Dwy v. Conn. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 January 1915
• Citation: 92 A. 883,89 Conn. 74
• Parties: DWY v. CONNECTICUT CO. et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

92 A. 883

89 Conn. 74

DWY

v. CONNECTICUT CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 26, 1915.

Concurring Opinion Feb. 3, 1915.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edwin B. Gager and Lucien F. Burpee, Judges.

Action by Walter Dwy against the Connecticut Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Judgment set aside, and cause remanded.

The plaintiff's injuries were sustained while he was engaged as an employe of Fred T. Ley & Co., Incorporated, which corporation in turn was at the time engaged in doing work for and upon the premises of the Connecticut Company. He was at the time working under the direction of a foreman of the Ley Company. His injuries were occasioned by an electric current of high voltage with which an iron structure upon which he was instructed and directed to work was charged. The complaint alleges that before taking his position upon this iron structure he was informed by the defendants that there was no danger from electricity, and that the defendants undertook to see to it that the current was shut off. It also alleges that the defendants, their servants and agents, were negligent in failing to shut off the current, and in not keeping it shut off, while the plaintiff was at work upon this structure, and also in informing him that the current was shut off. Following the receipt of his injuries, the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, executed and delivered to the Ley Company the two following instruments under his hand and seal:

"Know all men by these presents that I, Walter Dwy, of Waterville, county of New Haven, state of Connecticut, for and in consideration of the sum of one hundred dollars to be paid by Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have remised, released, and forever discharged, and do hereby for myself, heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, remise, release, and forever discharge to the said Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., its successors and assigns, of and from all debts, demands, action, causes of action, suit dues, sums and sums of money, account, reckoning, bond specialties, covenant, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, doings, omissions, variances, damages, expense, executions, and liabilities whatsoever, both in law and equity, or which may result from the existing state of things, which against the said Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., the said Walter Dwy now have or ever had from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents, more especially on account of injuries I received on May 6, 1913, by being burned by electricity, I hereby reserving, or hereby reserving, my right to sue any other party or parties."

"I, Walter Dwy, in consideration of one hundred dollars ($100) and other valuable consideration, do hereby release and discharge Fred T. Ley & Co., Inc., from all claims for damages on account of an accident occurring to me on the 6th day of May, 1913, and make no claim against my employer or hereby reserving my right to sue any other party or parties."

Nathaniel R. Bronson and Lawrence L. Lewis, both of Waterbury, for appellant.

Joseph F. Berry, of New Haven, for appellees.

PRENTICE, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). This appeal presents a single question only, to wit:

"Did the execution and delivery by the plaintiff to the Ley Company, his immediate employer, of the two instruments recited in the answer, operate to discharge the defendants from liability for the plaintiffs injury?"

The plaintiff contends that it did not so operate for two reasons: (1) That the Ley Company did not stand in the position of a joint tort-feasor; and (2) that, even if it did, the legal effect of the instruments, when properly construed, was not to release from liability the defendants as others of the joint tort-feasors.

We will consider the second of these propositions first.

It is an ancient and familiar legal proposition that a release or discharge of one or more of several joint tort-feasors, given for a consideration, is a release of all. While this statement has had general acceptance as expressive of the law, there has by no means been a uniformity of view either as to the reasons which underlie and support it or as to the nature of the release and discharge which comes within its provisions. There are not a few cases which have held that the instrument, to operate as the release of all, must be a technical release—that is, one under seal. Eastman v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387, 389; Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 305, 308; Berry v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 9, 13, 43 Am. Dec. 584; Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. Law, 358, 360; Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393, 407, 100 Am. Dec. 752. More have moved farther away from the ancient notion of the sanctity of a seal, and understand the rule as applicable to sealed and unsealed instruments alike. Some, while not confining the operation of the rule to technical releases, interpret its language literally, thereby bringing every instrument using the word "release" or "discharge" within the rule, whatsoever other language it may contain. Others interpret its language with regard for its underlying purpose, and conform its application to the intent of the parties as thereby disclosed, and to ultimate justice. Many, as we have done, frankly extend its terms so as to include satisfaction, whatever the evidence of it may be, with release and discharge as accomplishing the indicated result Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447, 452, 83 Am. Dec. 154. Possibly these differences of attitude, and there are variations of them, are in part attributable to differing views entertained as to the underlying reason for the rule. Possibly, also, a failure to bear these differing views of the rule's foundation in mind has contributed to the confusion which exists in the adjudicated cases. At any rate a confusion does exist that renders harmonizing far from easy, and forcibly suggests that an intelligent solution of the problems presented in any given jurisdiction, in an attempt to make practical application of the familiar formula of words, can only be had by keeping steadily in mind the theory of the law which it represents as there accepted.

