Dyer v. Ponte, 84-1312

• Decision Date: 28 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-1312,84-1312
• Citation: 749 F.2d 84
• Parties: Bryan A. DYER, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Joseph PONTE, Respondent, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 84

749 F.2d 84

Bryan A. DYER, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Joseph PONTE, Respondent, Appellee.

No. 84-1312.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued Oct. 2, 1984.

Decided Nov. 28, 1984.

Henry D. Katz, Boston, Mass., by appointment of the Court, for petitioner, appellant.

Paula J. DeGiacomo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., Frederick W. Riley and Barbara A.H. Smith, Asst. Attys. Gen., Boston, Mass., were on brief for respondent, appellee.

Before COFFIN, Circuit Judge, TIMBERS, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Bryan A. Dyer, appeals dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Dyer, who was convicted by a Massachusetts state court on four counts of murder, as well as for armed robbery and the unlawful carrying of a firearm, claims that his constitutional right to due process was violated during his state court trial. He points to the trial judge's allegedly improper joint enterprise instruction to the jury and to the judge's failure to exclude unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. The district court rejected both of Dyer's claims; it found that the eyewitness identification claim was barred by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), and that the joint enterprise claim failed on the merits. We affirm, adopting in its entirety the district court opinion on the eyewitness identification issue. Although we agree generally with the district court's conclusion on the merits on the joint enterprise claim, we think it important to note our concern as to whether the petitioner adequately exhausted his remedies in state court.

1. Background

The facts surrounding the four murders are described in full in the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirming Dyer's conviction. Commonwealth v. Dyer, 389 Mass. 677, 451 N.E.2d 1161 (1983). The district court summarized the pertinent state court proceedings:

"The bodies of the four victims were found on the morning of September 22, 1980 in a room at the rear of Sammy White's Brighton Bowl in Boston. Each of the victims had been shot in the head with a .38 caliber handgun, and each had received multiple blunt injuries to the head. The victims were found lying on the floor with their hands restrained behind their backs. The bowling alley's safe had been opened, and approximately $4,000 was missing.

"In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the Commonwealth would prove that Dyer alone committed the murders, and the evidence the Commonwealth offered did not specifically implicate anyone other than the petitioner. During his cross-examination of two of the Commonwealth's expert witnesses, however, the defendant's counsel repeatedly asked the witness whether it was not more likely that the murders were committed by a number of persons rather than by a lone gunman. The witnesses declined to offer an opinion on this question.

"After closing arguments, just before he charged the jury, the trial judge told the prosecutor and the defense attorney for the first time that he intended to charge the jury on the law of joint enterprise. Over the objections of the defendant, he did so charge, as follows:

" 'Now ladies and gentlemen, some suggestion has been made that perhaps these crimes were committed by more than one person. This raises the concept known as the law of joint enterprise. Under the theory of joint enterprise, a defendant must have associated himself with a criminal venture and participated to some extent in the commission of the crime.

" 'In order to find the defendant guilty of a crime or crimes, under this theory of the law, the Commonwealth must prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant associated himself with a criminal venture. And, second, that the defendant participated to some extent in the commission of the crime or crimes. In short, in order to convict a defendant of the crimes with which he is charged, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he actively or that he was actively engaged in committing these crimes, irrespective of whether other persons were or may have been involved.' "

In his petition for habeas corpus, Dyer claims that this joint enterprise instruction violated his right to due process in two ways. First, he argues that the instruction should not have been given at all because it allowed the jury to convict him on the basis of matters not in evidence, i.e., it allowed speculation that the crime was committed by more than one person and that Dyer was only one of several perpetrators. That speculation violated his rights, he argues, because he had relied on alibi and mistaken identification defenses which would be undercut by the suggestion that others were involved in the crimes. Dyer's second argument addresses an aspect of the joint enterprise instruction to which he did not object at trial. In charging the jury on joint enterprise, the judge omitted the element of intent, and Dyer argues that the jury could therefore have found him guilty without finding every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating his due process rights.

The Commonwealth responds that Dyer failed to exhaust his state remedies, as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, and, even if he did, the joint enterprise instruction met constitutional requirements. The district court held that Dyer had exhausted the joint enterprise claim, but that the instructions did not deprive him of due process. We consider both aspects of this issue below.

2. Discussion

a. Exhaustion

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 explicitly requires that an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus exhaust his state remedies before challenging his conviction in federal court. We have recently discussed the threshold a petitioner must cross to meet this requirement:

"A habeas petitioner 'must have "fairly presented" to the state courts the "substance", of his federal habeas corpus claim', Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 278, 74 L.Ed. [2d] 3, 7 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. [Connor], 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.Ct. 509, 513-14, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)), ..." Dougan v. Ponte, 727 F.2d 199, 200 (1st Cir.1984).

In Dougan, the petitioner argued that he satisfied this requirement, and raised his constitutional objections to the conduct of his state trial, simply by including the words "unfair trial" in the issues captions of his state court brief. He made no reference to a constitutional provision or specific right and cited no cases which rested on constitutional grounds. We concluded that the claims had not been exhausted because "the most meticulous search on the part of the state court would have turned up nothing suggesting that petitioner was making a federal due process argument." Id. at 202.

Dyer has done barely more than the petitioner in Dougan. In his main brief to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Dyer made two references to the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the joint venture charge "irreparably harmed the Defendant and deprived him of his right to a fair trial under the Fourtheenth [sic] Amendment to the United States Constitution", and that the instruction "emasculated the defense strategy and deprived the defendant of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amentment [sic] of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." In his reply brief, Dyer made no specific references to the Fourteenth Amendment, but several times argued that the instructions violated his right to due process. One such argument was that

"[t]he inclusion of a joint enterprise instruction in the charge to the jury deprived the defendant of due process of law and authorized the jury to return a verdict of guilty on that theory despite a lack of evidence."

We have doubts about whether these cursory references to the Fourteenth Amendment and due process were sufficient to raise the constitutional issue before the Supreme Judicial Court. Dyer cited no federal cases in his state court brief and made virtually no federal argument, in sharp contrast to his extensive discussion of the issue under state law. ¹ Although Dyer's express reference to the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to meet the exhaustion requirements spelled out in Daye v. Attorney General of the State of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 192 (2d Cir.1982) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 723, 79 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984), which we cited with approval in Dougan, 727 F.2d at 201, we believe the instant case comes close to implicating Dougan. A petitioner need not cite " 'book and verse on the federal constitution' " Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. 509, 513, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.1958)), to exhaust his state remedies, but we question whether a petitioner who only cites " 'book and verse' " has done enough to inform the state court of his federal constitutional claim. Thus, although we have decided to address Dyer's petition on the merits, we think counsel would be well advised in the future not to rely on a passing reference to a constitutional provision without supporting federal argument and without citations to federal authorities. ²

b. Merits of the Joint Enterprise Claim

Dyer makes two arguments regarding the constitutional deficiency of the joint enterprise instruction. He argues first that the instruction should not have been given at all because there was no direct evidence suggesting that there was more than one murderer. We commend the district court's treatment of this aspect of the joint enterprise issue, and adopt it as our own.

Dyer also argues that the joint enterprise instruction violated his right to due process because the trial judge neglected to include the element of intent; as a result, the state allegedly failed to...