Dymnioski v. Crown Equip. Corp.

Decision Date24 May 2013
Docket NumberCiv. No. 11-3696
PartiesKeith DYMNIOSKI and JoAnn DYMNIOSKI Plaintiffs, v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORP.; COSTCO; ABC, INC. (1-25); and JOHN DOE (1-25); said names ABC, Inc. (1-25), and John Doe (1-25), being fictitious, jointly, individually and in the alternative, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon two motions by Defendant Crown Equipment Corporation ("Defendant"): (1) a Motion to Preclude the Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Bruce Gorsak, (Doc. No. 38); and (2) a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 39). Plaintiffs oppose. (Doc. Nos. 40, 41). The Court has considered the motions and reached a decision based upon the written and oral submissions of the parties. For the reasons included herein, the Court grants both of Defendant's motions.

BACKGROUND

This action originates from the filing of Plaintiff's May 26, 2011 Complaint in New Jersey Superior Court, Somerset County. (Doc. No. 1, Att. 1, Ex. A). On June 27, 2011,Defendant filed a notice of removal, (Doc. No. 1, Not. of Removal), and on June 4, 2012, this Court permitted Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint and denied Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice pending discovery. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22).

The facts of the underlying matter are as follows. On July 12, 2009, Plaintiff Keith Dymnioski ("Mr. Dymnioski") was injured during the course of his employment while operating a Crown stand-up rider forklift, model RC 5535-30. (Doc. No. 39, Att. 1, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, "SUMF," at ¶ 2).1 Specifically, his leg was seriously injured when it "was able to leave" the operator compartment and the forklift struck a building column. (Doc. No. 23, Amd. Compl. at ¶ 2; SUMF at ¶¶ 3-4).

Plaintiffs allege that the subject forklift was defectively designed because Defendant failed to equip the lift with an operator compartment door and because Defendant failed to implement a prevention algorithm in the lift's braking system. (SUMF at ¶ 5). According to Plaintiffs, these design defects existed at the time the Crown RC5500 was in the possession and control of Defendant, (Amd. Compl. at ¶ 3), and without them, Mr. Dymnioski's injuries would not have occurred. (SUMF at ¶ 5).2

In support of their claims that the forklift was defective in design due to the lack of a door enclosing the operator compartment and a prevention algorithm in the forklift's braking system, Plaintiffs have offered the testimony of Bruce Gorsak ("Mr. Gorsak"). (See Doc. No. 38, Att. 3, Ex. F, Gorsak Report). Defendant argues that Mr. Gorsak is unqualified and has failed to support his opinions as required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 702. Defendant has accordingly moved to preclude Mr. Gorsak's testimony. (Doc. No. 38). Should the Court grant Defendant's motion and exclude Mr. Gorsak's testimony, Defendant has also moved for summary judgment based upon Plaintiffs' failure to proffer a qualified expert in support of their design defect claim. (Doc. No. 39).

Plaintiffs have opposed both motions, despite failing to submit either a responsive statement of undisputed material facts or a statement of disputed facts with their opposition to summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 40, 41). On May 7, 2013, this Court held an oral hearing on the record in which both parties argued as to the admissibility of Mr. Gorsak's testimony and the matter of summary judgment. (Doc. No. 44). After due consideration of both the written and oral arguments of the parties, the Court now issues this Opinion.

DISCUSSION

Because Defendant's motion for summary judgment is contingent upon the exclusion of Mr. Gorsak's expert testimony, the Court will first address the motion to exclude before considering whether this matter is appropriate for Rule 56 dismissal.

1. Motion to Preclude Testimony of an Expert

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,

A witness, qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Courts frequently distill Rule 702 into a three-factor list that requires expert testimony to be (1) proffered by a sufficiently qualified expert; (2) reliable; and (3) fit. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579); Ortiz v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., No. 03-3657, 2005 WL 2044923, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2005). The Court, in reaching its decision, will first review the question of Mr. Gorsak's qualifications before turning to whether or not his proposed testimony is reliable and fit.

