Dyson v. Webber
| Docket Number | Civil Action ELH-22-1299 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Parties | ERIC SYLVESTER DYSON, Petitioner, v. SHANE WEBBER and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Petitioner Eric Sylvester Dyson, a Maryland prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2016 conviction in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland for second-degree murder and theft-related offenses. ECF 1. At the direction of the Court (ECF 6, ECF 7), Dyson filed a supplement. ECF 8. I shall refer to ECF 1 and ECF 8 collectively as the “Petition.”
Dyson raises five grounds for relief. ECF 1 at 5-6. Specifically he claims that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce a statement that he gave to the police (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement that he made; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his theft convictions and resulting sentence; (4) the trial court erred in failing to strike the jury panel; and (5) his post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Id. at 5-6, 23.
Respondents Warden Shane Webber and the Maryland Attorney General filed a “Limited Answer,” with exhibits. ECF 5; ECF 5-1. They assert that Dyson's ineffective assistance claim is not cognizable in this proceeding and, in any event, his Petition may not be considered by this court because it was not timely filed within the one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. ECF 5 at 12-19.
Respondents also assert that Dyson is not entitled either to statutory tolling or an equitable exception to the one-year filing deadline. Id. at 20-23.
Pursuant to Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 2002), the court provided Dyson an opportunity to explain why the Petition should not be dismissed as time barred. ECF 6; ECF 7. Dyson filed a supplement, stating that, for the purpose of filing the Petition, he believed he “had one year from [his] final disposition which was July 26th 2021,” when he was “denied post-conviction relief for modification of sentence ....” ECF 8 at 1.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the matter. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md 2021); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) ().
For the reasons that follow, I shall dismiss the Petition. I also decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
On May 13, 2016, Dyson was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of second-degree murder, theft of a credit card, two counts of use and disclosure of credit card numbers, and engaging in a theft scheme. State of Maryland v. Eric S. Dyson, Case No. 126986C (Cir. Ct. for Montgomery Cnty.); ECF 5-1 at 7-8.[1] He was sentenced on October 13, 2016, to a total of 47 years and six months of incarceration. Id.
Dyson timely noted a direct appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,[2] which affirmed his judgment of conviction in an unreported opinion filed on September 24, 2018, with the mandate issuing that same day. Dyson v. State, No. 1969, Sept. Term 2016 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sep. 24, 2018); ECF 5-1 at 152-87.
Dyson subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which he later supplemented. ECF 5-1 at 188-200. On February 22, 2019, the petition was denied. Dyson v. State, 462 Md. 564, 201 A.3d 1232 (2019); ECF 5-1 at 201.
Then, on September 10, 2019, Dyson filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state circuit court. ECF 5-1 at 25. Following a hearing on January 22, 2021, the post-conviction court issued a memorandum opinion and order on February 26, 2021, granting in part and denying in part Dyson's petition. Id. at 28.[3] From the docket, it appears that the post-conviction court granted Dyson relief in the form of leave to file a belated motion for reconsideration of his sentences, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(e). See id.[4] Dyson filed his belated motion on April 30, 2021, and following a hearing on July 26, 2021, the circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 28-29. Dyson did not otherwise file an application for leave to appeal from the postconviction court's judgment. See id.
On April 28, 2022, Dyson filed his Petition in this court.[5] See ECF 1 at 6; Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (); Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, Rule 3(d) ().[6]
Additional facts are included, infra.
The Petition seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court is precluded from granting habeas corpus relief “on a claim decided on the merits in a state court unless it determines the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record evidence.'” Crockett v. Clarke, 35 F.4th 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2022). Moreover, the federal court's review of a state court decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is conducted “through a narrow lens . . .,” requiring a review of “the record in its entirety” as it existed before the post conviction court. Mahadi v. Stirling, 20 F.4th 846, 854 (4th Cir. 2021); see Mays v. Hines, U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021) (per curiam); Hyman v. Hoekstra, 41 F.4th 272, 274 (4th Cir. 2022). The Fourth Circuit has characterized the standard as “an extraordinary standard of review.” Crockett, 35 F.4th at 235.
A § 2254 petition must set forth specific grounds for relief. Samples v. Ballard, 860 F.3d 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 267 (4th Cir. 2022). Claims by a State prisoner that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States “implicate concerns about federalism and comity[.”] Crockett, 35 F.4th at 241. Concerns of comity and federalism “reach their apex” when a state court has previously ruled on an alleged wrongful conviction. Valentino v. Clarke, 972 F.3d 560, 575 (4th Cir. 2020). Therefore, “the standard for such claims is exceedingly high.” Crockett, 35 F.4th at 241; see Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013).
Notably, “[t]he State possesses primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law, and for adjudicating constitutional challenges to State convictions.” Shinn v. Ramirez, U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 1718, 1730-31 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The role of a federal habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review of factual findings and to substitute its own opinions for the determinations made on the scene by the trial judge.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 276 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, § 2254 “is not to be used as a second criminal trial, and federal courts are not to run roughshod over the considered findings and judgments of the state courts that conducted the original trial and heard the initial appeals.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000); see Walters v. Martin, 18 F.4th 434, 441 (4th Cir. 2021). Therefore, the habeas court may not disturb a state court judgment “absent an error that lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Mays, 141 S.Ct. at 1146; see Walters, 18 F.4th at 441.
In Nicolas v. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, 820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2016), the Fourth Circuit explained (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)):
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a federal court reviewing a habeas petition that has already been adjudicated on the merits in state court to give considerable deference to the state court decision. A federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court arrived at “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Factual determinations are unreasonable when they are “‘sufficiently against the weight of the evidence ....'” Williams v. Stirling, 914 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). But, “‘a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013) (citation omitted).
Under AEDPA, a habeas petition is subject to a one-year statute of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Woodfolk v. Maynard, 857 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2017). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:
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