Durkin v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen

Decision Date10 June 1936
Docket Number28.
Citation185 A. 322,170 Md. 562
PartiesDURKIN v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; George A. Solter Judge.

Action by Frank L. Durkin against the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL SHEHAN, and JOHNSON, JJ.

Charles E. Moylan and Wilfred T. McQuaid, both of Baltimore (Michael Paul Smith, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Michael J. Manley, of Baltimore (Joseph W. Shirley, Jr., of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

JOHNSON Judge.

The appellant, Frank L. Durkin, is a member in good standing of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, a fraternal beneficiary society, hereinafter referred to as the Brotherhood, his contract with which consists of his application for membership, application for beneficiary certificate, the certificate, and the constitution of the Brotherhood. Prior to August 18, 1933, Durkin made a claim for disability benefits, alleging he had suffered a total and permanent disability. This claim was denied by the general secretary and treasurer of the Brotherhood, and appellant thereafter appealed to the international president and board of directors of the Brotherhood, who likewise disallowed it. Within six months thereafter he brought this suit. His amended declaration contains two counts, the first of which alleges that on November 16, 1925, appellee issued its policy or beneficiary certificate to him in the sum of $1,500, and thereby insured him in that amount and granted to him all the rights, privileges, and benefits of membership in the Brotherhood, and that, in the event of his becoming afflicted or sustaining one or more of the physical or bodily ailments for which payment was provided in the constitution of the Brotherhood, he was entitled to participate in its beneficiary fund to the extent of $1,500; that included among said physical injuries or bodily ailments, for which payment is provided in the constitution is the bodily ailment or affliction of total and permanent disability; that he has complied with all provisions of the certificate and constitution, and is totally and permanently disabled and entitled to the payment of $1,500 as provided therein, for which sum he has made demand upon the defendant, and the latter has refused to pay the same.

The second count alleges appellant is a member of the Brotherhood and entitled to all rights, privileges, and benefits of membership in the organization, and that, in the event he should become totally and permanently disabled, except on account of consumption of the lungs, he became entitled to receive $50 per month for each full calendar month, and a proportionate amount for a fraction of a calendar month from the time of his application for such benefits is received at the Grand Lodge office of the Brotherhood until his death or until he should not longer be totally and permanently disabled; that since August 18, 1933, he has been totally and permanently disabled, but not on account of consumption of the lungs, and he made application to the Brotherhood on account of his total and permanent disability for the benefits to which he was entitled; that his application was received at the Grand Lodge office of appellee on or before August 18, 1933, and he is entitled to payment by appellee of the sum of $50 per month for each and every calendar month and a proportionate amount for each fraction of a calendar month, accounting from said date, which benefits he has demanded, but the appellee has refused to pay the same.

The Brotherhood demurred to the first count, assigning as a reason therefor that the total and permanent disability alleged therein did not entitle him to payment of the beneficiary certificate, but that he became entitled to such payment with certain deductions as provided in its constitution only upon "sustaining the loss of a hand by amputation or actual separation, at or above the wrist joint, or the loss of a foot by amputation or actual separation, at or above the ankle joint, or the total or permanent loss of sight of an eye, or upon reaching the age of seventy years." This demurrer was sustained by the lower court without leave to amend.

To the second count the Brotherhood pleaded that it was a fraternal beneficiary society operating upon the lodge system, with ritualistic form of work and conducting itself for the sole benefit of its members, with no attempt at profit making, and its funds were raised by mutual and voluntary assessments and contributions; that the claim of the plaintiff arose solely by virtue of his application for membership, application for beneficiary certificate, the certificate, and the constitution of appellee, in which it was provided that the claim of a member for permanent and total disability should first be submitted to the appellee's general secretary and treasurer, with the right in appellant to prosecute an appeal from his action, and, after a careful investigation, his claim was disapproved by the general secretary and treasurer on February 1, 1933, from which decision no appeals were taken, but that the second application for disability benefits made by him was received on August 18, 1933, by the general secretary and treasurer of the Brotherhood, and, after another careful investigation, his application for disability benefits was disapproved by that official on October 12, 1933, whereupon the plaintiff below prosecuted an appeal from the decision of that official to the international president and board of directors, and the decision of the general secretary and treasurer in disallowing his claim was approved on such appeal by the last-named body, whose decision was by article 2, section 5 (11), of its constitution, final; further that it was provided by article 2, section 7 (h) thereof, that the said board of directors should carefully investigate appeals presented to them, and should "equitably determine the controversy," and their decision should be final.

An amended replication was filed by plaintiff below to this plea, in which it was alleged that, even though the plaintiff prosecuted an appeal from the decision of the general secretary and treasurer in disallowing his claim for disability benefits to the international president and board of directors, resulting in the approval of the decision of the general secretary and treasurer, the plaintiff thereafter was entitled to resort to the civil courts for adjudication of his claim under various provisions of the constitution of the Brotherhood, of which section 25 of article 8 and section 7 (a) of article 17 were referred to. The first of these reads as follows: "Any and all right of action arising under any claim for disability benefit allowances in this department shall be absolutely barred unless suit is commenced by the member, or on his behalf in some court of competent jurisdiction within six (6) months of notice of the final rejection of the claim by the Board of Directors. A notice of such rejection mailed to the last known post office address of the member shall be sufficient notice under this section."

The second provides: "No member or subordinate lodge of the Brotherhood shall resort to the Civil Courts to correct or redress any alleged grievance or wrong or to secure any alleged rights from or against any member, subordinate lodge or the organization, until such member or lodge shall first have exhausted all remedy by appeal, provided by the laws of the Brotherhood for the settlement and disposition of any such rights, grievances or wrongs".

Appellee filed a demurrer to this replication to the effect (1) that appellant by reason of the allegations of the Brotherhood's third plea could not contest the jurisdiction of its tribunals as being final and exclusive and that the determination of said tribunals would not be reviewed by the court, except in case of fraud, and (2) that under the law of Maryland the court would not inquire into the regularity of the procedure adopted by tribunals of fraternal beneficiary societies in passing upon claims, since the jurisdiction of such tribunals was exclusive, and their...

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