Dusenbery v. Bidwell
Decision Date | 09 March 1912 |
Docket Number | 17,472 |
Citation | 121 P. 1098,86 Kan. 666 |
Parties | GEORGE W. DUSENBERY, Appellee, v. MATEY L. BIDWELL et al., Appellants |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided January, 1912.
Appeal from Kiowa district court.
STATEMENT.
ACTION for redemption from an alleged mortgage, which was, in form an absolute deed, in which appellee asked to have the amount of the mortgage debt determined and that he be allowed to redeem the land upon payment of the amount due, and that thereupon he be decreed to have the legal and equitable title to the land. Upon testimony offered the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
June 23, 1893.
Sixty days after date we promise to pay to the order of Geo. H. Bidwell Five Hundred and 00-100 Dollars, at Mullinville. Value received, with interest at ten per cent per annum after date until paid. G. W. DUSENBERY.
LAVINA DUSENBERY.
Ninety days after date I promise to pay to the order of George H. Bidwell, Two Hundred Thirty One Dollars at ten per cent interest from date. Value received. G. W. DUSENBERY.
In accordance with these findings judgment was entered decreeing a redemption upon the payment by appellee of $ 1500 and that his title in the land be quieted as against appellants. From this judgment an appeal was taken.
Judgment affirmed.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. DEED--Absolute in Form--Security--A Mortgage. Where a debtor executed to his creditor a deed, absolute in form, which both understood and intended as a security for the payment of the debt, it will be treated as a mortgage with the consequent right in the grantor to redeem.
2. MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION--Tax Sale--Certificate--Tax Deed. Where the mortgagee held the legal title and possession of the mortgaged land under an agreement that he would pay the taxes and charges accrued and accruing against the land, and that when a purchaser was found and a transfer made he would take from the proceeds the amount of the debt due him and the mortgagor should have the remainder of the proceeds, and, thereafter, the mortgagee failed to pay the taxes, and later purchased the land at a tax sale, his purchase, in effect, constituted a payment of the taxes, although he procured the certificate of sale and tax deed to be issued in the name of another.
3. LACHES--Redemption--Statute of Limitations--Fraud. Lapse of time is not necessarily laches and laches in asserting a right does not necessarily defeat it. Whether laches is sufficient to bar relief depends on the circumstances of the case, such as the presence of fraud, intervention of the rights of third parties, delay being induced by the action of the adverse party, disability, death of parties, ignorance of facts or of rights, and change of relations and conditions.
4. LACHES-- Same. Where the mortgagee purchased the land at a tax sale and took the title in the name of another, representing in letters written to the mortgagor, who resided in a distant place, that he had been unable to pay the taxes, that the land had been conveyed by a tax deed to a stranger, that the period of redemption had passed so that the interest of both had been lost, and where, about seven years after the mortgage was given, the mortgagee died, and thereafter the stranger in whose name the tax deed was taken conveyed the land to the heirs of the mortgagee without consideration, and where the mortgagee and his heirs had the possession of the land, which in the meantime had greatly increased in value, and where the mortgagor knew that the land had been sold for taxes and conveyed to another but did not know of the fraud of the mortgagee, nor that he was the purchaser at the tax sale, nor that the grantee in the tax deed was not a bona fide purchaser, until about fifteen years after the mortgage was made and executed, nor until about the time the action to redeem was begun, held, that the right of redemption of the mortgagor was not extinguished by laches or by the statute of limitation.
F. Dumont Smith, and L. M. Day, for the appellants.
Z. T. Hazen, R. H. Gaw, and Otis E. Hungate, for the appellee.
The instrument executed by George W. Dusenbery to George H Bidwell, on August 22, 1894, was a deed, absolute on its face, and its purpose and effect are the principal points of dispute between the parties. It is contended by appellants that the agreement made when the instrument was executed was an attempt to create an express trust which, under the statute, can not be created by a parol agreement; while appellee insists that the instrument was understood and intended by the parties to be a mere security for the payment of a debt due...
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