Durden v. State, (No. 5077.)

CourtGeorgia Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtHILL
Citation131 S.E. 496,161 Ga. 537
PartiesDURDEN. v. STATE.
Decision Date13 January 1926
Docket Number(No. 5077.)
161 Ga. 537

131 S.E. 496

DURDEN.
v.
STATE.

(No. 5077.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 13, 1926.


(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Savannah; John Rourke, Jr., Judge.

W. D. Durden was convicted of permitting dancing on a pavilion under his control on Sunday, and he brings error. Affirmed.

McIntire, Walsh & Bernstein, of Savannah, for plaintiff in error.

Walter C. Hartridge, Sol. Gen., and Saml. B. Adams, both of Savannah, for the State.

HILL, J. The Legislature of Georgia passed an act which was approved August 8, 1925 (Acts 1925, p. 339), and is as follows:

"An act to prohibit dancing at any public place in Georgia on the Lord's Day, commonly known as Sunday.

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Georgia, that dancing at any public place in the state of Georgia on the Lord's Day, commonly known as Sunday, be and the same is hereby prohibited.

"Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that the owner, proprietor, manager, agent, lessee, or tenant, of any public place in Georgia who shall permit dancing at such public place on the Lord's Day, commonly known as Sunday, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punishable under the terms and provisions of section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia,

"Sec 3. Be it further enacted, that all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act be and the same are hereby repealed."

W. D. Durden was accused in six counts, as the owner, proprietor, manager, lessee, agent, or tenant of the Durden-Powell Pavilion, a public place upon the island of Tybee, of permitting dancing upon such pavilion on Sunday, August 9, 1925, in violation of the act above set out. To this accusation the defendant filed his demurrer on the following grounds:

"(1) That said accusation does not charge said Wm. D. Durden with any offense against the laws of the state of Georgia. (2) That said accusation, and each and every count thereof, being based upon the Act of the General Assembly of Georgia, approved by the

[131 S.E. 497]

Governor of the state of Georgia upon the 8th day of August, 1925, charges no offense against the laws of the state of Georgia, the said act being unconstitutional, null, and void, for the following reasons: (a) That said act is violative of article 3, § 7, par. 8, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia, as codified in section 6437 of 1910 Code of the state of Georgia, as follows: 'No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.' (b) That section 2 of said act is in violation of article 3, § 7, par. 8, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia, as codified in section 6437 of 1910 Code of Georgia, in that said section contains matter different from that expressed in the title of said act; the language of the caption being [as set out above], and shows that this language does not indicate any purpose to make the owner, agent, or lessee, etc., of such place guilty of a state offense, and that the second section of said act contains matter different from that expressed in the title thereof. (c) That said act in question is further null and void as being violative of the definition of a misdemeanor as contained in section 31 of the Penal Code of Georgia, as follows: 'A crime or misdemeanor shall consist in a violation of a public law, in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence'—and shows that the permission of the owner, proprietor, manager, etc., of a public place for dancing, as set forth in section 2 of said act. does not constitute a 'union or joint operation of act and intention' and therefore not a misdemeanor."

The court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant excepted.

We are of the opinion that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer on each and all of the grounds thereof. This act refers to but one subject-matter, viz. the prohibiting of dancing at a public place on the Lord's Day, commonly known as Sunday. There is no reference in the caption or in the body of the act to any other subject except the prevention of dancing at a public place on the Lord's Day, commonly known as Sunday. See Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 794 (6), 820 (6), 40 S. E. 857. In Stanley v. State, 135 Ga. 859, 864, 70 S. E. 591, it was held:

"The Act of the General Assembly, approved August 2 [22], 1907 (Acts 1907, p. 121), entitled 'An act to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in certain narcotic drugs, and to regulate the sale thereof, ' is not unconstitutional on the ground that it violates that portion of article 3, § 7, par. 8, of the Constitution of this state, which provides that 'no law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, ' because 'said act refers to more than one subject-matter, in this, that its object, as stated in the title thereof, is to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in certain narcotic drugs and to regulate the sale thereof, and in addition to said object said act seeks to...

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4 practice notes
  • Pittman v. Pittman, No. 14564.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • July 8, 1943
    ...based upon facts wholly different from those in the present case: Wood v. Rice, 143 Ga. 647, 650, 85 S.E. 838; Drake v. Drake, 161 Ga. 87, 131 S.E. 496; Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S.E. 654; Evans v. Pennington, 180 Ga. 488, 179 S.E. 123; Brown v. Carmichael, 152 Ga. 353(5), 110 S.E. ......
  • Leontas v. Walker, (No. 6120.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • April 16, 1928
    ...impure milk as referred to in. the ordinance; so that, in substance, the ordinance only involves one subject-matter. See Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 540, 131 S. E. 496, and citations. The exact question ruled above was not involved in the case of Davis v. Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S. E. 6......
  • Copeland v. Leathers, No. 16874.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 17, 1949
    ...to more than one subject-matter, or as containing matter different from that expressed in its title." See also Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 131 S.E. 496; Holland v. State, 155 Ga. 795, 799, 118 S.E, 203; Fite v. Henson, 157 Ga. 679, 688, 122 S.E. 412; Maner v. State, 181 Ga. 254(1), 2......
  • Bd. Of Com'rs Of Kettle Creek Drainage Dist v. Mun. Sec. Corp. Of Chicago, (No. 4695.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • January 25, 1926
    ...for interlocutory relief should not be granted; and for process. The petition was sworn to by an attorney in fact. It was not alleged, [131 S.E. 496]nor was it shown by the affidavit of any competent person, that the sale would take place or that there would be any injury to the property if......
4 cases
  • Pittman v. Pittman, No. 14564.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • July 8, 1943
    ...based upon facts wholly different from those in the present case: Wood v. Rice, 143 Ga. 647, 650, 85 S.E. 838; Drake v. Drake, 161 Ga. 87, 131 S.E. 496; Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S.E. 654; Evans v. Pennington, 180 Ga. 488, 179 S.E. 123; Brown v. Carmichael, 152 Ga. 353(5), 110 S.E. ......
  • Leontas v. Walker, (No. 6120.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • April 16, 1928
    ...impure milk as referred to in. the ordinance; so that, in substance, the ordinance only involves one subject-matter. See Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 540, 131 S. E. 496, and citations. The exact question ruled above was not involved in the case of Davis v. Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S. E. 6......
  • Copeland v. Leathers, No. 16874.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 17, 1949
    ...to more than one subject-matter, or as containing matter different from that expressed in its title." See also Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 131 S.E. 496; Holland v. State, 155 Ga. 795, 799, 118 S.E, 203; Fite v. Henson, 157 Ga. 679, 688, 122 S.E. 412; Maner v. State, 181 Ga. 254(1), 2......
  • Bd. Of Com'rs Of Kettle Creek Drainage Dist v. Mun. Sec. Corp. Of Chicago, (No. 4695.)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • January 25, 1926
    ...for interlocutory relief should not be granted; and for process. The petition was sworn to by an attorney in fact. It was not alleged, [131 S.E. 496]nor was it shown by the affidavit of any competent person, that the sale would take place or that there would be any injury to the property if......

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