Dyar v. State, 1794-01.

Citation125 S.W.3d 460
Decision Date23 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 1794-01.,1794-01.
PartiesBradley Robert DYAR, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Keith S. Hampton, Austin, for appellant.

Sarah Wannarka, Assist. D.A., Bastrop, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for state.

PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MEYERS, WOMACK, JOHNSON, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

The issue on this appeal is whether the appellant's warrantless arrest was made while the appellant was in a "suspicious place" and therefore, authorized under Article 14.03(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated. Before trial, the appellant moved to suppress the blood specimen, asserting that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest. After a pre-trial hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere. The Third Court of Appeals held that the arrest was legal and that the blood specimen taken pursuant to that arrest was untainted. Dyar v. State, 59 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001). We affirm.

FACTS

The appellant was in a one-car accident in Smithville, Texas, around midnight on New Year's Eve, 2000. The appellant, the lone occupant of the vehicle, was taken to Smithville Hospital before the police responded to the accident scene. After arriving at the scene of the accident, Trooper Thompson observed that the appellant's vehicle had left the road and landed upside down. Trooper Thompson went to the hospital emergency room to speak with the appellant about the accident. The appellant told the trooper that he had been partying in Austin for New Year's Eve and was attempting to drive back to Houston. The appellant admitted to drinking alcohol and driving. The trooper noticed that the appellant had slurred speech, red glassy eyes, a strong smell of alcohol, and that many of the appellant's answers were unintelligible.

Based on the above information, coupled with the details of the accident, Trooper Thompson believed that he had established probable cause. Trooper Thompson read the appellant his Miranda warnings and the DWI statutory warning and arrested the appellant for driving while intoxicated. The appellant consented to providing a sample of his blood.

The appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated. The appellant moved to suppress the blood specimen, claiming that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest. The trial court denied the appellant's motion finding that, due to the facts and circumstances known to Trooper Thompson on that night, it was reasonable to conclude that the appellant had committed a breach of the peace. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a)(1).

The appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere. The trial court sentenced the appellant to 180 days confinement in the county jail, but suspended the sentence and placed the appellant on community supervision for two years. The trial court ordered the appellant to pay a $750 fine, to pay restitution of $64.92, and to perform 100 hours of community service.

On appeal, the appellant noted that Article 14.03(a)(1) permits the warrantless arrest only of persons found in "suspicious places." Dyar v. State, 59 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001). The appellant argued that the hospital where he was arrested is not a "suspicious place." Ibid. Under the totality of the circumstances test, the Third Court of Appeals found that the accident scene coupled with Trooper Thompson's observations at the hospital constituted the "suspicious place" leading to the appellant's lawful arrest. Id. at 717.

DISCUSSION

Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim. App.1985). However, the instant case presents us with a question of law based on undisputed facts, thus we perform a de novo review. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

The appellant claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the appellant's warrantless arrest was authorized by Article 14.03(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The article in question provides in part:

a) any peace officer may arrest, without warrant:

1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws.

Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a)(1). Specifically, the appellant argues that the hospital where he was arrested was not a suspicious place under the above Article. Moreover, the appellant claims that the courts, in interpreting the above Article, have not given meaning to "suspicious places."

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes certain requirements upon arrests and other "seizures" of the person. George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, 40 Texas Practice § 7.11, at 443 (2d ed.2001). But there is no general requirement of a warrant, and there is nothing in the United States Supreme Court's prior case law indicating that, under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required to make a valid arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-17, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976).

As for the Texas Constitution, this Court recently stated:

It is our holding that Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution contains no requirement that a seizure or search be authorized by a warrant, and that a seizure or search that is otherwise reasonable will not be found to be in violation of that section because it was not authorized by a warrant.

This is not to say that statutes which require warrants for seizure or search may be ignored. Nor do we say that the issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate may not be a factor in the totality of circumstances by which we judge whether a seizure or search was reasonable.

Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim.App.1998).

Texas statutory law imposes a number of requirements beyond those mandated by the federal constitution. George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, 40 Texas Practice § 7.11, at 444 (2d ed.2001). Most significantly, Texas law imposes a general requirement—subject to exception—that arrests be made pursuant to arrest warrants. Ibid. Because warrantless arrest are permissible only when authorized by statute, Texas statutory law deals extensively with officers' power to make warrantless arrests. Ibid.

The Texas Legislature has acknowledged that certain circumstances justify the use of arrest powers even though a warrant has not been issued. Texas courts have interpreted these statutes as requiring that a warrant be obtained before an arrest is made, unless one of the limited statutory exceptions applies. Randall v. State, 656 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Crim.App.1983).

Chapter Fourteen of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the authority for most lawful warrantless arrests in Texas.1 These provisions of the Code are founded in the law of necessity, that is, the necessity for prompt action in order to arrest or detain the offender so as to prevent his escape. Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).

For instance, an arrest may be made with probable cause when the authorities, be they peace officers or magistrates, have a reasonable belief that an offense is being committed in their presence. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. arts. 14.01, 14.02. Article 14.04 applies when officers receive information from a credible person that a felony has been committed and that the offender is about to escape so that there is no time to procure a warrant. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.04.

Article 14.03 includes a number of exceptions. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03. Several of these permit, and sometimes require, officers to arrest without a warrant persons who have assaulted household members or violated the terms of a protective order. Id. art. 14.03(a)(2)-(4), (b). Other provisions deal with the authority of peace officers to arrest without a warrant outside their territorial jurisdiction. Id. art. 14.03(d), (g).

Article 14.03(a)(1), which is the article at issue here, allows a lawful warrantless arrest when officers discover a person in a suspicious place and under circumstances which reasonably show an offense has been or is about to be committed. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a)(1).

The predecessor of Article 14.03 originated in the Penal Code of 1856, and the language of the Article remains largely unchanged.2 However, Texas legislative history is sparse with respect to the legislature's intent in passing this Article, and there is no definition of "suspicious places" given. Therefore, this Court is left to interpret Article 14.03(a)(1).

In Lara v. State, this Court handed down the test to be applied to an Article 14.03(a)(1) analysis. 469 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1971). In that case, the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 178. At trial, the officers testified that they observed the defendant running from a known drug house. Ibid. They further testified that they apprehended the defendant and performed an initial search, and upon apprehending the remaining individuals, they read the defendant his rights. Ibid. They then performed a second search of the defendant and found a capsule of heroin. Ibid. On appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no reversible error where, under all the circumstances observed by the officers and the facts known by them, they had probable cause and the defendant's arrest was authorized under the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03(a)(1). Id. at 179. This test has been repeated on many occasions by this Court and others.

In this case, the appellant was taken to the hospital before the...

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