Dwinell v. Bliss
| Decision Date | 31 July 1886 |
| Citation | 58 Vt. 353,5 A. 317 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | DWINELL, Ex'r, v. BLISS. |
Appeal from chancery.
This was a bill in chancery brought to set aside a deed purporting to have been executed by the orator's testatrix to the defendant, and conveying certain real estate therein described. Heard on bill, answer, traverse, and report of a special master. Powers, Ch., pro forma, dismissed the bill. Appeal by the orator.
The master found as follows:
That the defendant paid no consideration for said deed, except his trouble and expenses in getting said deed made, executed, and recorded, which was but a small sum; that the services the defendant was to perform by the terms of said deed have never been performed, owing to the said Loisa Bliss having demanded, soon after the execution of the deed, that the property be conveyed to her, which demand not being complied with, she joined in this suit for the purpose of compelling the defendant to reconvey the same to her; that at the time of the date of the deed the said Loisa Bliss was nearly 76 years old, and quite feeble; that for some years she had contemplated making her will, and had made one several times, changing it in some small particulars, but that she always had it in her mind, in case she left any property, to provide, so far as she could, for her sister Roxana Stanton; that the said Loisa spoke to the defendant the same year that the deed bears date, before its execution, about making a will; that she sent by him to J. P. Lamson, of Cabot, to come and make her will, and she had talk with him from time to time as to what she intended to do with her property; that on the fifth day of December, 1879, she went to the house of the defendant, and the defendant then made some minutes as to how she desired to have her property disposed of; that before this meeting she and the defendant had had talk about making a will, and the defendant had told her that she could better and more cheaply accomplish her object some other way, and advised her to consult about the matter; finally he procured the deed in question to be drawn; that she did not but that she could alter this deed or writing, as she called it, at any time she chose after it was executed and delivered, the same as she could a will, but that the defendant did know it, and that he did not communicate this fact to her; that when she signed and acknowledged the deed she knew she was signing a paper in reference to her property, and she further knew that said paper contained instructions as to what was to be done with her property after decease; that she understood the nature of the business she was engaged in, but did not know, in case she executed and delivered the deed, that it was not in her power to alter or change it without the consent of the defendant; that although the said Loisa left this deed in the possession of the defendant at the time it was executed, that she did not deliver it to him as a deed at that time, or ever after, but that she expressly told him not to put the deed on record, and the first time after the deed was executed that she saw the defendant, and before the deed was recorded, she called for it, and never consented to have the deed recorded.
J. P. Lamson, for orator.
Joseph A. Wing, for defendant.
This is a bill...
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