Duvall v. ICI Americas, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-9304-EX-186,93A02-9304-EX-186
• Citation: 621 N.E.2d 1122
• Parties: Elsie (Adkins) DUVALL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ICI AMERICAS, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1122

621 N.E.2d 1122

Elsie (Adkins) DUVALL, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ICI AMERICAS, INC., Appellee-Defendant.

No. 93A02-9304-EX-186.

Court of Appeals of Indiana First District.

Sept. 29, 1993.

Stephen W. Voelker, Jeffersonville, for appellant-plaintiff.

Peter J. Sewell, Segal and Shanks, Jeffersonville, for appellee-defendant.

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

We are asked to decide whether carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease as defined under the Indiana Occupational Diseases Act. Elsie Duvall appeals an award from the Worker's Compensation Board ("Board") in favor of her former employer, ICI Americas, Inc., which operates the Indiana Army Ammunition Plant in Charlestown. The Board denied her claim for benefits, found that her work-related carpal tunnel syndrome did not constitute an occupational disease and found that as an injury, her claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for a claim under the Worker's Compensation Act. We affirm.

ISSUES

We restate the issues presented on appeal as follows:

1. Whether Duvall's carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease under the Indiana Occupational Diseases Act or an injury under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act.

2. Whether Duvall's claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

FACTS

Duvall was employed from 1981 until September 23, 1987, on ICI's production line in a job described as "weigh, load and sew." By March of 1983, Duvall experienced the symptoms and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. ¹ Duvall then filed a worker's compensation claim and alleged that she suffered from a condition called "trigger thumb" of her right hand which was complicated by her carpal tunnel syndrome. The Board accepted the parties' stipulation that Duvall suffered no temporary total disability but found that Duvall's In September of 1984, Duvall again complained of pain and consulted Dr. Kasden who diagnosed a mild form of carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand and wrist. Dr. Kasden prescribed a treatment regime of vitamins and night-splinting and placed restrictions on her work duties. Those restrictions precluded her from using vibratory tools, from heavy gripping or pinching with simultaneous flexing and extension of her right wrist, and from lifting more than five pounds. ICI honored Duvall's work restrictions until September of 1987 when it asked Duvall to perform work which exceeded the weight restriction prescribed by her physician. Duvall refused, and ICI then terminated her employment.

trigger thumb was caused by her employment at ICI without deciding the effect of her carpal tunnel syndrome. The Board awarded Duvall her medical expenses and attorney's fees.

On September 13, 1991, Duvall filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim with the Board and alleged as grounds for her claim that "[r]epeated trauma to [her] hand caused carpal tunnel syndrome" to result from an initial job-related injury. Record at 9. Duvall sought "future medical bills ..., temporary total disability, and total disability." Record at 9. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board adopted the single Board member's findings and entered a decision which denied Duvall's claim. Duvall appealed that decision, and this court, in Duvall v. ICI Americas, Inc. (1992), Ind.App., 589 N.E.2d 1200, reversed and remanded to the Board for further consideration and instructed the Board either to accept or reject the parties' stipulation that Duvall's carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. On remand, the Board accepted the parties' stipulation concerning causation, found that Duvall's carpal tunnel was not an occupational disease, concluded that Duvall's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and entered a modified decision in favor of ICI. Duvall again appeals the Board's decision.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

In this appeal from a decision of the full Worker's Compensation Board, we are bound by the Board's findings of fact and may only consider errors in the Board's conclusions of law. See IND.CODE Sec. 22-3-4-8(b). We cannot disturb the Board's factual determinations unless we conclude that the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary result. Eastham v. Whirlpool Corp. (1988), Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 23, 26, trans. denied. We disregard all evidence unfavorable to the Board's findings of fact and consider only the facts and reasonable inferences which support those findings. Id. While this court is not bound by the Board's interpretations of law, we should reverse only if the Board incorrectly interpreted the Worker's Compensation Act. See Houchins v. Kittle's Home Furnishings (1992), Ind.App., 589 N.E.2d 1190, 1192.

Issue One: Occupational Disease or Injury

Duvall maintains that the Board erred when it found that her carpal tunnel syndrome was not an occupational disease. Duvall urges us to hold that carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease because her repetitive motion injury flowed as a natural risk out of her employment. ICI responds that our courts have previously determined carpal tunnel syndrome is not an occupational disease and that no extension or modification of Indiana law is warranted under these circumstances. See Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson (1944), 115 Ind.App. 221, 58 N.E.2d 202. ² We must construe our statutes as written, and we conclude that under Indiana law carpal tunnel syndrome is not an occupational disease and that the Board's determination was correct.

The Indiana Occupational Diseases Act defines an "occupational disease" as follows:

"(a) As used in this chapter, "occupational disease" means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section.

(b) A disease arises out of the employment only if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all of the circumstances, a direct casual connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and which does not come from a hazard to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence."

IND.CODE Sec. 22-3-7-10. Duvall reasons from this definition that since ICI stipulated to the causal connection between her carpal tunnel syndrome and her employment at ICI, and the Board adopted that stipulation, the Board was required to find that carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease. We cannot agree.

The definition of an "occupational disease" found in Indiana Code Sec. 22-3-7-10 is incomplete because it assumes that the employee suffers from a "disease" and focuses on whether the disease is causally connected to workplace conditions. "Disease" is not defined in the Indiana Occupational Diseases Act, nor have our cases squarely confronted what constitutes a disease under the Act. Duvall has established by stipulation that her carpal tunnel syndrome is causally connected to her occupation, but that causal relationship does not require the conclusion that carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease. Therefore, the first question before us is whether Duvall's carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease.

In construing a statute, we examine and interpret the statute as a whole, giving words their common and ordinary meaning. Spaulding v. International Bakers Services, Inc. (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 307, 309. Our foremost objective is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Id.

The statutory definition describes an occupational disease in terms of a worker's "exposure" to conditions in the workplace. Specifically, the definition provides that a disease is an occupational disease when it results from "exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment." I.C. Sec. 23-3-7-10(b) (emphasis added). The term "exposure" indicates a passive relationship between the worker and his work environment rather than an event or occurrence, or series of occurrences, which constitute injury under the Worker's Compensation Act. Duvall's carpal tunnel syndrome did not result from exposure to workplace conditions at ICI but resulted from the hand and wrist mechanics associated with Duvall's work on ICI's production line. Her carpal tunnel syndrome did not result from where she worked but from the work she did.

Moreover, carpal tunnel syndrome is in a class of disorders described as "cumulative trauma disorders." As a disorder caused by trauma, carpal tunnel syndrome is not a disease. A trauma is defined as a "wound, especially one produced by sudden physical injury." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language at 1366 (1981) (emphasis added). Similarly, a "traumatism" is an "injury" or a "wound produced by injury; trauma." Id. Thus, by definition, the term trauma is synonymous with injury, and the cumulative effect of more than one trauma is likewise an injury.

We rely upon our supreme court's decision in Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp. (1986), Ind., 491 N.E.2d 969, which clarified the term "injury" as used in Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. After Evans, in order to state a compensable claim under the Worker's Compensation Act, a claimant is no longer required to prove that his injury arose from an accident as a specific, identifiable event; rather, an...