Dye v. Mayor

Citation119 Miss. 359,80 So. 761
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
Decision Date03 March 1919
PartiesDYE ET AL. v. MAYOR ET AL

March 1919

[80 So 761, Division B.]

1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Organizations. Collateral attack. Where a town has been created a separate school district by legislative authority and as such becomes an instrumentality of the government for school purposes, being a governmental arm of the state, the legality of its organization cannot be inquired into or attacked collaterally in a proceeding to enjoin the issuance of district school bonds.

2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Bond elections. Qualification of voters.

Where complainants sought to enjoin the issue and sale of district school bonds on the ground of the illegality of the election authorizing the issuance of bonds, failed to show that any person was permitted to vote who was not a bona-fide resident of the school district and otherwise duly qualified as a voter, in such case the petition will be dismissed.

3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Bonds. Election. Legality.

Where in a suit to enjoin the issuance of bonds authorized by an election, complainants failed to show that the result of the election would have been against the bonds in the event certain voters had not been permitted to vote in the election and there was no charge of fraud and the election was not contested. In such case, the complainants failed to make out their case.

HON. J G. MCGOWEN, Chancellor.

APPEAL from the chancery court of Panola county, HON. J. G. MCGOWEN Chancellor.

Suit by W. T. Dye and others against J. L. Brewton and others, as Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the Town of Sardis, seeking an injunction against the issuance and sale of bonds of the Sardis separate school district. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Decree affirmed.

Geo. M Johnson and Jas. Stone, for appellant.

It must be admitted that any separate school district is a quasi-public corporation which corporation is invested with certain powers and authority, and that said quasi-corporation derives all of its power through and by legislative acts enacted by the legislative department of the state. It must also be admitted that it has been universally held in other states that only quo warranto or action in the nature of same can the legality of the organization be inquired into but after diligent search counsel have not been able to find a single decision from this court.

The county school board is a court of limited jurisdiction. Every member of that board is presumed to have known the law. By act of legislature of 1890, chapter 281, the limits for school purposes was extended to include four sections of land, of which the original town was the geographical center. By ordinance passed by mayor and board of aldermen the town limits was withdrawn to be a mile square which authority we think the board has as to the town limits or exercising its police powers but that such an ordinance did not disturb the then already organized Sardis separate school district, nor was it within their power to disturb same as this power was vested upon organization in the county school board under limited powers. No territory can be added to an already established municipal school district unless the territory proposed to be added lies adjoining such municipality. (Sec. 4533, Code of 1906.)

The court in Wallace v. State ex rel. Tucker reported in 104 Miss. 162, 83 So. 61, said: "for the reason that section 4533 of the code provides a complete scheme by which adjoining territory may be added to a separate school district."

This court in Jones County v. Grisson et al., reported 97 Mis.. 193, 52 So. 629, said: "The only exception to this is found in section 4533 of the code. This last section (that is 4533) allows separate school districts to be created out of 'any part of a county adjoining a municipality which is a separate school district,' to be included in such district, when a petition is filed for this purpose."

It is contended for the appellees that the county school board was a court of competent jurisdiction and upon petition as presented asserting that such territory was adjoining said municipality or town of Sardis when as a matter of law such territory was not adjoining the municipality of the town of Sardis but was adjoining the Sardis separate school district as established by the legislature, could not confer jurisdiction on said limited court of limited jurisdiction. These facts we contend the county school board should have taken judicial knowledge of and if they failed then we contend that when an attack is made on the issuance of bonds by another body, the mayor and board of aldermen, that the court, assuming jurisdiction, can go into all the facts and decide the whole case. Now we admit the reverse would be if the county school board had the authority to issue bonds as well as to established school districts. In other words it is the contention of the appellants that because of the issuance of bonds a lien is placed on the territory described by such order or ordinance to protect the holders of said bonds and because of the equities involved therein, chancery court had jurisdiction of persons and property and on assuming jurisdiction that such court could inquire in and decide all matters material to this cause. Section 532, Code of 1906; Bank v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 470; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Brooks, 66 Miss. 583; and Eyrich v. Bank, 67 Miss. 60. In this matter the court refused to go into the facts as to the organization of the separate school district.

The only registration ordered by the mayor and board of aldermen for this election was an order to the clerk to give notice to all persons living outside of the corporate limits of the town of Sardis and within the proposed Sardis separate school district to register. No other registration is necessary to hold an election of this kind. The mayor and board of aldermen acting for the town can at any time they deem necessary issue and sell bonds for improvements and no vote except their vote need be taken unless such bond issue would increase taxation above the maximum allowed under the statute. Surely appellees cannot contend under the facts as shown in this record that there was a registration of any kind. If there was no registration there is certainly no election. (87 Miss. 463.)

For the above reasons set out we most respectfully ask this court to reverse this cause and cause same to be remanded to the chancery court in order that this court might well and truly go into the organization of said separate school district and an organization of a school district which would by judicial act and not by ex-parte petition be established.

Since counsel for appellees has agreed to allow us time within which to file this brief and assignment of error we respectfully ask that if there is any part of this brief that he desires to answer that this court will allow him to do so in order that this court might well and truly have facts and law before its body for final decision.

F. H. Montgomery, for appellees.

The Sardis separate school district is a quasi-public corporation, and as such it is a part of the governmental arm of the state and is invested with governmental power and authority. It was created by the state acting through the legislative department, and was brought into existence for public and not private purposes.

It derives its franchises from the states and was created for the better regulation and government of local affairs. It is an arm of the state through which the state's government is benefitted and being a part of the sovereignty of the state and exercises public governmental powers and functions, its organization cannot be attacked or inquired into by a private individual whose interests are not distinct from those of other citizens and tax payers.

In such cases the right to institute or inquire into the legality of the organization of the corporation is confined to the state itself in a direct proceeding in the nature of a quo-warranto.

This proposition of law is so universally established by the courts of last resort in this country, that an argument is unnecessary to sustain the contention.

I refer the court to the following cases, which fully sustain me in this proposition. School District v. Fremont Co., 86 P. 24; A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 6 P. 281; State v. Ryan, 125 P. 666; Shriver v. Day, 114 N.E. 918; Haynes v. School District, 164. N.W. 887; Nelson v. School District, 164 N.W. 874; Coffman v. School District, 141 S.W. 132; City of El Paso v. Rubhman, 46 S.W. 25; Keweenaw Asso. v. School District, 57 N.W. 404; State v. Ferguson, 134 N.W. 872; State v. Palmer, 26 N.W. 469; Burnham v. Rogers, 66 S.W. 970; Wood v. Calaveras Co., 129 P. 283; School District v. Chappell, 135 S.W. 75; People v. Powell, 112 N.E. 614; State v. Miller, 88 S.W. 637; School District v. Young, 133 S.W. 143; Black v. Early, 106 S.W. 1014; School District v. Cheyenne Co., 26 P. 43; School District v. School Directors 28 N.E. 49; Connive v. Smith, 157 N.W. 450. And this is true, even though it might be successfully contended that the organization was so defective as to be void in its inception. Evans v. Anderson, 155 N.W. 1040.

This principle of law is so completely established by the foregoing decision, that I would not undertake to add anything to the decisions of the courts by way of argument. It is very clear from these cases that the complainants in the case at bar had no right in their suit to question the legality of the organization of the district.

In addition to this there is another very satisfactory reason why this contention of the...

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