Duvall v. Novant Health Inc.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:19-CV-00624-DSC |
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Parties | DAVID L. DUVALL, Plaintiff, v. NOVANT HEALTH INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties' Post-Trial Motions, including Defendant Novant Health, Inc.'s “Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law” (Doc. 124), “Motion to Set Aside Punitive Damages” (Doc. 127), “Motion for Sanctions” (Doc. 130), and “Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Post-Trial Evidence” (Doc. 137); and “Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgments and Enquitable (sic) Relief” (Doc. 132) and “Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment and Equitable Relief” (Doc. 135). These Motions have been fully briefed. (Docs. 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134 138-145, 149, 150, 152-157, 159, 160 and 161).
Plaintiff David Duvall brought three claims against Defendant Novant Health, Inc. under federal and state law for “reverse” discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (as amended) and public policy under North Carolina General Statute § 143-422.2, respectively; and an ERISA §510 interference claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1140. All claims arise from his termination on July 30, 2018.
Because “other employee” evidence factors into several of Defendant's Motions, the Court summarizes the history here. Defendant filed a pre-trial Motion in Limine to exclude anticipated evidence regarding the terminations of other former Novant Health employees. (Docs. 70, 71). Defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant, could create mini-trials that would confuse and distract the jury from the ultimate issue, and cause undue prejudice. (Doc. 71). The Court granted the Motion barring presentation of this “other employee” evidence at trial finding that “the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and confusing the issues.” (Doc. 84, p. 1).
On the first day of trial, Defendant's counsel expressed concern about Plaintiff violating the Motion in Limine Order. In response, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed his understanding that he could not introduce evidence of terminations by other decision makers. But he was allowed to present evidence of terminations by Jesse Cureton the decision maker in this case. Defendant objected, arguing that this was a “classic 403 situation.” (Doc. 114, Tr. 8:2-9:10). The Court clarified: (Id., Tr. 41:3-8).
During trial, Plaintiff testified as follows:
And then, you know, I was aware that several senior male executives had been let go from the company in the months prior to me being let go. And then in the weeks and months following my termination, more and more were being let go. And that's when you know, a very clear pattern started to emerge when you have, you know, your chief legal officer, your chief experience officer, your chief medical officer, your chief IT officer, your president of the Charlotte market, yourself.
Defendant's counsel did not object to this testimony. Instead, he asked the Court to take up the matter outside the presence of the jury following Plaintiff's direct testimony. He argued that (Doc. 116, Tr. 213:3-6). Defendant's counsel also argued that the evidence “was raised unilaterally by the party in - apparently in a knowing way.” (Id., Tr. 214:34). Defendant's counsel also made it clear (Id., Tr. 214:25-215:3). Defendant's counsel also noted that “Mr. Largess, apparently recognizing this, did follow-up with his next questioning there, just focusing on what the Court had ruled previously, the reports to Mr. Cureton which the Court did allow.” (Id., Tr. 216:9-12).
In response, Plaintiff's counsel stated that “I don't think that Mr. Duvall did anything knowingly, You Honor.” (Id., Tr. 219:3-4). He also argued there was evidence about the pattern of white male executives being terminated that fell outside the scope of the Motion in Limine, including testimony from Mr. Brunstetter, Mr. Grady and Mr. Armato. The Court ultimately gave the jury a limiting instruction following the bench conference:
Ladies and gentleman, the Plaintiff, Mr. Duvall, testified yesterday identifying by position some employees who separated from Novant but did not report to Jesse Cureton. You are instructed to disregard that testimony. There is no evidence in the record concerning those separations.
This seven-day trial included five days of evidence. Plaintiff called eight witnesses and introduced over ninety-five exhibits, including nine joint exhibits. Defendant called two witnesses and introduced eight exhibits
On October 26, 2021, the jury returned a verdict finding that Plaintiff had proven his race (Caucasian) and/or his sex (male) were a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to terminate him and that Defendant would not have made the same decision without regard to his race (Caucasian) and/or sex (male). It awarded $10 million in punitive damages[1]. (Doc. 99).
Following the jury verdict, this Court directed both sides to file post-trial motions addressing Plaintiff's eligibility for back pay and front pay as well as the ERISA claim. Both parties filed Motions, and the Court heard oral argument on May 24, 2022 related to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Punitive Damages, Plaintiff's eligibility for back pay and front pay and the ERISA claim. For the reasons detailed herein, the Court DENIES Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 124), GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Punitive Damages (Doc. 127), DENIES Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 130), DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Post-Trial Evidence (Doc. 137); and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgments and Equitable Relief (Docs. 132 and 135).
Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury. If the court denies a motion made under Rule 50(a), Rule 50(b) allows the party to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict has been returned. Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 156 (4th Cir. 2012).
“When a jury verdict has been returned, judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (and in support of the jury's verdict) and drawing every legitimate inference in that party's favor, the only conclusion a reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving party.” Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 3 F.4th 605, 610 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Int'l Ground Transp. v. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City, MD, 475 F.3d 214, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2007)).
When considering a Rule 50 motion, the court must “review the record as a whole” and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000); see also, Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999). A jury's verdict will withstand a motion under Rule 50 unless the court “determines that the only conclusion a reasonable trier of fact could draw from the evidence is in favor of the moving party.” Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Winant v. Bostic, 5 F.3d 767, 774 (4th Cir. 1993)); see also Konkel, 165 F.3d at 279. “[O]nce a jury has evaluated witness credibility, weighed evidence, and reached a verdict, a litigant seeking to overturn that verdict faces a steep hurdle.” Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 2019). Notably, if “reasonable minds could differ” as to the findings of the jury, then the court should deny the motion. Bresler v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 855 F.3d 178, 196 (4th Cir. 2017). The task of the court, then, is to determine whether “the evidence presented, combined with all permissible inferences ... provide[s] a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable to jury to find” in favor of the nonmoving party. Fry v. Rand Constr. Corp., 964 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 2020) (brackets added). The Court may allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct entry ofjudgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).
With this standard in mind, the Court turns to the parties' motions.
Defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). It argues that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the decision to terminate his employment was the result of intentional race or sex discrimination.
To establish intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII, Plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated on account of...
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