Dye v. State, 6 Div. 239.
| Decision Date | 24 May 1932 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 239. |
| Citation | 25 Ala.App. 138,142 So. 111 |
| Parties | DYE v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; H. P. Heflin, Judge.
Clinton Dye was convicted of burglary of a railroad car, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
George Frey, of Birmingham, for appellant.
Thos E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Jas. L. Screws, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.
In this prosecution, the offense complained of, by indictment, was burglary of a railroad car. The corpus delicti was proven without dispute or conflict, and the only further inquiry upon the trial of this case in the court below was whether or not this appellant was one of the parties who committed the crime complained of. The undisputed evidence, as stated disclosed that the railroad car in question had been broken into. That the car originally contained six hundred sacks of sugar, and that thirteen sacks of the sugar had been stolen from the car. There was some evidence that these particular thirteen sacks of stolen sugar were sold and delivered to one Digeorgia, and that they were so sold and delivered by this appellant and two others. This appellant denied all connection with or knowledge of the burglary, and strenuously insisted he did not participate in any manner in the sale of the sugar or its delivery to Digeorgia, as testified to by Digeorgia and an admitted accomplice, one Johnny Jones.
The position taken by appellant in the court below was to the effect that there was no evidence tending to connect him with the commission of the offense other than that of accomplices and he undertook to invoke the provisions of section 5635 of the Code 1923, wherein it is provided a conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice (or accomplices), unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense etc. And in this connection appellant insisted that the purchaser of the stolen goods, the said Digeorgia, was an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court left it to the jury to decide from the evidence whether Digeorgia was an accomplice, and in this we think there was no error. On this question the court made the following statement, to which exception was reserved: ...
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Leonard v. State, 6 Div. 169
...Ala.App., 191 So.2d 224 (Ms. August 16, 1966): 'Summarizing, while there is some surface confusion as to the rationale of Dye v. State, 25 Ala.App. 138, 142 So. 111, contrasted with that of Jones v. State, 23 Ala.App. 395, 126 So. 178, and Motes v. State, 20 Ala.App. 195, 101 So. 286, yet w......
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Davis v. State
...to conceal Davis's crime, or a receiver of stolen property if it had been proved that the $15.00 came from the station. In Dye v. State, 25 Ala.App. 138, 142 So. 111, this court expressly approved (for that case) a jury direction as to a purported accomplice. We '* * * appellant insisted th......
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Humber v. State
...(1969); Cooper v. State, 43 Ala.App. 385, 388-89, 191 So.2d 224, cert. denied, 280 Ala. 711, 191 So.2d 229 (1966); Dye v. State, 25 Ala.App. 138, 139, 142 So. 111 (1932); Motes v. State, 20 Ala.App. 195, 196, 101 So. 286 (1924). "[T]he receiver is an accomplice where he knew in advance that......
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Childs v. State
...the stolen property and indicted for buying, receiving or concealing it, does not make them accomplices as a matter of law. Dye v. State, 25 Ala.App. 138, 142 So. 111; Sweeney v. State, 25 Ala.App. 220, 143 So. 586. 'The burden of proving the witness to be an accomplice is, of course, upon ......