Durrence v. City of Brunswick, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-137

• Decision Date: 03 November 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-137
• Parties: LARRY EUGENE DURRENCE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRUNSWICK; OFFICER AUSTIN ARMSTRONG; BRUNSWICK MUNICIPAL COURT; SONYA M., D.D.S.; and D.U.I. REDUCTION & DEFENSIVE DRIVING, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

LARRY EUGENE DURRENCE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BRUNSWICK; OFFICER AUSTIN ARMSTRONG;BRUNSWICK MUNICIPAL COURT; SONYA M., D.D.S.;and D.U.I. REDUCTION & DEFENSIVE DRIVING, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-137

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION

November 3, 2015

ORDER

Plaintiff Larry Eugene Durrence, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the named Defendants on September 14, 2015. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff contemporaneously filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff's Complaint, filed with this court as a civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, appears to attack a conviction obtained in the Brunswick Municipal Court in Glynn County, Georgia.¹ For the reasons set forth below, the Court DEFERS ruling on Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs and ORDERS him to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.

Through his Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Plaintiff asserts that he is unable to pay the civil filing fee and, therefore, seeks to proceedwithout the prepayment of that fee. (Doc. 3.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

Additionally, "[t]he district courts of the United States . . . are 'courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,'" Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). "In order to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the district courts original jurisdiction in federal-question cases—civil actions that arise under the Constitution,laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). This Court is unaware of any constitutional provision or federal law that would provide the basis for Plaintiff's Complaint, and, in its current form, Plaintiff's pleadings do not shed any light on this matter.

To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking relief for a state or conviction or sentence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court forewarns him that such claims may be barred by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court reasoned:

We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for

...