Duvall v. State
| Citation | 978 N.E.2d 417 |
| Decision Date | 11 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 03A04–1108–CR–447.,03A04–1108–CR–447. |
| Parties | Tami L. DUVALL, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Russell A. Johnson, Heath Y. Johnson, Suzy St. John, Johnson, Gray & Macabee, Franklin, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Tami L. Duvall (“Duvall”) appeals her conviction for Murder, a felony, 1 five of her six convictions for Insurance Fraud, Class C felonies, 2 and two of her three convictions for Obstruction of Justice, Class D felonies.3 We affirm the conviction for Murder, but reverse and remand with instructions to vacate five of the convictions for Insurance Fraud and two of the convictions for Obstruction of Justice.
Duvall presents three issues for review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, pursuant to the intent exception of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b), testimony from Duvall's former boyfriend that he believed Duvall had poisoned him;
II. Whether the admission of evidence suggesting that Duvall stole a bottle of morphine from her workplace is fundamental error; and
III. Whether Duvall committed only a single offense of Insurance Fraud and a single offense of Obstruction of Justice.
Around 8:00 a.m. on August 24, 2007, Duvall placed a 9–1–1 call and told operator Angela Lee that she had arrived home from work and found her estranged husband, Alan Duvall (“Alan”), dead in a chair in the back yard. According to Duvall, Alan had come over the prior evening to work on a malfunctioning air conditioning unit, became overheated, and went outside to cool down. He had then slept outside. Duvall advised the operator that Alan was a heavy drinker.
It was initially believed that Alan, who had a blood-alcohol content of 0.436%, died of alcohol poisoning. However, several of Duvall's and Alan's family members contacted the Columbus Police Department to convey their suspicions of foul play, prompting Detective Marc Kruchten to request an autopsy of Alan's body. Toxicology reports from the autopsy revealed that Alan's blood had a morphine concentration of 6,590 nanograms per milliliter (approximately 100 times a therapeutic dose) and 3,229 nanograms per milliliter of cyclobenzaprine, a muscle relaxer (approximately eight times a therapeutic dose). In light of this evidence, Detective Kruchten began to conduct a homicide investigation.
The investigation revealed that Alan and Duvall, who had been separated for several months, had significant financial problems. Creditors were continually calling the marital residence to discuss delinquencies of various consumer accounts and past-due vehicle payments. The marital residence was a subject of foreclosure proceedings, and college tuition for Duvall's youngest daughter had become due. Alan had only recently begun to work with a glass installation company after several job changes, and Duvall's earnings as a certified nurse's aide were inadequate for the mounting financial obligations.
A short time before Alan's death, Duvall had encouraged Alan to procure a $100,000 life insurance policy and name her as the beneficiary. According to the couple's friends and acquaintances, Alan had been willing to do so because he believed it was a mortgage insurance policy and he expected to move back in with Duvall as soon as her daughter moved to college. The policy had been obtained through insurance agent Gary Ruddell (“Ruddell”), with whom Duvall was having an extra-marital affair. Although, according to Ruddell, he advised Duvall not to attempt to collect on the policy because Alan died during the policy “grace period” and it would look suspicious, (Tr. 2134) Duvall promptly made a claim for payment.
Motorists Life Insurance did not immediately pay the claim, but instead assigned Dennis Thomas (“Thomas”) to investigate the circumstances surrounding Alan's death. Thomas interviewed Duvall on multiple occasions, as did Detective Kruchten. Duvall maintained that she had, upon arriving home from early morning home health duties, observed Alan slumped in his backyard chair, and immediately called 9–1–1 and tried, without success, to pull Alan from his chair to perform CPR.
Early in the investigation, Duvall suggested that Alan had been a drug user and had “hid the other part of his life” from her. (Tr. 1806.) However, she claimed to lack specific knowledge of what Alan had ingested or how he did so. Ultimately, in an interview with Detective Kruchten and Bartholomew County Prosecutor William Nash, Duvall stated that she had observed Alan take muscle relaxers of the brand name Flexeril, which he had allegedly obtained from his cousin, Zillah Thompson (“Thompson”). She also described seeing Alan, on the last evening of his life, in possession of an eye dropper type bottle with a lavender-colored liquid inside (a description consistent with Roxanol, a liquid form of morphine used for hospice patients). She admitted to disposing of empty medication and alcohol bottles after Alan's death.
