Durst v. United States

• Decision Date: 22 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-5935,76-5935
• Parties: Rickey Lee DURST et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

434 U.S. 542

98 S.Ct. 849

55 L.Ed.2d 14

Rickey Lee DURST et al., Petitioners,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 76-5935.

Argued Dec. 5, 1977.

Decided Feb. 22, 1978.

Syllabus

Petitioners, youth offenders, pleaded guilty to various federal offenses and, under § 5010(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), were given suspended sentences and placed on probation, which was conditioned on payment of fines and in one instance on making restitution. Their convictions were affirmed in the courts below. While now conceding that restitution is a permissible condition of probation under the YCA, petitioners contend that a sentence of probation under § 5010(a) is a substitute for any other penalty provision, and that since § 5010(a) does not expressly authorize fines, the authority to impose them cannot be imputed from any other penalty provision. They argue, moreover, that a fine is necessarily punitive and contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the YCA. Held : When a youth offender is placed on probation under § 5010(a), restitution may be required, and, when the otherwise applicable penalty provision permits, a fine may be imposed as conditions of probation. Pp. 549-554.

(a) Though the language of § 5010(a) neither grants nor withholds the authority to impose a fine or to order restitution, § 5023(a) of the YCA incorporates by reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 ed.), to permit such an exaction, and it is clear from the YCA's legislative history that Congress' purpose in adopting § 5023(a) was to assure that a sentence under § 5010(a) would not displace the authority under § 3651 to impose a fine and order restitution as conditions of probation. Pp. 549-553.

(b) In preserving the authority to impose a fine as a condition of probation Congress necessarily concluded that such a condition comports with YCA's rehabilitative goals. Pp. 553-554.

4 Cir., 549 F.2d 799, affirmed.

Michael S. Frisch, for petitioners, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Sol. Gen. Wade H. McCree, Jr., Detroit, Mich., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari, 430 U.S. 929, 97 S.Ct. 1547, 51 L.Ed.2d 772 (1977), to decide whether a trial judge (or designated United States Magistrate) who suspends a sentence of commitment and places a youth offender on probation pursuant to § 5010(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (1976 ed.), may impose a fine, or require restitution, or both, as conditions of probation.¹

Each of the five petitioners pleaded guilty in a separate proceeding before a United States Magistrate to an offense for which penalties of fine or imprisonment or both are provided. Petitioners Durst and Rice pleaded guilty to obstruction of the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 ed.). Petitioners Blystone and Pinnick pleaded guilty to stealing property with a value less than $100 from a Government reservation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1976 ed.). Petitioner Flakes pleaded guilty to theft of property belonging to the United States with a value less than $100 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976 ed.). Each petitioner was sentenced by a Magistrate, under § 5010(a), to probation and a suspended sentence of imprisonment.² Petitioner Flakes was ordered to pay a fine of $50 as a condition of probation and each of the others $100. Petitioner Durst was also ordered to make restitution, in the amount of $160, as a condition of probation.

Each petitioner appealed his sentence to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which consolidated and affirmed the appeals. Crim.Action No. N-75-0828 (June 25, 1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, No. 76-1905 (Dec. 9, 1976), judgt. order reported at 549 F.2d 799, relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Oliver, 546 F.2d 1096 (1976), cert. pending No. 76-5632, which had held that imposition of a fine as a condition of probation was consistent with the YCA. In addition, the per curiam in the instant case stated: "For the reasons expressed in Oliver, we believe that a requirement of restitution is also consistent." App. 2. We agree that, when placing a youth offender on probation under § 5010(a), the sentencing judge may require restitution, and, when the otherwise applicable penalty provision permits, impose a fine as a condition of probation, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

The YCA is primarily an outgrowth of recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the United States, see Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3048, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), designed to reduce criminality among youth. Congress found that between the ages of 16 and 22, "special factors operated to produce habitual criminals. [Moreover,] then-existing methods of treating criminally inclined youths were found inadequate in avoiding recidivism." Id., at 432-433, 94 S.Ct., at 3048 (citation omitted).

The core concept of the YCA, like that of England's Borstal System upon which it is modeled,³ is that rehabilitative treatment should be substituted for retribution as a sentencing goal.⁴ Both the Borstal System and the YCA incorporate three features thought essential to the operation of a successful rehabilitative treatment program: flexibility in choosing among a variety of treatment settings and programs tailored to individual needs; ⁵ separation of youth offenders from hardened criminals; ⁶ and careful and flexible control of the duration of commitment and of supervised release.⁷ The YCA established the framework for creation of a treatment program incorporating these features, and, as an alternative to existing sentencing ptions, authorized a sentence of commitment to the Attorney General for treatment under the Act. Dorszynski, supra, 418 U.S. at 437-440, 94 S.Ct. at 3049-3051.

The Act contains four provisions regarding sentencing. Section 5010(a) provides that "[i]f the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need commitment," imposition or execution of sentence might be suspended and the youth offender placed on probation. Sections 5010(b) and (c) provide that, if the youth is to be committed, the court might "in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law," sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision. Section 5010(d) provides that "[i]f the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c)," the court may sentence the youth offender "under any other applicable penalty provision." ⁸

A particularly valuable benefit for the offender sentenced under the YCA is the prospect of obtaining a certificate setting aside his conviction. A certificate automatically issues when a youth committed to the custody of the Attorney General under § 5010(b) or § 5010(c) is unconditionally released prior to expiration of the maximum sentence imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (1976 ed.). In 1961, the YCA was amended to extend the benefit of a certificate to youths sentenced to probat on under § 5010(a) when the court unconditionally discharges the youth prior to expiration of the sentence of probation imposed. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub.L. No. 87-336, 75 Stat. 750 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (1976 ed.)).

Petitioners make two arguments in support of their submission that sentencing judges choosing the option under § 5010(a) of suspending sentence and placing the youth offender on probation may not impose a fine as a condition of probation.⁹ First, they argue that the sentencing provisions of the YCA are alternatives to other sentencing provisions and therefore a substitute for the penalties provided in the statute for violation of which the youth offender was convicted; since § 5010(a) does not explicitly authorize the imposition of fines, sentencing judges have no authority to impose them when sentencing under that provision. Second, they argue that fines are necessarily punitive and their imposition therefore inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals of the YCA. Neither of these arguments has merit.

II

The language of § 5010(a) neither grants nor withholds the authority to impose fines or orders of restitution. Another provision of the YCA, however, § 5023(a), incorporates by reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute to permit such exactions. Section 5023(a) provides: "Nothing in [the Act] shall limit or affect the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place a youth offender on probation or be construed in any wise to amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of chapter 231 [§§ 3651-3656] of this title . . . relative to probation." Chapter 231 is the general probation statute and 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 ed.) expressly provides, inter alia:

"While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant—

"May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and

"May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had . . . ." ¹⁰

Petitioners argue, however, that the sentencing provisions contained in § 5010 are separate and distinct from each other and from any other penalty provision. Recognizing that § 5023(a) makes § 3651 applicable to a § 5010(a) sentence, they now concede ¹¹ that restitution is a permissible condition of a probationary sentence under § 5010(a), because § 3651 directly authorizes restitution without resort to any other penalty provision. On the other hand, a fine may be imposed under § 3651 only if the penalty provision of the offense under which the youth is convicted so provides.¹² Thus, a fine is not permissible in conjunction with a § 5010(a) sentence because it requires resort to the offense penalty...