A. Mr. Gorsak's Expert Qualifications

When considering an expert's qualifications, the trial court must determine whether a witness possesses "'specialized knowledge' with regard to the area he is testifying about." Ortiz, 2005 WL 2044923 at *3; see Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. Within the Third Circuit's liberal interpretation of Rule 702, Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003), "the basis of this specialized knowledge can be practical experience as well as academic training and credentials," Fisher v. Walsh Parts & Serv. Co., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 496, 508 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted); Hammond v. Int'l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982). A court must be cautious not to exclude the expert testimony simply because that expert, in the view of the trial court, is neither the best nor most appropriately qualified. Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. ("Paoli I"), 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3d Cir. 1990)). The strengths and weaknesses of an expert's qualifications are insteadfrequently factored into the weight given to that expert's testimony, rather than its admissibility. Id. at 782.

The Court finds here that Mr. Gorsak's qualifications with respect to this particular subject matter are weak at best, even under a liberal gaze. Mr. Gorsak's favorable qualifications include his bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, (Doc. No. 41, Att. 3, Ex. A., "Gorsak Dep.," at 14:13-15), his license as a forklift operator, (Gorsak Dep. at 27:4-7), his general familiarity with forklifts, (see, e.g., Gorsak Dep. at 27:2-3, 7-9), and his experience with algorithms in other settings, (see Doc. No. 41, Att. 5, Ex. C, "Gorsak Report," at 10 (explaining that Mr. Gorsak had applied an algorithm on molding presses such that if any of the parameters to produce a good molded part did not conform to the setting for that specific part, it would not cycle to make a bad batch of parts)). He also, at one point, designed some material handling attachments for forklifts, (Gorsak Dep. at 22:13-20), studied to become a Professional Engineer, (Gorsak Dep. at 14:16-20), and has had membership in at least some seemingly relevant societies, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 41, Att. 4, Ex. B, Gorsak Curriculum Vitae (specifying membership in the American Society of Safety Engineers)).

Defendant, however, is quick to point out both the limitations of the above qualifications and Mr. Gorsak's lack of qualifications generally. Despite his previous studies, Mr. Gorsak is not a Professional Engineer and does not have an advanced degree in engineering. (Gorsak Dep. at 14:16-20; 15:3-5). His forklift license applies to sit-down forklifts and he has almost no experience with stand-up rider forklifts. (Gorsak Dep. at 27:15-20, 27:21-25; 28:1-3; 28:9-12; 28:13-16). Indeed, he has never operated a Crown RC 55000 series stand-up rider forklift (the forklift at issue in this case), (Gorsak Dep. at 28:17-19), and his experience operating any stand-up rider lift is limited to one occasion that lasted for less than ten minutes, (Gorsak Dep. at27:21-25; 28:1-3). Mr. Gorsak has never worked for a company that manufactures or designs forklifts, much less stand-up rider forklifts, (Gorsak Dep. at 29:12-14), he owns no patents for any type of design of material handling equipment, (Gorsak Dep. at 26:18-20), and he has never designed any type of forklift or a component part for a forklift. (See generally, Gorsak Dep. at 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22).

Significantly, Mr. Gorsak demonstrates ignorance with regard to the governing safety standards in place for the design and manufacture of the forklift at issue, in some instances, stating that a forklift operator should take the exact opposite course of action than is recommended.3 He has never drafted any instructions, warnings, labels, or operator or training manuals for forklifts, (Gorsak Dep. at 20:2-4, 5-8), nor is he a member of any national, governmental, or other organization responsible for developing or evaluating the standards for material handling equipment, (Gorsak Dep. at 30:25-31:1-6). Despite the context-specific nature of forklift safety design - i.e., whether or not a forklift is used in circumstances that require the ability to quickly leave the operator compartment - Mr. Gorsak has admitted to not knowing precisely the activity for which a stand-up rider forklift is used, a fact which Defendant emphasizes makes safety determination difficult. (Gorsak Dep. at 67:23-68:6). Mr. Gorsak has also admitted to being unfamiliar with the type of forklift braking system employed in the Crownforklift at issue in this case, raising the question of how he might be qualified to argue that it is defectively designed. (Gorsak Dep. at 72:17-19).

Aside from the seeming gap in...

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