Durm v. Walmart, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action ADC-20-2809 |
| Parties | EVA DURM Plaintiff, v. WALMART, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Defendant Walmart, Inc. ("Defendant"), moves this Court for summary judgment (the "Motion") (ECF No. 31) on Plaintiff Eva Durm's ("Plaintiff) Complaint (ECF No 2).[1] After considering the Motion and responses thereto (ECF Nos. 31, 34) the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). In addition, having reviewed the pleadings of record and all competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the claim asserted. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Defendant's Motion.[2]
On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff and her two grandsons entered the Walmart Supercenter at 8107 Ritchie Highway in Pasadena, Maryland to buy cupcakes and cakes for her daughter's birthday. ECF No. 34-1 at 1-2. After picking up the cakes at the bakery, Plaintiff and her grandsons walked through the produce aisle on their way to the cashier. Id. As they walked through the produce aisle, they passed the banana display. Id. The bananas were set out on a pyramid-shaped table with four sides, allowing customers to move around the display. Id. at 2. Black, metal wheeled carts sat under the display table. Id. at 2-3. The carts were rectangular and low to the ground, measuring 21" x 32" x 5". Id. at 3. These carts were placed under the display table to hold cardboard boxes filled with overstock bananas. Id. Employees used the carts to restock the display table. Id. Defendant's policy is that carts are to be stored under the banana display table when not in use. Id.
Plaintiffs grandchildren were slightly ahead of Plaintiff when they passed the banana display. Id. at 2. Plaintiff turned a corner around the display and stepped on an empty cart. ECF No. 2 15. The cart then wheeled out from underneath Plaintiff and caused her to stretch her right leg out and fall to the ground. Id. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of the fall. Id. at If 6. Prior to her fall, Plaintiffs 12-year-old grandson was walking slightly ahead in a different portion of the aisle, saw the cart on the floor, and tried to warn Plaintiff before she stepped on it. ECF No. 31-1 at 2, 7. However, Plaintiff did not see the cart before tripping on it. ECF No. 34-1 at 3.
Video surveillance footage captured the incident. Id. It showed that, prior to Plaintiffs fall, one of Defendant's employees was restocking the display and walked away carrying several cardboard boxes. Id. However, the banana cart and floor were obscured from view at the time of the Plaintiffs fall, and the banana cart cannot be seen at all. Id.
On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging that Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for her injuries sustained from stepping on a banana cart and falling in one of its stores. ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 5-7.[3] On June 16, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. ECF No, 31. On June 30, 2021, after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33), Plaintiff responded in opposition. ECF No. 34. Accordingly, this matter is now fully briefed, and the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion as well as the responses thereto. For the following reasons Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material, fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Supreme Court has clarified that not every factual dispute will defeat a motion for summary judgment, but rather there must be a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) . An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute could affect the outcome. Id. at 248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the court has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and "the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing either that no genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non-movant's claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the onus is on the non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order to meet this burden, the non-movant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," but must instead "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 3A6 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011)). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Res. Bankshares Corp. v, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Thus, "to grant summary judgment the [c]ourt must determine that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence before it." Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990)).
In its Motion, Defendant contends that it is not liable to Plaintiff for negligence for multiple, reasons. First, Defendant argues it did not breach any duty owed to Plaintiff because it had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the banana cart where it was open and obvious. ECF No. 31-1 at 5-6. Second, Defendant had policies and procedures in place for customer safety, however any alleged violation of its own policies is not evidence of negligence. Id. at 11. Finally, Defendant asserts the affirmative defense that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk, therefore Defendant is not liable for her injuries. Id. at 12. The Court addresses each argument below. .
Plaintiff alleges a single count of negligence. A claim for negligence requires plaintiff prove "1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of that duty."[4] Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 469 Md. 704, 727 (2020). It is further well-established in Maryland that in "slip and fall" cases, the duty of care owed by an owner or occupier of the premises is determined by the owner's legal relationship to the person entering the premises. Garner v. Supervalu, Inc., 396 Fed.Appx. 27, 29 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A business invitee is one who enters the property for a purpose "related to the possessor's business." Rehn v. Westfield America, 153 Md.App. 586, 592-93 (2003) (citation omitted). One in possession of land and operating a store owes "his business invitee... the duty of reasonable care for the protection of the business invitee:" Tucker v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 689 F.Supp. 560, 562 (D.Md. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1989)
A storekeeper has a duty to protect the business invitee "against dangers which may arise from some . . . unsafe condition . . . [and] dangers which may be caused by negligent acts of his employees." Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636-37 (1994) (quoting Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 607, 178 A. 691, 694 (1935)). Nevertheless, there are limits to the duty. Liability for negligence is not presumed simply because Plaintiff is injured on Defendant's premises. Rehn 153 Md.App. at 593. Owners "ordinarily [have] no duty to warn an invitee of an open, obvious, and present danger" because the invitee must exercise due care for her own safety. Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md.App. 381, 389 (1997) (citing Casper v. Charles F. Smith & Son, Inc., 316 Md. 573, 582 (1989)).
Defendant first argues that it is not liable to Plaintiff for negligence because the banana cart was an open and obvious danger, and Defendant thus had no obligation to warn Plaintiff of its existence. ECF No. 31-1 at 5. "An open and obvious condition is one that is apparent and recognizable to 'a reasonable person in the position of a visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment.'" Duncan-Bogley v. U.S., 356 F.Supp.3d 529, 540 (D.Md.2018) (...
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