Dyer v. Dist. of Columbia, Unemploy. Comp. Bd., 13281.

Decision Date14 September 1978
Docket NumberNo. 13281.,13281.
Citation392 A.2d 1
PartiesMary E. DYER, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Mary E. Dyer, pro se.

Russell L. Carter, Bill L. Smith, Washington, D. C., D. Kevin Dugan and Norma Denise Wilson were on the brief, for respondent.

Before YEAGLEY and FERREN, Associate Judges, and HOOD, Chief Judge, Retired.

YEAGLEY, Associate Judge:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the District Unemployment Compensation Board (DUCB) finding that petitioner was dismissed from her job due to misconduct and therefore was ineligible for unemployment compensation for a five-week period following her termination and for an additional four-week period because she had been given two months' voluntary dismissal pay by her employer. The DUCB decision upheld in all respects the prior decision of its Hearing Examiner.

Petitioner contends: (1) that there was insufficient evidence adduced at the two hearings held before the Appeals Examiner from which he could conclude that petitioner was dismissed for misconduct; (2) that the payment of two months' wages to petitioner by her employer when petitioner was dismissed was a gift and not a voluntary dismissal payment; and (3) that since her dismissal petitioner has been unemployed and is therefore eligible for unemployment compensation from the date of her dismissal.

The record on appeal provides the following uncontested evidence:

Petitioner was employed by the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse & Co. beginning in July 1973. From the spring of 1975 until her dismissal on September 9, 1977, she served as a librarian for the firm. Price Waterhouse had a rule that employees were not to write memoranda voicing dissatisfaction with the company, but instead were to present any complaints orally to supervisory personnel. On at least six occasions during her employment with Price Waterhouse, petitioner disregarded this rule and authored, co-authored, or signed memoranda criticizing the company. The Appeals Examiner found that before writing the last memorandum, petitioner had been specifically instructed not to writ any more.

The particular incident which precipitated petitioner's dismissal had its origin in August of 1977, when petitioner addressed a memorandum to the partner in charge of the District of Columbia office of Price Waterhouse, complaining of alleged inequities in the company's pay system. She contended that an employee who reported to petitioner potentially could have earned more salary than petitioner herself. Petitioner was reprimanded for writing the memo at a meeting with the personnel manager and the partner in charge. At the same meeting, she was informed that the firm might no longer need the services of a librarian, and was requested to keep a log of her activities to aid the company in that determination. When petitioner left for vacation two weeks later, she sent copies of the log to the partner in charge, to the personnel manager, and to the national office librarian of Price Waterhouse in New York.

Upon her return petitioner was reprimanded for sending a copy of her log to the national office librarian and was asked to resign. She refused to do so and suggested that the firm fire her instead. Later that same day petitioner was dismissed from her job by the partner in charge. However, he asked petitioner to remain with the firm for six more working days, and it was also agreed that petitioner would be paid for the six days' work and would receive two months' additional pay upon her severance on September 9, 1977.

On the basis of a telephone conversation with Price Waterhouse's personnel manager, the DUCB Claims Deputy disqualified petitioner from compensation from September 4, 1977 through October 17, 1977, a period of six weeks, amounting to $702, because she determined that petitioner had been dismissed due to insubordination. Petitioner appealed this determination.

At the hearing before the Appeals Examiner, further evidence was presented, including testimony from petitioner and a Price Waterhouse employer representative. From the evidence presented the Appeals Examiner concluded that petitioner had been dismissed for misconduct, but he reduced petitioner's disqualification from six weeks to five weeks (September 4, 1977 through October 8, 1977) and from $702 to $585 due to mitigating circumstances. Petitioner appealed the decision and Price Waterhouse excepted to the determination that petitioner should be paid unemployment compensation for any time before November 8, 1977, since Price Waterhouse had given her severance pay covering that time period. A rehearing on that issue was held and the Appeals Examiner concluded that petitioner was also disqualified from unemployment compensation for an additional four weeks, from October 9, 1977 through November 5, 1977, because of the voluntary...

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5 cases
  • Gardner v. DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 1999
    ...v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 497 A.2d 1056, 1058 (D.C.1985). Gardner relies on Dyer v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Bd., 392 A.2d 1 (D.C.1978), where this court held that "[i]n order to be `unemployed' and be eligible for compensation under the [Dist......
  • Dowdy v. D.C. Dept. of Employment Services, 84-1416.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • September 24, 1986
    ...substantial evidence in the record and whether there was a correct application of the relevant law. Dyer v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Board, 392 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1978). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable min......
  • Ideal Academy Public Charter Sc. v. Bernola, No. 07-AA-1224.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • June 11, 2009
    ...District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 452 A.2d 1170, 1173 (D.C.1982) (emphasis added) (citing Dyer v. District of Columbia Unemployment Comp. Bd., 392 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1978) (similarly stating that an individual "must not have performed any services or received any earnings during ......
  • MATURU v. DOES
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1999
    ...unemployment benefits. The Department of Employment Services (DOES) apparently interpreted our decision in Dyer v. District of Columbia Unemployment Comp. Bd., 392 A.2d 1 (D.C.1978), to mandate that a severance payment must be treated as applicable to the time in which the payment was actua......
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