Dwyer v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 18 May 1948
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Citation: 321 Mich. 178,32 N.W.2d 434
• Parties: DWYER v. APPEAL BOARD OF MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

321 Mich. 178

32 N.W.2d 434

DWYER

v.APPEAL BOARD OF MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 18, 1948.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Thomas J. Murphy, judge.

Certiorari proceeding by John Dwyer against the Appeal Board of the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission and the Packard Motor Car Company, a Michigan corporation, to review a decision of the Appeal Board that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act. From a judgment reversing the Appeal Board's decision and awarding judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Packard Motor Car Company, a Michigan corporation, appeals.

Circuit court's judgment reversed and cause remanded to circuit court to enter judgment affirming award of Appeal Board.

Before the Entire Bench.

Ernest Goodman, of Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Bodman, Longley, Bogle, Middleton & Armstrong, of Detroit, (Grant E. Armstrong and Alfred C. Wortley, Jr., both of Detroit, of counsel), for defendant-appellant, Packard Motor Car Co.

Beaumont, Smith & Harris, of Detroit, for Michigan Mfrs. Unemployment Compensation Bureau, Inc., amicus curiae.

BUTZEL, Justice.

This case involves a claim for benefits under the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act.¹ The essential facts are undisputed. Plaintiff and appellee, John Dwyer, voluntarily retired from the Detroit Police Department in September, 1944, after 25 years' service as a patrolman. He is receiving a life pension of half-pay from that organization, is 50 years of age, and in good health. On October 3, 1944, shortly after retiring from the police force, he took employment with the Packard Motor Car Company, defendant and appellant, as a plant guard, and continued in its employment until September 9, 1945, when he was laid off because the employer found it necessary to reduce its work force, the cessation of hostilities of World War II having brought an end to the war work in which it had been engaged. After being laid off, plaintiff applied for and was paid unemployment benefits under the act in the amount of $390. His right to those benefits is not questioned. Plaintiff has not been recalled to work by defendant because he lacks sufficient seniority to entitle him to a job in its peace-time organization. He did not secure employment elsewhere up to the time this case was heard below by the appeal board of the unemployment compensation commission, and at that time he had been unemployed for a period of 19 months. During this period it appears that plaintiff has sought employment only three or four times, although he registered and reported for work at an employment office as required by the act and the regulations of the commission. He has not sought employment from others in police work, for which he is qualified by reason of his 25 years of experience, because as he stated he did not wish to compete with returning veterans and he felt that the field was too crowded with applicants. In his testimony before the appeal board he stated that he is qualified to do painting and decorating work, but that he made no effort to obtain such work, although he contemplated entering into that business with his son when the latter returned from service in the armed forces.

Plaintiff's claim is for benefits for a second ‘benefit year,’ and is based upon his continued unemployment after July 1, 1946. Under the act as it read before amendment by Act No. 360, Pub.Acts 1947, plaintiff's first ‘benefit year’ covered the period from July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1946, and the ‘base period’ of employment earnings during which determined the maximum amount of benefits payable to him for this ‘benefit year,’ extended from April 1, 1944, to March 31, 1945. Plaintiff's second ‘benefit year’ covers the period from July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1947, and the ‘base period’ for this ‘benefit year’ extends from April 1, 1945, to March 31, 1946. Since plaintiff earned wages during two calendar quarters of this ‘base period,’ he is entitled to additional benefits under the act, provided he meets the other conditions for eligibility. (For definitions of the terms ‘base period,’ ‘benefit year,’ and ‘calendar quarter’ as used in the act, see sections 45, 46 and 47 thereof; and see sections 27(b) and 27(d) as to amount of benefits payable to eligible individuals.)

The claims' examiner of the unemployment compensation commission determined in the first instance that plaintiff was eligible for benefits as claimed. An appeal was taken by the defendant to a referee appointed by the commission, who, after a hearing, affirmed the determination of the claims' examiner. Defendants then appealed to the commission's appeal board, which, after a further hearing, reversed the decision of the referee and held that claimant was not eligible for benefits. Plaintiff then took the case to the circuit court for the county of Wayne on writ of certiorari, which court reversed the appeal board and entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff.

The principal question before us is aptly phrased in the opinion of the appeal board as follows:

‘The only issue in this case is with respect to claimant's availability for full-time work under the provisions of that part of section 28(c) of the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act which reads as follows:

“Sec. 28. Benefit eligibility conditions. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the commission finds that: * * * (c) He is able to perform full-time work of a character which he is qualified to perform by past experience or training, and of a character generally similar to work for which he has previously received wages, and he is available for such work, full-time, either at a locality at which he earned wages for insured work during his base period or at a locality where it is found by the commission that such work is available.”

The appeal board reasoned that the public policy which the Unemployment Compensation Act was designed to carry into effect is to provide benefits for persons who are unemployed through no fault of their own, and that ‘the requirement that an individual, to qualify for benefits, must be available for full-time work, was obviously made a part of the statute in order to prevent individuals who do not want to work and who are not in fact in the labor market from receiving benefits.’ Placing this interpretation upon the word ‘available’ as used in section 28(c) of the act, the majority of the appeal board reached the following conclusion: ‘Benefits should be paid where it appears that the claimant has made a bona fide, reasonable attempt to keep himself in the labor market, and withheld when it appears from the proofs that such attempt is lacking. What is a bona fide, reasonable attempt must necessarily be judged by the facts and circumstances in a given case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this respect, but it must be kept in mind * * * that the burden of proof as to claimant's availability for full-time work in any case rests with the claimant and does not shift.’

The circuit judge took issue with this interpretation of the word ‘available’ as used in section 28(c), and in his opinion said: ‘The Appeal Board interprets availability to mean that the claimant not only must register and report, but must be continually seeking employment. I do not think that availability can be given that meaning.’

Evidently other circuit judges have come to a contrary conclusion.² Thus, the primary question raised involves a problem of statutory interpretation: What is the meaning of the word ‘available’ as it is used in section 28(c) of the act?

Another issue was referred to by the appeal board. Section 28(a) provides that an unemployed individual shall be eligible for benefits only if ‘he has registered for work at and thereafter has continued to report at an employment office in accordance with such regulations as the commission may prescribe.’ The plaintiff in the instant case fulfilled this requirement, and it is contended that by registering and reporting he fulfilled the requirement as to ‘availability’ in section 28(c). The appeal board answered this contention in the negative, taking the position that registering and reporting only fulfills the requirements of section 28(a), ‘which is only one of the benefit eligibility conditions,’ and does not fulfill the separate eligibility conditions contained in section 28(c). The board reached the conclusion that compliance with section 28(a) is not, ipso facto, a compliance with section 28(c), and that a claimant is required to do more than register and report to establish that he is eligible for benefits. Plaintiff points to the fact that by Act No. 360, Pub. Acts 1947, the legislature amended section 28(a) to make it a condition of eligibility that an unemployed individual must not only register and report at the commission's employment office, but also must be ‘seeking work.’ He argues that this amendment indicates an intention by the legislature to change the meaning of the section, and that the only change in meaning which could have been intended was to impose a new requirement upon the right of an unemployed worker to benefits, the requirement that he personally seek work. The trial judge gave credence to this argument in his opinion, where he said: ‘The legislature in 1947 amended section 28-A to provide that a claimant must not only register and report, but that he must also seek employment. If it was their intention that availability mentioned in section 28-C required the claimant to seek employment there would have been no necessity for the amendment.’

Plaintiff also argues that the appeal board was in error in applying the legal principle of ‘burden of proof’ to his case, and that to require a claimant udner the act to be aware of the legal requirements involved in the burden of proof concept would be...