Duross' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 20 April 1959
• Citation: 395 Pa. 492,150 A.2d 710
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Margaret A. DUROSS, Late of the Borough of Wernersville, Deceased. Appeal of Jane L. Duross FITZPATRICK.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 710

150 A.2d 710

395 Pa. 492

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Margaret A. DUROSS, Late of the Borough of Wernersville, Deceased Appeal of Jane L. Duross FITZPATRICK.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 20, 1959.

Ralph W. D. Levan, Edward Youngerman, Reading, for appellant.

H. Ober Hess, Bruce L. Castor, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Paul H. Edelman, Reading, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN and McBRIDE, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

There are three questions of importance involved in this appeal: (1) Was Margaret Duross suffering from an insane delusion which directly controlled her will and caused it to be different than if the delusion had not existed? (2) What is the rule which governs a hearing Judge ¹ in disposing of a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, in a will contest? and (3) What is the test to be applied by an appellate Court in reviewing the entry by a hearing Judge of a judgment or decree non obstante veredicto?

Margaret A. Duross died by suicide on September 29, 1955, at the age of 45. She left a will dated August 23, 1954, which was duly proved and probated. Her signature was witnessed by a friend, Betty J. Keppley. Decedent was survived by two sisters, Mrs. M. Elisabeth Duross Hendricks and Mrs. Jane L. Duross Fitzpatrick, and by two brothers, George H. Duross and John A. Duross.

Decedent left her residuary estate, consisting of $15,142 to her closest friend, Rose-Beth Woolley. She appointed her brother, John A. Duross, Executor. Miss Woolley was also the named beneficiary in a $5,000 life insurance policy dated September 12, 1949. Decedent gave her Pennsylvania Retirement Fund amounting to $3,543 to her sister, Mrs. Hendricks, and a life insurance policy in the amount of $10,000 to her 11 nephews and nieces, four of whom were children of Mrs. Fitzpatrick.

Mrs. Fitzpatrick filed a petition for citation, ² alleging (a) that testatrix was not of sound mind; (b) that the will was procured by undue influence; and (c) that the will was executed under the influence of an insane delusion which had no reasonable basis.

An issue was granted and the jury found: (1) that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind, memory and understanding at the execution of her will; and (2) that the decedent was under an insane belief or delusion at the execution of her will, and that her will was a direct offspring of such insane delusion [that everybody hated her]. No evidence of any kind or description was introduced to prove undue influence; and no one testified that testatrix was not of sound mind. On the contrary, proponents affirmatively proved by a number of lay witnesses and by two doctors--and the hearing Judge found, based upon the uncontradicted and unassailable evidence, that testatrix was of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution of her will.

The hearing Judge ordered and decreed 'that the verdict of the jury be set aside and the will of testatrix of August 23, 1954 is hereby declared valid non obstante veredicto.' From this Decree Mrs. Fitzpatrick took this appeal.

Appellant approaches this case under the mistaken belief, which is shared by many laymen and by some members of the medical profession, that disinheriting a child or relative invalidates a will and discloses a lack of testamentary capacity, or undue influence, or insanity or an insane delusion. Of course that is not the law.

Testamentary capacity is presumed and the burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity or an insane delusion is upon those who assert it. In re Lauer's Will, 351 Pa. 438, 41 A.2d 552; In re Sturgeon's Will, 357 Pa. 75, 53 A.2d 139; O'Malley's Estate, 370 Pa. 281, 88 A.2d 69; Kerr v. O'Donovan, 389 Pa. 614, 134 A.2d 213; Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14.

In Re Johnson's Estate, 370 Pa. 125, 87 A.2d 188, Johnson, an illiterate colored man 84 years of age, the father of ten children, left by will two houses and their furniture to an acquaintance who was a white woman. Johnson was suffering from senile dementia, from occasional loss of memory, and from a mental disturbance pertaining to sex. This Court sustained the refusal of an issue devisavit vel non and said (370 Pa. at pages 127-128, 129, 87 A.2d at page 190): '* * * it is and always has been the law of Pennsylvania that every individual may leave his property by will to any person, or to any charity, or for any lawful purpose he desires, unless he lacked mental capacity, or the will was obtained by forgery or fraud or undue influence, or was the product of a so-called insane delusion. While it is difficult for many people to understand how or why a man is permitted to make a strange or unusual or an occentric bequest, especially if he has children or close relatives living, we must remember that under the law of Pennsylvania "a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty. He has a right to the control of his property while living and may bestow it as he sees fit' at his death. McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561, 192 A. 674, 676; Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72.' * * *'. See to the same effect: In re Borsch's Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119; Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Heidenreich, 290 Pa. 249, 257, 138 A. 764; In re Higbee's Will, 365 Pa. 381, 384, 75 A.2d 599.

