Durden v. State

Citation18 Ala.App. 498,93 So. 342
Decision Date11 April 1922
Docket Number4 Div. 761. [*]
PartiesDURDEN v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Geneva County; H. A. Pearce, Judge.

Lige Durden, alias Elijah Durden, and others, were indicted for murder in the first degree, and upon severance and separate trial said Durden was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

In murder prosecution, refusal to charge on manslaughter was proper, there being no evidence raising the issue.

The following charges were refused to the defendant:

(1) "I charge you that you cannot find this defendant guilty as an aider or abettor of the killing of Alto Windham, if he gave no assistance, and uttered no words to the person or persons doing the killing, if the defendant was not present by preconcert, special or general, in person, with the knowledge of the persons doing the killing, with the intent to aid them, unless he actually took part in the killing itself."

(2) "A principal in the first degree is one whose unlawful acts or omissions caused the death of the victim without the intervention of any responsible agent, and you cannot convict the defendant Lige Durden under the evidence in this case of being a principal in the first degree."

(3) "The jury cannot convict the defendant of being a principal in the first degree in or about the killing of the deceased."

(4) "A principal in the second degree is one who was actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime aiding or abetting therein, but not directly causing the death."

(5) "The jury cannot convict this defendant of actually or constructively being present at the scene of the killing of Alto Windham, aiding or abetting therein, and hence the jury cannot convict the defendant under the evidence in this case of being a principal in the second degree."

(6) "The jury cannot convict this defendant under the evidence in this case of being a principal in the second degree for the killing of Alto Windham, the deceased."

(7) "The jury under the evidence in this case must acquit the defendant of being a principal in the first or a principal of the second degree in the killing of Alto Windham."

(8) "An accessory before the fact is one who has conspired with the actual perpetrator to convict the homicide, or some other unlawful act that would naturally in a homicide, or who have procured, instigated, encouraged, or advised him to commit it, but who was neither actually nor constructively present when it was committed."

(9) "Unless you believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the defendant Lige Durden entered into a conspiracy to take the life of or do bodily harm to Alto Windham, the deceased, or that he aided and abetted in the killing of Alto Windham, then your verdict should be not guilty, although you believe from the evidence that he was present at the time and place of the killing, with the intent or purpose in his mind to assist or aid in the killing if the necessity arose."

(12) "If you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant went to the sawmill on the car with Dan Whitehead the deceased, and others, without any prior conspiracy although you believe from the evidence that the defendant had knowledge of a purpose and intent on the part of the others to kill Alto Windham, and even that the defendant approved of its commission, yet you cannot convict the defendant in this case unless you further believe from the evidence that such approval of the defendant was communicated to the persons who actually killed Alto Windham."

(13) "If you believe from the evidence in this case that the act of the defendant in going to the sawmill in the car with deceased and others is all the evidence to connect the defendant with the common design, then you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this act or acts encouraged, aided, or abetted some of those engaged in the common design to kill Alto Windham, before you can find the defendant guilty as charged."

(14) "You must believe beyond all reasonable doubt that the act or acts of the defendant in going to the sawmill in the car with the deceased and some of the others in the common design to kill the deceased, if you find there was such common design to kill the deceased, must have resulted in encouraging, instigating, inciting, advising, or counseling some of said persons in the common design to kill the deceased before these acts can operate to the prejudice of the defendant in this case."

(15) "The gravamen of the offense charged is the 'intent to murder Alto Windham,' and if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant at the time he went in the automobile with the deceased and others to the sawmill did not know of any common design or purpose to kill Alto Windham, or other unlawful assault on him, then you must find the defendant not guilty."

(16) "If you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant Durden, when he reached the sawmill with the deceased and the others in the automobile, abandoned any purpose or common design to assault or kill Alto Windham, and his associates were notified of his withdrawal by his leaving the mill or millyard and not going down in the swamp at the scene of the killing, then you cannot convict the defendant, although you may further believe from the evidence that the defendant had previously conspired with the others to kill the deceased, Alto Windham."