Meanwhile, the police investigation uncovered several witnesses who contradicted Duvall's claims of a prompt 9–1–1 call and Alan's drug use. Also, one of Duvall's former employers, Miller's Merry Manor, had documented the mysterious disappearance of a bottle of Roxanol. Thompson admitted that she had left medications, including Flexeril, out in plain view at her house, and that she had recently had a block party attended by the Duvalls. However, those who knew Alan, including Thompson, insisted that Alan was opposed to ingesting drugs.
On August 6, 2010, the State charged Duvall with Murder, six counts of Insurance Fraud, and three counts of Obstructionof Justice. On April 5, 2011, Duvall's jury trial commenced. On April 22, 2011, the jury found Duvall guilty as charged. On May 25, 2011, she received an aggregate sentence of sixty and one-half years (fifty-five for Murder, six concurrent sentences of four years for Insurance Fraud, and three concurrent sentences of one and one-half years for Obstruction of Justice). Duvall now appeals.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 225 (Ind.2009). We will reverse the trial court's decision only when it is clearly against the facts and circumstances before the court; moreover, even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence, the judgment will be undisturbed if the decision to admit evidence is harmless error. Granger v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). “Harmless error occurs ‘when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ind.2009)). Accordingly, we reverse only when the record as a whole discloses that the evidence admitted in error likely had a prejudicial impact upon the mind of the average juror, thereby contributing to the verdict. Id.
During the investigation following Alan's death, police learned that Stephen Brown (“Brown”), Duvall's former boyfriend, had made a June 27, 2005 statement to Farm Bureau Insurance special investigator John Moon (“Moon”) in the course of an investigation into alleged theft of Duvall's property. Brown denied that he had stolen Duvall's property and, during the interview, advised Moon of his suspicion that Duvall had tried to poison him with tainted pudding immediately before requesting his signature and identifying information on a life insurance policy.
Prior to trial, Duvall filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Moon's testimony with regard to the alleged poisoning attempt. The State conceded that such testimony would be inadmissible unless the defense opened the door to its admissibility.
In his opening statement, Duvall's counsel advanced the defense theory that Alan had killed himself. The factual scenario described by counsel essentially mirrored those facts described by Duvall in her interview with Detective Kruchten and Prosecutor Nash; that is, on the last night of his life, Alan was taking pills and had “an eye dropper full of morphine.” (Tr. 300.) According to counsel, Duvall came home, found Alan dead, and “freaked out,” thus explaining the delay in calling 9–1–1. (Tr. 300.) The State argued that the defense had opened the door to Brown's testimony in order to contradict a particular factual scenario portrayed by the defense and, after a bench conference, the trial court agreed.
Brown testified that, around Thanksgiving of 2004, Duvall had arrived at his home with food, including a pudding that she insisted he must eat because her daughter had made it especially for Brown. When Brown took a few bites of the pudding, it tasted “like aspirin dissolving” and he felt “very out of it” for several hours. (Tr. 2318.) Duvall had also brought a life insurance policy application, and claimed that she needed information from Brown so that he could be the listed beneficiary. She asked Brown to sign and provide his Social Security number. Brown did not do so, and Duvall left, taking with her the bowl and plate that she had brought.
Duvall claims that the trial court admitted this evidence in violation of Evidence Rule 404(b), which provides in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]
Evidence of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Garwood v. State
...to "substantially overestimate" its value nor to be excessively "arouse[d]" or "inflame[d]" against the Garwoods. Duvall v. State , 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (articulating standard for reversible unfair prejudice).20 2. Change of Plea Hearing Transcript [97] For similar reaso......
-
Myers v. State
...the value of the evidence or (2) that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind.2002) ), trans. denied. [78] The crux of Myers's argument is that the ......
-
Balfour v. State
...... inquiry boils down to a balance of the probative value of the. proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial. value of that evidence.". . 19 . . Hendricks v. State , 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1134. (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (citing Duvall v. State , 978. N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied ). The balancing of the probative value against the danger of. unfair prejudice must be determined with reference to the. issue to be proved by the evidence. Id. (citing. Ward v. State , 138 N.E.3d ......
-
Rasnick v. State
...of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.” Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind.2002)). This balancing is “a discretionary task best performed by the tri......