What is testamentary capacity was once again pointed out in Williams v. McCarroll, supra. In that case the jury found in the trial of an issue devisavit vel non, that the decedent did not have testamentary capacity to make a valid will on the day on which his last will was made, and that the will was obtained by undue influence practiced upon him by the residuary legatee. The Chancellor who saw and heard the witnesses entered judgment non obstante veredicto, and this judgment was affirmed by this Court. The Court in its opinion said (374 Pa. at page 292, 97 A.2d at page 19): "* * * a decedent possesses testamentay capacity '* * * if he has an intelligent knowledge regarding those who are the natural objects of his bounty, of what his estate consists, and of what he desires done with it, even though his memory has been impaired by age or disease": Franz Will, 368 Pa. 618, 622, 84 A.2d 292; also In re Sturgeon's Will, 357 Pa. 75, 53 A.2d 139; In re Ash's Will, 351 Pa. 317, 41 A.2d 620; In re Olshefski's Estate, 337 Pa. 420, 11 A.2d 487.' Moreover, 'Less capacity is needed to make a valid will than is sufficient in most cases to transact ordinary business. In re Higbee's Will, 365 Pa. 381, 382, 75 A.2d 599; In re Sturgeon's Will, 357 Pa. 75, 81, 53 A.2d 139, and cases cited therein; In re Conway's Will, 366 Pa. 641, 79 A.2d 208.' Thompson Will, 387 Pa. 82, 104, 126 A.2d 740, 751.

That brings us to the next question: What is an insane delusion and when is it sufficient to invalidate a particular will?

The law is well settled that a person may be of sound mind in regard to her general affairs and have testamentary capacity, yet at the same time may be under an insane delusion. It is difficult to formulate a definition of an insane delusion which will cover every possible case, but the general rule is clear that it must be, as its name implies, an insane delusion, and that it must have caused decedent to make his will in a manner entirely different from what he would have if the insane delusion did not exist.

In Re Johnson's Estate, 370 Pa., at page 129, 87 A.2d at page 190, supra, the Court, quoting from In re Leedom's Estate, 347 Pa. 180, 32 A.2d 3, said: "It is well settled that 'A delusion which will render invalid a will executed as the direct result of it is an insance belief or a mere figment of the imagination--a belief in the existence of something which does not exist and which no rational person, in the absence of evidence, would believe to exist.' In re Alexander's Estate, 246 Pa. 58, 62, 91 A. 1042. See also McGovran's Estate, 185 Pa. 203, 39 A. 816 [and] * * * Thomas v. Carter, 170 Pa. 272, 282, 33 A. 81 [where the Court said]: 'A man may be of sound mind in regard to his dealings in general, but he may be under an insane delusion; and whenever it appears that the will was the direct offspring of the partial insanity or monomania under which the testator was laboring at the very time the will was made, that it was the moving cause of the disposition, ³ and if it had not existed the will would have been different, it ought to be considered no will, although the general capacity of the testator may be unimpeached."'

Margaret Duross was in charge of the occupational therapy department at the Wernersville State Hospital in 1954 and had been for many years. Her job was the supervision of a number of workers--usually 12 to 18 in number--and the planning of the activities of 800-900 patients is such things as arts and crafts, the utilization of weaving machines, the making of small projects of various sorts. Margaret's duties also included the purchase of supplies for the department; arranging for the sale and distribution of things made by the patients; she was recreational director, and planned and supervised dances, games and some athletic activities. Margaret was also in charge of the accounts of the department and she personally attended to these accurately and competently, including the month of August of 1954.

Miss Duross's work was to be greatly enlarged under a new State policy and she did not know whether the expanded work might be too big for her. Dr. Lutz suggested that Margaret consult an independent psychiatrist, not as a patient, but because the new head of the Department in Harrisburg had issued a directive that (high ranking) State employees should ascertain their own feelings and motivations in order to better ascertain and cope with the feelings and motivations of the patients at State Hospitals.

Mrs. Fitzpatrick, the contestant, produced only four witnesses. We shall summarize their testimony.

Dr. Pokrass, an eminently qualified...