Dutton v. City of Midwest City

• Decision Date: 31 January 2014
• Docket Number: NO. CIV-13-0911-HE,CIV-13-0911-HE
• Parties: RODNEY DUTTON and SHIRLEY DUTTON, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

RODNEY DUTTON and SHIRLEY DUTTON, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF MIDWEST CITY, ET AL., Defendants.

NO. CIV-13-0911-HE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Dated: January 31, 2014

ORDER

Rodney and Shirley Dutton, a married couple appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this case against the City of Midwest City and certain law enforcement personnel.¹ They assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of their constitutional rights. They also filed a second case (CIV-13-0912) arising out of the same general circumstances, which the court previously consolidated into this case. Order, November 27, 2013 [Doc. #17]. The City of Midwest City has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have responded, accompanying their response to the motion with a request for the appointment of counsel.

Background

It appears from the amended complaint that this case arises out of two separate arrests

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of Mr. Dutton by the Midwest City police department. The specific circumstances and chronology of the alleged events are not entirely clear,² but it appears that, as to the first arrest, Mr. Dutton was allegedly arrested for assault and public intoxication while attempting to chase a dog off of his property with a brick. The second arrest was apparently based on a charge of domestic abuse. The complaint alleges that, at some point while in jail for one of the arrests, Mr. Dutton was "struck in the head several times by an inmate with his fists" and later treated at a local hospital.

The allegations indicate Mr. Dutton was later convicted in Midwest City Municipal Court of some or all of the referenced charges. He allegedly sought, but was refused, counsel to represent him. The complaint alleges Mr. Dutton requested to be sentenced to time served and that the judge initially granted that request. It further alleges that, as Mr. Dutton left the courtroom, he "said calmly to nobody in particular 'I'll see you in federal court.'" This, according to Mr. Dutton, caused the judge to rescind his initial decision, and instead sentence him to thirty days in jail.

The amended complaint generally alleges there was no evidence to support any of the charges Mr. Dutton was convicted of and that he has been forced to file for post-conviction relief, referencing three court cases.³

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Mr. Dutton's claims, construed liberally because of his pro se status,⁴ appear to be as follows: 1) a First Amendment violation, based on alleged retaliation for the comment he made while leaving the courtroom, 2) a Fourth Amendment claim, based on his arrest and prosecution without probable cause, 3) denial of due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 4) denial of assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 5) an Eighth Amendment claim, based on failure to protect him from abuse by a fellow inmate, and 6) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, both plaintiffs assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for loss of consortium and violation of their "right to pursue life and happiness together in their marriage and individually without wrongful interference by officials of [the] government."

Discussion

The City of Midwest City has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule permits a court to dismiss a claim when a party fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). Unsupported, conclusory allegations, however, need not be accepted as true. See Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). Further, "mere 'labels and conclusions' and 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will

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not suffice." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The question is whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. As noted above, when plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court construes the claims liberally.

The City's motion is based entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994), because Mr. Dutton's conviction has not been invalidated. Plaintiffs appear to argue that Heck does not apply because Mr. Dutton is not seeking release from custody, and because some of their claims fall outside of its scope.

In Heck, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when a prisoner may assert a § 1983 claim relating to his conviction or sentence. The Court held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983...