Dyson v. Pen Mar Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1950
• Docket Number: 134.
• Parties: DYSON v. PEN MAR CO., Inc., et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

73 A.2d 4

195 Md. 107

DYSON v. PEN MAR CO., Inc., et al.

No. 134.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 14, 1950

Paul Berman and Melvin J. Sykes, Baltimore (Sigmund Levin and Theodore B. Berman, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Paul R Kach and Paul M. Higinbothom, Baltimore, for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C J., and COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

HENDERSON, Judge.

Joseph Dyson, an illiterate laborer 47 years of age, fell from a freight car and injured his head on August 17, 1945, while working for the Pen Mar Co., Inc. He was paid compensation for temporary total disability up to February 8, 1946, when he returned to work and worked intermittently through that month. His previous work record had been good. Upon his request, a hearing was scheduled for April 11, 1946 to determine the nature and extent of his injuries. On that date Dyson and the attorney for the insurer informed Commissioner Koon that they had agreed to a final compromise and settlement under section 39, Article 101 of the Code, for the sum of $750. An agreement was prepared and executed by the parties, and approved by the Commission on April 23, 1946. Payment of the full amount was made in installments until November 11, 1946. On March 21, 1947 the appellant filed a petition with the Commission to set aside the agreement on the ground of mutual mistake. After hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal to the Superior Court of Baltimore City, testimony was taken and the case submitted to the court, without a jury, and the court found there was 'no mutual mistake under which both parties acted.' From a ruling affirming the action of the Commission and a judgment in favor of the appellees for costs, the appeal comes here.

A procedural question is raised as to whether the Commission had any jurisdiction to consider the petition to set aside the agreement of settlement, and, if so, whether its decision is appealable. Section 39, Article 101, of the Code (1947 Supplement) provides: '* * * At any time after a claim for compensation under this Article has been filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission by any claimant, the said claimant * * * may, with the approval of the State Industrial Accident Commission, enter into an agreement with the employer or insurer of such employer providing for a final compromise and settlement of any and all claims which the said employee * * * might then or thereafter have under the provisions of this Article, upon such terms and conditions as the Commission shall, in its discretion, deem proper. Any such settlement when approved by the Commission shall be binding upon all parties thereto, and no such settlement shall be effective unless approved by the Commission.' We have not previously had occasion to construe this provision.

An award of compensation is not the pronouncement of a court and not a judgment, but may be enforced by suit as a statutory specialty. Mattare v. Cunningham, 148 Md. 309, 314 129 A. 654. The filing and approval of a final settlement agreement has many of the aspects of an award. While the language quoted does not expressly call the agreement an award, it is included in section 39 which requires the Commission to 'make or deny an award' whenever a claim is filed, and it provides that no settlement shall be effective without approval, in which event it becomes binding upon all parties thereto. We note that in the instant case the Commission not only approved the agreement but directed the employer and insurer to pay the agreed amount at a definite weekly rate, and ordered a payment to the Second Injury Fund 'in addition to the above Compensation'.

In Stevenson v Hill, 170 Md. 676, 683, 185 A. 551, 554, it was held that the Commission had the power to reopen a case, even for reconsideration of a question previously decided. It was pointed out that Section 54 [now 53] of Article 101 provides that the powers and jurisdiction of the Commission are continuing, and that it may, within the time specified 'make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified.' Its powers in this respect are not limited by the provisions of Section 42 to cases of 'aggravation, diminution or termination of disability.' However, as Judge Urner stated, 'with respect to a question which the commission has once determined, none of the parties has a right to require that the case be reopened or to appeal from a refusal to comply with such a demand. * * * A successful application to the commission itself for a reconsideration of its action may be sustainable even though a right of appeal to a court from its refusal to grant the application could not be recognized. There may be adequate reasons why the commission would desire to reconsider a case upon request of a party in interest or on its own motion. The absolute denial of that authority might in some instances interfere with a completely just exercise of the commission's important functions. The Court relied upon the well-reasoned opinion of Chief Judge Bond in Gold Dust Corporation v. Zabawa, 159 Md. 644, 152 A. 500, and distinguished Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. v. Simmons, 143 Md. 506, 122 A. 678, where it was held that a refusal to reopen in a case of aggravation was appealable. See also Howard Contracting Co. v. Yeager, 184 Md. 503, 505, 41 A.2d 494.

The appellant contends that these cases are not controlling on the right of appeal because the Commission, in approving the settlement agreement, did not consider the question of mutual mistake and hence that question was never presented or decided. It is argued that the case should be appealable to the same extent as a refusal to reopen to permit proof of aggravation or diminution under Section 42. We think the argument is unsound. The underlying question as to the compensation to be paid for the injury, by agreement rather than by the determination of a contested issue, was presented and decided. The petition to reopen is not predicated upon a subsequent change of condition, but involves an inquiry into the justice of the approval in the light of conditions existing at the time of the settlement. This would appear to be the very type of inquiry which Judge Urner had in mind in the passage quoted.

It is argued that the refusal of the Commission to set aside the settlement agreement is appealable under the provisions of Section 57 of Article 101, 'in the Circuit Court of the county or in the Common Law Courts of Baltimore City * * * and the Court shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts concerning the injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the Article, and whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided. * * * Upon the hearing of such an appeal the Court shall, upon motion of either party * * *, submit to a jury any question of fact involved in such case.' For a number of reasons we think the latter provision is inapplicable. Insofar as the Commission's approval can be deemed an award, it would seem to fall within the rule of the cases cited. Insofar as the matter of approval or disapproval as to the terms and conditions of the agreement is left to the Commission's discretion, there would be no issue of fact to determine. Cf. Bonner v. Celanese Corporation Md., 72 A.2d 686; Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290, 297, 52 A.2d 605; and Bethlehem Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 481, 483, 50 A.2d 799. See also Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Bishop, 189 Md. 147, 55 A.2d 507, 511....