, was traveling at what he described as the normal speed for traffic over the four lane paved road. He described the normal flow of traffic as exceeding the posted speed regulation by fifteen to twenty-five miles per hour (50 to 60 m.p.h.). Durant indicated there were two cars ahead of him, one of which was in the same lane ahead of Durant's Corvette. He testified he was not catching up to either vehicle, but was maintaining his distance. Just after passing Brown Hall Street, another street in the Saturn complex, and after negotiating a gentle curve, Durant lost traction, spun almost 180 degrees and left the road, flipping three times, and jumping a six foot ditch. Although Durant acknowledged that his speed was a contributing factor in his crash, he initially reported his accident as "due to road and weather conditions [with] no guardrail at point of steep embankment." He further indicated that previous experience had shown the pavement to be slippery and that "geese were all over the place." Durant had never been issued a citation for speeding and indicated Saturn did not attempt to enforce the posted speed limit. In fact, Durant testified he had, on one or two occasions, attempted to drive the 35 m.p.h. speed limit, but that during the attempts he had two or three "near misses" because the normal flow of traffic so far exceeded that posted speed limit. Durant opined that it was sad, but it was impossible to follow the 35 m.p.h. speed limit. Saturn's counsel conceded "It's on Saturn's premises. Saturn doesn't have the power to cite people. They have to discipline them when they're found speeding. . . It's basically a safety regulation."

At the close of plaintiff's proof, the defendant employer made an oralTennessee Rules of Civil Procedure rule 41.02(2) motion to dismiss. For the purpose of the motion, Saturn admitted there was proof the plaintiff was on the Saturn premises leaving work and therefore in the course of employment. Instead, Saturn insisted that plaintiff had failed to prove any cause for his accident other than speeding. Saturn insisted that since Durant's speeding was the only cause Durant could point to as a specific cause of the accident, there was no relationship between the work and the accident . There was no rational connection between the accident and Durant's work duties. Accordingly, Saturn argued Durant's injuries did not arise out of his employment. In argument, plaintiff's attorney acknowledged that speeding was a significant contributing factor in causing the accident.

The trial judge granted Saturn's motion to dismiss holding:

The Court is of the opinion that the motion should be sustained, and that with all due respect, under the law that plaintiff has not shown a right to relief in this case. The Court first finds that even though it's not advanced, the Court relies upon the evidence in the statements of counsel for the plaintiff and does find that the evidence amounts to willful misconduct as that term is defined by law. The speeding which was a substantial factor in leading to the injury was done intentionally. It was a wrongful act. It was a purposeful violation of what was communicated to the worker by the employer in this case, and under all the circumstances, the Court considers that there is an element of perverseness in doing that. Now, the Court does not need to make its finding based upon that. The Court does find the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that the injury arose out of this workers' employment, and that is the prong of the definition the Court is focused on. The Court also finds that the actions of Mr. Durant, with all due respect to Mr. Durant, did involve, quote, an added element of peril, quote closed, if it's necessary for the Court to do that. [emphasis added].

Scope of Review/Grant of Motion to Dismiss

A non-jury case may be dismissed at the close of plaintiff's proof if the facts which have been presented by plaintiff show no right to relief under the law. Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 41.02(2). The trial judge must impartially weigh and evaluate the evidence and determine the facts in the same manner as required if the judge were making findings of fact at the conclusion of all the evidence. See, City of Columbia v. C.F.W. Const. Co., 557 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1977); Adkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). The trial judge must then apply the law to the facts found, and, if the plaintiff's case has not been made out by a preponderance of the evidence the trial judge may, at that time, render judgment against the plaintiff. See Columbia, 557 S.W.2d at 740 and Adkins 823 S.W.2d 547.

Since, on motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's proof, the trial judge is to weigh the evidence, the trial court's factual findings are subject to our de novo review upon the record. As mandated by Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 13[d], there is a presumption that those findings of fact are correct, and we must honor that presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). When a trial judge has seen and heard a witness's testimony, we give considerable deference to the trial court's finding of credibility and the weight to be given that testimony. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992). We must then determine...