(D) "Unless the jury believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that there was a conspiracy between the defendant Durden and the other defendants jointly indicted with him to kill, greatly injure, the deceased, before the deceased was carried down into the swamp away from the mill, or millyard, you cannot convict the defendant."

(24) Defining manslaughter in the first degree, and directing a finding of guilt in that degree if the jury believed it justified by the evidence.

Farmer, Merrill & Farmer, of Dothan, for appellant.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MERRITT J.

The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree, convicted for murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 15 years.

No matter what our opinion may be, in reference to the legality of the grand jury that found and returned the indictment against the defendant, and whether the defendant can here raise these questions by plea in abatement, we are precluded from a consideration thereof by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babe Whitehead v. State, 90 So. 351. This court is bound by the ruling of the Supreme Court.

The defendant complains at the ruling of the trial court in permitting the state to ask the state's witness Collins on redirect examination the following question:

"Was there anything said there in the presence of the defendant with reference to this man [deceased] being a negro or white man, or being kin to anybody?"

On cross-examination of this witness, he had detailed what had been said and done there, when the defendant and others had come up, and that he had word "from defendant that the man he wanted stopped was a yellow negro, and I took deceased to be a yellow negro at the time and stopped him." In the light of what the defendant had brought out on cross-examination this testimony was competent, moreover, it was clearly a part of the res gestæ.

Some eight or nine persons were jointly indicted for the killing of deceased, among them being the defendant, Dan Whitehead Babe Whitehead, and others. The state insisted that the defendants formed a mob, and that, while some did the actual shooting, the killing was the result of a conspiracy entered into by the defendant and the parties that did the shooting to take the life of the deceased, or that the defendant either aided, abetted, encouraged, invited, or furthered the enterprise, that is the killing of the deceased, either by words, acts, or by conduct on his part, of such a nature or character as was calculated to and intended to bring about, or cause the procurement of the death of deceased. There was evidence offered by the state tending to show this was true. It was therefore competent, as tending to bear out the state's contentions of such a common design, for the state to show what was said by Dan Whitehead to the deceased, at the house of Collins on the afternoon of the day that deceased was killed. These sayings, separate and apart, might seem immaterial and unimportant, but as circumstances taken together they may have been...

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11 cases
  • Smith v. State, 94-245
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • August 31, 1995
    ...cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972); Moore v. State, 539 So.2d 416 (Ala.Crim.App.1988); Durden v. State, 93 So. 342 (Ala.Ct.App.1922), cert. denied, Ex parte Durden, 208 Ala. 697, 93 So. 922 (1922); Lesieurs v. State, 170 Ark. 560, 280 S.W. 9 (1926); State v. Mu......
  • Moore v. State, 8 Div. 930
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 20, 1988
    ...res gestae. Statements made by a co-conspirator within the res gestae of the crime are admissible against the defendant. Durden v. State, 18 Ala.App. 498, 93 So. 342, cert. denied, Ex parte Durden, 208 Ala. 697, 93 So. 922 (1922). The record reveals that the evidence in the case sub judice ......
  • Kilpatrick v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • August 28, 1973
    ...and at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication, is a part of the res gestae.' Durden v. State, 18 Ala.App. 498, 93 So. 342; Lancaster v. State, 21 Ala.App. 140, 106 So. 609; Cline v. State, 25 Ala.App. 433, 148 So. 172; Largin v. State, 20 Ala.App. 610, 104......
  • Leverett v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 1922
    ...... as against any conspirators except those by whom or in whose. presence such statements were made"-the obvious reason. being that statements made, or acts done, during the pendency. of the conspiracy are a part of the res gestæ and when made. afterwards they are not. Durden v. State (Ala. App.). 93 So. 342 (4 Div. 761); McAnally v. State, 74 Ala. 9; Johnson v. State, 87 Ala. 39, 6 So. 400;. Hunter v. State, 112 Ala. 77, 21 So. 65. . . . Therefore the acts and declarations of McArdle long after the. consummation of the common purpose, not in the ......
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