Dyer v. Steward Carney Hosp.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 17-cv-11452-DJC |
| Parties | JOSEPH DYER, Plaintiff, v. STEWARD CARNEY HOSPITAL, INC., STEWARD MEDICAL GROUP, INC, MICHAEL REILY, M.D.; ZACHARY CROSSEN, and THUAN LAI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Plaintiff Joseph Dyer (“Dyer”) filed this lawsuit alleging several claims against Defendants Steward Carney Hospital Inc. (“Carney Hospital”), Steward Medical Group Inc. (“SMG”), Michael Reily, M.D. (“Dr. Reily”) and police officers Zachary Crossen (“Crossen”) and Thuan Lai (“Lai”) D. 103. Dr. Reily, Carney Hospital and SMG (collectively, “Defendants”) have each moved for partial summary judgment. D. 233. Dr. Reily seeks summary judgment as to the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IX). Id. Carney Hospital and SMG seek summary judgment on the negligence claim (Count XI). Id. Carney Hospital also seeks summary judgment as to the claim for respondeat superior (Count VII). Id. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion.
The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000); see Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific admissible facts showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). In doing so, the nonmovant may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleadings. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The Court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).
The following facts are undisputed. Dyer was arrested on May 13, 2015 for suspected involvement in a drug transaction. D. 235 ¶ 1. During the arrest, Dyer stated he was experiencing chest pains. Id. ¶ 2. Subsequently, Dyer was transported to Carney Hospital for treatment, id., where he was treated by Dr. Reily, id. ¶ 3. Dr. Reily is an employee of SMG. Id. ¶ 4. Dyer contends that there are additional facts that support his opposition to the summary judgment motion. Namely, Dyer alleges that he was forcibly subjected to two anal cavity searches without a warrant, first by Crossen and then by Dr. Reily. D. 103 ¶¶ 25, 31, 33, 39. Dyer claims that Carney Hospital staff heard as he screamed for help during the searches. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 33-34. Dyer also argues that he did not consent to receiving medication or x-ray imaging of his abdomen and pelvis ordered by Dr. Reily. Id. ¶¶ 35, 40. Without Dyer's consent, id. ¶ 40, Dr. Reily communicated to Crossen and Lai that the x-rays showed that Dyer “had not secreted any drugs or contraband in his body, ” id. ¶ 36.
Dyer initiated this action against the City of Boston, Steward Health Care System, LLC (“Steward Health Care”), Carney Hospital, Dr. Reily, Crossen, Lai and Walter J. Ramos in Suffolk Superior Court on May 16, 2017. D. 1. City of Boston, Crossen and Lai subsequently removed the case to this Court on August 7, 2017. Id. The operative complaint is the second amended complaint. D. 103. Defendants have now filed their motion for partial summary judgment. D. 233. The Court heard the parties on the pending motion and took the matter under advisement. D. 239.
Defendants has moved for partial summary judgment, D. 233, on four of the eleven counts alleged in the second amended complaint, D. 103, which the Court will address in turn.
Dr. Reily has moved for summary judgment as to Count VIII, intentional infliction of emotional distress. D. 233. To state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the [defendant] intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 94 (1st Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45 (1976)). “The standard for making a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high.” Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 195 (1st Cir. 1996). Conduct is “extreme and outrageous” if it is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1987) () (internal quotation mark omitted). Recovery for such a claim generally “requires more than ‘that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.'” Doyle, 103 F.3d at 195 (quoting Foley, 400 Mass. at 99) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Dr. Reily challenges this claim as to Dyer's showing as to the causation and severity elements. D. 234 at 5.
Dr. Reily argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Count VIII because Dyer “will not be presenting any expert testimony or evidence at trial” to establish that Dr. Reily's actions were the proximate cause of Dyer's emotional distress. Id. Dr. Reily contends that because “Dyer has a long history of emotional distress and mental disorders, ” Dyer must present expert testimony at trial to distinguish between preexisting mental health disorders and any distress allegedly caused by the nonconsensual anal search. Id. There is, however, no Molloy v. Blanchard, 115 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (alteration in original) ( that the plaintiff's own testimony was sufficient for the jury to decide as to causation); see Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2018). In Sindi, the defendant argued, among other things, that the jury could not have properly found causation for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where the plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony to distinguish a prior stress disorder from the alleged emotional distress. Sindi, 896 F.3d at 23. The First Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, concluding instead that even absent expert evidence, “the jury had ample reason to infer that [the defendant's] conduct caused [the plaintiff]'s emotional distress.” Id. (citing Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 334, 341, (2000)); see Limone, 579 F.3d at 99 ().
Here, Dyer was previously diagnosed with mental health conditions, including bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress syndrome due to extensive childhood trauma and being shot by a gun in 1999. D. 233-2 at 31; D. 233-3 at 35. Dyer testified that as a result of the incident on May 13, 2015, he has trouble eating and sleeping, he does not trust medical professionals, and he suffers from suicidal thoughts. D. 233-2 at 52-53. Specifically, Dyer described that he suffers from nightmares about “doctors putting their hands in [his] ass.” Id. at 53. Although there may be some overlap with respect to Dyer's prior mental health conditions and the alleged emotional distress, a layperson need not rely on expert testimony to infer a causal link between Dr. Reily's conduct and Dyer's symptoms. D. 233-2 at 53. Compare Sindi, 896 F.3d at 23 () with Ramos v. Bd. of Selectmen of Nantucket, 16 Mass.App.Ct. 308, 450 (1983) (). Because there is some disputed evidence of a causal link here, the Court finds that Dr. Reily's challenge fails as to the causation prong of Dyer's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Dr Reily's argument also fails as to the severity prong of this claim. Again, Dr. Reily cites no legal authority to support the proposition that a plaintiff...
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