Dyer v. Osborne

Decision Date21 March 1876
Citation11 R.I. 321
PartiesCHARLES DYER, Collector of Taxes v. JOSEPH OSBORNE.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

O., a resident and tax-payer in Tiverton, R.I., owned certain shares of manufacturing corporations organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and located with their property in Fall River in that state, where all their property was invested. O. was taxed in Fall River for these shares, assessed under the laws of Massachusetts at their fair market value, and paid the tax. In the same year he was again taxed in Tiverton under the laws of Rhode Island for the same shares: -

Held, that under Gen. Stat. R.I. cap. 38, § 1, and cap. 39, § 10, this second tax was valid.

Held, further, that it did not conflict with art. 1 § 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, which declares that " the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens."

Held, further, that the Massachusetts tax, even if valid, could not divest Rhode Island of its jurisdiction, and that the amount of tax levied " is, within reasonable limits at least, a legislative, not a judicial question."

CASE. On demurrer to plea.

Shares of corporate stock, being in the nature of choses in action, incorporeal, and having no situs independently of their owner, are taxable in the state of his residence, and such state is not devested of jurisdiction to impose the tax, by the fact that they have already been taxed at their fair market value in another state, in which the corporation was organized, and that such tax has been paid.

Francis B. Peckham, Jr., for plaintiff.

William P. Sheffield, for defendant.

DURFEE C. J.

This is an action on the case to recover a tax of $280.00 assessed on the defendant in the town of Tiverton in the year 1874. The defendant pleads in bar of the action, that in compliance with a notice given by the assessors as prescribed by the statute, Gen. Stat. R.I. cap. 40, § 6, he rendered an account on oath as required by § 7 of that chapter, and his tax was duly assessed by the assessors upon the ratable property and estate in said account mentioned, and was by him promptly paid to the collector of taxes; and he further avers and pleads, " the taxes in the plaintiff's declaration mentioned were assessed upon other property of the defendant, to wit: upon forty shares of the capital stock or corporate property of certain manufacturing corporations, organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and located with their said property in the city of Fall River, in the said commonwealth, which said shares were of the par value of $40,000; all of which said capital stock of said corporations was then invested in lands, factory buildings, tenement houses, permanent and movable machinery and stock in process, all located and established in Fall River aforesaid, and said shares in the said corporate property were all taxed to this defendant in said Fall River at their fair market value, and which said tax in said Fall River he duly paid; and this defendant avers that the tax in the said plaintiff's declaration mentioned was assessed on the said shares in the said corporate property, and not upon other and different property or estate of the defendant, and that the said property was not ratable in the said town of Tiverton, and that the said tax mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration and assessed thereon, was and is illegal and void," & c. To this plea the plaintiff demurs.

The declaration describes the defendant as " of Tiverton," and for anything that appears in the plea, he was a citizen or inhabitant of the state, having his domicil in that town. The question, therefore, which is presented by the pleading is, whether a citizen or inhabitant of the state is liable to pay a tax assessed against him in the town of his domicil upon shares of stock which he owns in a manufacturing corporation of another state, he having been taxed and paid the tax on the same shares in such other state.

The question arises under chapters 38 and 39 of the General Statutes. The first section of chapter 38 declares that " all real property in the state, and all personal property belonging to the inhabitants thereof, shall be liable to taxation, unless otherwise specially provided." Section 10 of chapter 39 declares that " personal property, for the purposes of taxation, shall be deemed to include all goods, chattels, debts due from solvent persons, moneys, and effects, wherever they may be; all ships or vessels at home or abroad; all public stocks and securities, except those issued by the government of the United States; all stocks or shares in any bank or banking association; in any turnpike, bridge, or other corporation within or without the state, except such as are exempted from taxation by the laws of the state."

The language is plain. It clearly makes the shares of any corporation, whether manufacturing or other, whether without or within the state, liable to taxation, if the owner is an inhabitant of the state, unless such shares are exempted from taxation by the laws of the state. At the time the tax now sued for was assessed, shares in the stock of a manufacturing corporation of another state were not exempted from taxation by the laws of this state. Upon what ground, then, can we hold that the assessment of the tax was illegal and void?

The defendant says the practice of assessors in regard to the taxation of such shares has varied, and that in a majority of the towns such shares have not been taxed to their owners living in this state. A practice under a statute, which has been uniform and long continued, is entitled to weight in construing a statute, if the construction is open to serious doubt. The practice here invoked has not been uniform, and we do not think there can be any serious doubt of the true construction of the statute.

The defendant contends that the assessment, even if within the statute, was illegal and void. He does not point to any specific provision of the Constitution of either the state or the United States which is infringed by the assessment, or by the statute which authorized it; but he plants himself upon the broad ground that the assessment of such a tax is not the exercise of a legitimate power of the state. He has cited numerous cases which he contends support this position. The cases specially referred to are Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Jones v. Town of Bridgeport, 36 Conn. 283; Hoyt v. The Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N.Y. 224; Duer v. Small, 17 How. Pr. 201; People ex rel. Trowbridge v. Com. of Taxes, 11 N.Y. Supreme Ct. 595.

In Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, a resident of New York mortgaged personal property in Illinois to secure an existing debt. In New York, no record or delivery of the property was required to give the mortgage effect; but in Illinois the mortgage without record and delivery was ineffectual as to third persons. The property was attached in Illinois after the mortgage was made and before it could be recorded. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the property, though personal, being situated in Illinois, was subject to the law of Illinois, in respect to attachment.

In Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262, the point decided was that interest on bonds issued by a corporation created by two states, and binding the road in both states,...

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26 cases
  • Bellows Falls Power Co. v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 16 Septiembre 1915
    ...Cyc. 821, 864, 865. Our decision upon this branch of the case is supported by direct adjudications upon the same point in Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R. I. 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460;Worth v. Com., 90 N. C. 409;Appeal Tax Court v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354, 373;Judy v. Beckwith, 137 Iowa, 24, 33, 114 N. W. 5......
  • State ex rel. Rankin v. Harrington
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 16 Julio 1923
    ...Rep. 692;Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28, 38 Am. Rep. 547;McKeen v. County of Northampton, 49 Pa. 519, 88 Am. Dec. 515;Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R. I. 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460;Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 5 Sup. Ct. 1014, 29 L. Ed. 240;Wright v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 195 U. S. 219, 25 Sup. C......
  • State v. Harrington
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 25 Junio 1923
    ... ... Rep. 692; Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28, ... 38 Am. Rep. 547; McKeen v. County of Northampton, 49 ... Pa. 519, 88 Am. Dec. 515; Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R.I ... 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S ... 511, 5 S.Ct. 1014, 29 L.Ed. 240; Wright v. Louisville & N. R ... ...
  • Judy v. Beckwith
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Enero 1908
    ...save as objection has been occasionally made in academic discussions, such taxation is upheld by all of the courts. Dyer v. Osborne, 11 R.I. 321 (23 Am. Rep. 460); Bank v. State, 17 Tenn. 490, 9 Yer. 490; Barrington v. Berkshire, 16 Pick. 572; McKeen v. County, 49 Pa. 519 (88 Am. Dec. 515);......
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