Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2015–1214.,2015–1214.
• Citation: 800 F.3d 1375,116 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045
• Parties: DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC, Appellant v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

800 F.3d 1375

116 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045

DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC, Appellant

v.NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC., Appellee.

No. 2015–1214.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Sept. 4, 2015.

Matthew R. McClean Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, argued for appellant. Also represented by Patrick M. Bergin, Joseph S. Heino.

Michael T. Griggs, Boyle Fredrickson, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, argued for appellee. Also represented by John Paul Fredrickson, Sarah M. Wong.

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and O'MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Dynamic Drinkware, LLC (“Dynamic”) appeals from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in an inter partes review not to reject claims 1 and 12 of National Graphics, Inc.'s (“National Graphics”) U.S. Patent 6,635,196 (the “'196 patent”) as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).¹ See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., No. 2013–00131, 2014 WL 4628897 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2014) (“Board Decision ”). Because Dynamic failed to carry its burden of proving unpatentability, we affirm.

Background

National Graphics owns the '196 patent, which is directed to making molded plastic articles bearing a “lenticular” image. The '196 patent issued on October 21, 2003, from an application filed on November 22, 2000. The '196 patent claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/211,112, filed on June 12, 2000.

Dynamic petitioned the PTO for inter partes review of the '196 patent. In its petition, Dynamic argued that claims 1, 8, 12, and 14 of the '196 patent were anticipated by U.S. Patent 7,153,555 (“Raymond”). The application for Raymond was filed on May 5, 2000, claiming the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/182,490 (the “provisional application” or “Raymond provisional application”), filed on February 15, 2000. The PTO granted the petition in part, and instituted trial on claims 1 and 12.

The Board concluded that Dynamic failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 12 were anticipated under § 102(e)(2) by Raymond. Board Decision at 13. The Board first found that Dynamic failed to prove that the Raymond patent was entitled to the benefit of its earlier February 15, 2000 provisional filing date, and hence that it was a § 102(e) reference as of its provisional date. Id. at 3. According to the Board, “[t]o be entitled to rely on the February 15, 2000 provisional filing date, [Dynamic] had to establish that it relies on subject matter from Raymond that is present in and supported by its provisional.” Id. (citing In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2010) ; Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606 (B.P.A.I.2008) ). The Board found that, rather than comparing “the portions of [Raymond] relied on by [Dynamic] to the Raymond provisional,” Dynamic only compared claim 1 of the '196 patent to the Raymond provisional application. Id. at 4. As a result, the Board found that Dynamic “failed to carry its burden of proof that Raymond's effective date is earlier than May 5, 2000.” Id. It is worth emphasizing that the relevance of the Raymond provisional application date here is not to give the Raymond patent any earlier priority over a competing application or patent, but to serve third party Dynamic's goal of creating earlier prior art against the '196 patent.

The Board then found that National Graphics reduced to practice its invention by March 28, 2000, before the May 5, 2000 filing date of the Raymond patent. Id. at 12. Thus, the Board concluded that Dynamic failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 12 of the '196 patent were anticipated by Raymond under § 102(e). Id. at 13.

Dynamic timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

Discussion

We review the Board's legal determinations de novo, In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed.Cir.2004), and the Board's factual findings underlying those determinations for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed.Cir.2000). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938).

For a patent to claim priority from the filing date of its provisional application, it must satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2006), which provides that:

An application for patent filed under section 111(a) or section 363 of this title for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in a provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title, by an inventor or inventors named in the provisional application, shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title....

(emphases added). “In other words, the specification of the provisional must ‘contain a written description of the invention and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms,’ 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional application.” New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2002) (emphases in original).

I

Dynamic argues that the Board erred in shifting the burden to Dynamic to prove that the Raymond patent was entitled to the filing date of its provisional application. According to Dynamic, as a presumptively valid prior art patent, Raymond's presumed effective date is its February 15, 2000 provisional application filing date. Dynamic contends that it made a prima facie showing that Raymond was thus prior art to the '196 patent under § 102(e) as of its provisional date, and, under Giacomini, the burden should have shifted to National Graphics to prove that Raymond was not entitled to the filing date of its provisional application.

In response, National Graphics argues that the Board properly placed the burden of proof on Dynamic to support its contention that the Raymond provisional application provided written description support for the claims of the Raymond patent. According to National Graphics, priority claims are not examined by the PTO as a matter of course, and consequently are not entitled to a presumption of adequate written description support in the provisional application.

We agree with National Graphics that the Board did not err in placing the burden on Dynamic, the petitioner in the inter partes review, to prove that the prior art Raymond patent was entitled to the filing date of its provisional application. As an initial matter, and to clarify the relative burdens, we begin with the established concept that there are two distinct burdens of proof: a burden of persuasion and a burden of production.See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed.Cir.2008). The burden of persuasion “is the ultimate burden assigned to a party who must prove something to a specified degree of certainty,” such as by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (citations omitted). In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee. “Failure to prove the matter as required by the applicable standard means that the party with the burden of persuasion loses on that point—thus, if the fact trier of the issue is left uncertain, the party with the burden loses.” Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327.

A second and distinct burden, the burden of production, or the burden of going forward with evidence, is a shifting burden, “the allocation of which depends on where in the process of trial the issue arises.” Id. (citations omitted). The burden of production may entail “producing additional evidence and presenting persuasive argument based on new evidence or evidence already of record.” Id.

These burdens are illustrated in Technology Licensing, where the patentee, TLC, sued Gennum for infringement, and Gennum argued that TLC's patent was anticipated by certain prior art. Id. At issue was whether the asserted patent was entitled to the benefit of the priority date of a related nonprovisional application. Id. TLC argued that the asserted claim was entitled under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to the benefit of the earlier filing date of its parent nonprovisional application. Id. Section 120, which has language similar to that found in § 119(e)(1), provides that a patent application for an “invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in the United States ... shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application ....” (emphasis added).

Gennum, having the ultimate burden of proving its defense of invalidity based on anticipating prior art, also had the initial “burden of going forward with evidence that there is such anticipating prior art.” Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327. In response, TLC then had “the burden of going forward with evidence either that the prior art does not actually anticipate, or, as [TLC] attempted in this case, that it is not prior art because the asserted claim is entitled to the benefit of a filing date prior to the alleged prior art.” Id. We noted that “[t]his requires TLC to show not only the existence of the earlier application, but why the written description in the earlier application supports the claim.” Id. We concluded that once “TLC's evidence and argument in support of the earlier filing date is ... before the court, the burden of going forward again shifts to the proponent of the invalidity defense, Gennum, to convince the court that TLC is not entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date.” Id. at 1328.

The aforementioned shifting burdens and...