Dwight & Pierce v. Blackmar

• Decision Date: 02 April 1878
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Dwight & Pierce v. Blackmar

2 Mich. 330

Dwight & Pierce v. Blackmar

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 2, 1878

Error to Jackson Circuit. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

Judgment reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

A Blair, for plaintiff.

S. H Kimball, for the defendant.

OPINION

By the Court, Whipple, J.

This cause is brought before us by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the county of Jackson. The action was ejectment for an undivided eighth part of a lot or parcel of ground lying in the village of Jackson. On the trial, the plaintiff established the title of Samuel Blackmar, his ancestor, to the land in question, and having proved the death of said Samuel, and that he was one of his heirs at law, and that Dwight & Pierce were in possession of the premises at the commencement of the suit, the former claiming to be owner thereof, rested his cause.

The defendants to maintain the issue on their part, gave in evidence the record of a deed from Lucy Acker, John F. Durand and Silence, his wife, Louis Miller and Mary, his wife, Elizur B. Chapman and Julia, his wife, to Russell Blackmar, dated June 1st, 1836, of certain premises, including the lot in controversy; the said Lucy, Silence, Mary and Julia, being the four daughters and heirs at law of the said Samuel Blackmar.

After certain preliminary proofs, the defendants next offered in evidence a deed of the premises, from Russel Blackmar, administrator, and Eunice Blackmar, administratrix of Samuel Blackmar, to Russel Blackmar, dated second August, 1836. To the introduction of the deed as evidence in the cause, the plaintiff, for various reasons, objected; the objections however, were overruled, and the deed was read to the jury as evidence. It from these appeared that Dwight claimed to be owner of the premises by virtue of a conveyance to him by Russel Blackmar, and that Pierce was his tenant.

From this statement it will be seen that the plaintiff claimed as one of the heirs at law of Samuel Blackmar, and that Dwight's claim was founded upon a conveyance to him by Russell Blackmar, who professed to have acquired title by virtue of a deed from himself as administrator, and Eunice Blackmar, as administratrix of the estate of Samuel Blackmar. It was claimed that Russel Blackmar and Eunice Blackmar sold the land by virtue of a license of the Judge of Probate of Jackson county, upon the representation of the administrator and administratrix of Samuel Blackmar, that the personal property left by the deceased, was insufficient to pay his debts.

It is not my purpose to consider the numerous questions raised on the trial, and appearing in the voluminous record before us, respecting the admissibility as evidence, of the deed from the personal representations of Samuel Blackmar to Russel Blackmar, through whom Dwight claims title, as many of these questions were decided upon the erroneous view taken by the Circuit Court, of the legal character of the deed. It will also become unnecessary, for the same reason, to express an opinion upon other points made in the progress of the trial, and in respect to which exception was taken to the ruling of the Court, by the plaintiff. Those rulings were the consequence of a misapprehension by the Court below, of the validity and effect of the sale made by the administrators of Samuel Blackmar.

To the introduction of the deed executed by Russel Blackmar, administrator, and Eunice Blackmar, administratrix of Samuel Blackmar, to Russel Blackmar, objection was made, on the ground that the deed was fraudulent and void. The Court below, however, held that the deed was not absolutely void, but merely voidable. If the judgment of the Circuit Court upon this point cannot, upon correct legal principles, be sustained, the title of Dwight fails, and the plaintiff upon the showing in the Court below, was entitled to a verdict.

While it is the duty of this Court to view with liberality the proceedings of the Probate Court, when those proceedings are called in question to support titles derived through them, we are not at liberty to overthrow principles which have their foundation in the soundest rules of policy and morality, and the inflexible enforcement of which is deemed necessary to secure a faithful and honest administration of their duties by those to whom is committed the execution of delicate and important trusts.

It is probable that the attention of the Circuit Court was not called to several decisions, made at an early period in the history of this State, by the Court of Chancery, involving the precise question upon which the rights of the parties in this case depended. Those decisions, it is true, were not authoritative and binding upon the Circuit Court, not having received the sanction of this Court. They were nevertheless, entitled to great consideration, from the fact that they embodied the views of two high judicial officers, and seem to have been acquiesced in by counsel, as no attempt was made to call in question their accuracy or soundness by an appeal to this tribunal. Whatever doubt or obscurity may have hung over the important question submitted for our decision in this case, in consequence of views expressed by English and American Judges a half century ago, and still maintained in some of the States, those doubts have been dissipated, and the doctrine maintained by this Court in the case of Clute et al. v. Barron, ante 192, rests upon a foundation too solid to be shaken. That doctrine was commended to our adoption by reasons of policy so overwhelming, and supported by an array of authority so irresistible, as to make the path of duty plain, and leaves the doctrine where it should have been left, unimpaired by the unreasoned opinions or bare suggestions to be found in a few reported cases.

In the case of Beaubien v. Poupard Harrington's Rep., 206, Chancellor Farnsworth set aside a sale made by Poupard, as administrator, on the ground that "the rule is imperative that he could not become a purchaser." In Walton v. Torrey, Harrington, 259, the same Chancellor held that a purchase made by Torrey, of real estate sold under his order as Judge of Probate, was void, and referred to the masterly opinion of Chancellor Kent, in Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns, C. R. 268, as supporting to the fullest extent his opinion. In Ingerson v. Starkweather,...