Lord Coke said that the rule had its origin in the fact that the release should be taken most strongly against the releasor, and the assertion reappears in several modern cases. Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203, 205, 63 C. C. A. 361; Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 185, 186. Not infrequently it has been said that its reason was that the cause of action for the injury was one and indivisible, so that the release of one joint tort-feasor necessarily destroyed the right of action. Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q. B. (1892) 511, 513; Dufur v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 75 Vt. 165, 172, 53 Atl. 1068; Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 94, 97 N. E. 638, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 475, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 267. Again it has been said that the reason is that the law considers that the one who has received the release committed the whole tort and occasioned the whole injury, and that it has satisfied the injured party. Gilpatrick v. Hunter, 24 Me. 18, 19, 41 Am. Dec. 370; Abb v. Railroad Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954, 58 L. R. A. 293, 92 Am. St. Rep. 864. Still again, reference being had to technical releases, the rule has been made to rest upon a conclusive presumption said to attach to the presence of the seal that the sealer had been fully satisfied. Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138, 147, 6 N. W. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 830; McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 178, 93 N. W. 243, 61 L. R. A. 445, 102 Am. St. Rep. 416, 1 Ann. Cas. 61; Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203, 205, 63 C. C. A. 361. The reason most commonly assigned, especially in modern cases, and that which is most satisfactory in that it does not rest upon pure techniques, but upon broad principles of justice and equity, is that the releasor is entitled to one satisfaction, and one only, and that an unqualified release or discharge implies the receipt of such satisfaction. Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. 1, 17, 18 L. Ed. 129; McAllester v. Sprague, 34 Me. 296, 298; Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60, 67, 24 Am. Rep. 504; Matthews v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 3 Rob. (N. Y.) 711, 714.

We have adopted this last as the underlying reason for our rule, which, it should be borne in mind, expressly extends its statement to include all cases where satisfaction has been received. The language of this court states our theory of the law most clearly, and indicates the rule of interpretation to be given to the language used in expressing the rule of law, and in the application of it to concrete situations. In Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447, 452, 83 Am. Dec. 154, we said:

"It is, as we suppose, settled law that a release, discharge, or satisfaction of one or more of several joint trespassers is a discharge of them all, in the same manner that the discharge of one of several joint debtors, or a payment and satisfaction of the joint debt by one, is a satisfaction as to all, since a party injured by a trespass committed by several can have but one satisfaction for his injury, no more than one who has a debt against several can be entitled to be more than once paid."

It needs no argument to demonstrate that, under the theory of the law thus stated and more fully elaborated in the opinion and in the dissenting opinion of Judge Butler, there is no reason for the proposition that technical releases only come within its purview. What the law under our theory regards is not technical or artificially created conditions, but the substantial matter of acceptance of consideration in satisfaction for the injury received, and receipts in full and releases, sealed and unsealed, are only incidents which have their bearing upon the ultimate question. Different degrees of significance may attach to the several kinds of writing as evidence of satisfaction received, but behind them all alike lies the ultimate decisive fact sought after of the acceptance or...