Dyer v. Keefe
| Decision Date | 10 March 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 1575,1575 |
| Parties | William O. DYER v. Helen KEEFE. M. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Kelleher & Kelleher, Thomas F. Kelleher, Providence, for petitioner.
Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Kenneth P. Borden, Providence, for respondent.
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of the superior court striking the defendant's written claim of jury trial in the case of William O. Dyer v. Helen Keefe, Law No. 171233. We issued the writ and in compliance therewith the superior court has duly certified all of its records in the case for our inspection.
It appears therefrom that defendant Helen Keefe, on May 21, 1963 prior to the assignment day of the case in the superior court, filed a written claim of jury trial in accordance with G.L.1956, § 9-11-7. June 1, 1963 was assignment day. Thereafter on June 13 plaintiff William O. Dyer moved to strike the claim for the reason that defendant did not give him notice of the filing thereof, which notice he contended was required by rule 7, subd. a of the rules of practice and orders of the superior court. The trial justice granted the motion and defendant duly excepted to such ruling.
In the instant petition she alleges that he misconstrued rule 7, subd. a in holding that it was applicable to a claim of jury trial and that he thereby 'unlawfully, arbitrarily and capriciously' deprived her of her constitutional right to a trial by jury. She further alleges in her petition that she is without an adequate remedy except by certiorari to correct this error and prevent grave injustice and hardship being done to her.
The plaintiff denies this latter allegation and contends that certiorari is premature because defendant may have the alleged error reviewed by this court in due course by prosecuting a bill of exceptions. He further argues that certiorari does not lie to correct errors of law but only for the review of the actions of inferior judicial tribunals taken without jurisdiction or in excess thereof.
We do not agree with those contentions. It is true that the primary office of certiorari is of a supervisory nature to keep such tribunals within their jurisdiction. Gordon v. Gordon, R.I., 186 A.2d 732. However, we have heretofore issued the writ in the exercise of our revisory and appellate jurisdiction to correct alleged errors of law where it appeared that serious hardship was likely to result to the aggrieved party if his only recourse was the normal remedy by appeal or bill of exceptions. McCoy v. Nolan, Atty.Gen. ex rel. Providence Journal Co., 74 R.I. 464, 62 A.2d 330; White v. White, 70 R.I. 48, 36 A.2d 661, 151 A.L.R. 1374; Brickle v. Quinn, 63 R.I. 120, 7 A.2d 890. In our opinion the circumstances here are such that justice requires an immediate determination of the question whether defendant was unlawfully deprived of her constitutional right of trial by jury.
In this state trial by jury is inviolate. The state constitution so declares. Art. I, sec. 15. The right is thus placed absolutely beyond the power of the legislature to alter or abolish it. However, reasonable conditions may be placed upon its exercise. Mandeville, Brooks & Chaffee v. Fritz, 50 R.I. 513, 149 A. 859. In that case we held that the condition prescribed in P.L.1929, chap. 1327, now G.L.1956, § 9-11-7, was reasonable and did not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of the right. The statute merely provides that the right shall be deemed to be waived if neither party files a written claim for a jury trial before the assignment day of the case.
Although defendant Keefe filed such written claim, plaintiff contended that she nevertheless waived the right because she did not furnish him with a copy of her claim not later than the day of filing. In other words, he takes the position that by the promulgation of rule 7, subd a the superior court in the exercise of its rule-making power added a further condition precedent to plaintiff's exercise of her constitutional right. Such rule, he argues, has the same force and effect as a statute and therefore is as binding upon the defendant as § 9-11-7.
There is no controversy here as to that contention insofar as the legal effect of such a rule is concerned, but there is a serious question as to whether rule 7, subd. a is applicable to a written claim of jury trial. The defendant argues that the language of the rule does not comprehend such a claim. It is limited, she argues, to the pleadings, motions, etc. specifically enumerated. The pertinent portion of the rule referred to reads as follows:
'Copies Subsequent to Original Pleading
The plaintiff replies that the words 'or other paper' justify the inclusion of the claim of jury trial among the other enumerated pleadings. In answer to that contention defendant invokes the canon of ejusdem generis and argues that such general words following as they do specific words of enumeration must be narrowly construed as of like import. Assuming...
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Advisory Opinion to Senate
...a trial by jury, the inviolate clause of our constitution prohibits any legislative attempt to abolish or alter this right. Dyer v. Keefe, 97 R.I. 418, 198 A. 2d 159. The Legislature may not deprive a litigant of any of the essential features of a jury trial that were available to a litigan......
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State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court of Town of Jackson
...of serving upon the other parties a demand for a trial by jury is one of procedure and is governed by the rules." In Dyer v. Keefe, 97 R.I. 418, 198 A.2d 159, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was concerned with a proceeding on a writ of certiorari to review an order of the Superior Court s......
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Bendick v. Cambio
...to trial by jury has been placed by the State Constitution beyond the power of the Legislature to alter or abolish it. Dyer v. Keefe, 97 R.I. 418, 198 A.2d 159 (1964). We, in common with the federal courts, were confronted with the problem of accommodating the right to jury trial as require......
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Wilkinson v. Harrington
...her only recourse to obtain review of the trial justice's rulings was by way of appeal after a full trial on the merits. Cf. Dyer v. Keefe, 97 R.I. 418, 198 A.2d 159. Accordingly, because of the peculiar circumstances presented in this case, we have decided to exercise our discretion and ha......