Dzana v. Foti, 86-3668

• Decision Date: 16 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3668,86-3668
• Citation: 829 F.2d 558
• Parties: Lindelo M. DZANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles C. FOTI, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 558

829 F.2d 558

Lindelo M. DZANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles C. FOTI, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-3668

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 16, 1987.

Jane Johnson, Supervising Atty., Karen L. Campbell, Student Atty., Tulane Law Clinic, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Usry & Weeks, Freeman R. Matthews, Metairie, La., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before POLITZ, JOHNSON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

An Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detainee appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights action against officials of the Orleans Parish prisons. Because we must hold that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in dismissing the case, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Lindelo Moses Dzana arrived in the United States from South America as a stowaway on March 9, 1979. Dzana petitioned for asylum, claiming that, as a former member of the African National Congress, he would be in danger from both the government and his former colleagues if he were forced to return. The INS initially denied the asylum application and set Dzana's bond at $4,000. Dzana could not make the bond and was confined to the Orleans Parish prisons under a contractual arrangement between the INS and the parish.

While in prison, Dzana was disciplined several times by being sent to disciplinary segregation, on one occasion for more than thirty days. On August 23, 1985, the INS sent Dzana a letter revoking his bond with the following language:

In view of our subsequent determination that you have no further viable claim to possible asylum in the United States, or other administrative relief available, and in view of the clear threat to the peace and security of the United States due to your training and affiliation, as reevidenced by your behavior during your encarceration [sic], it is determined that the bond conditions be revoked and that you be henceforth detained without bond.

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, at 2 (emphasis added).

In September 1985 Dzana filed a pro se civil rights complaint against prison authorities. In November 1985, Dzana filed an amended complaint alleging that he had received inadequate medical care, that he had been beaten, and that he had been disciplined without due process. In January 1986, the Tulane Law Clinic took over representation of Dzana. In March 1986, Dzana received asylum and was released from prison. After a bench trial held March 31, 1986, a magistrate concluded (1) that Dzana's claim of inadequate medical treatment alleged, at most, negligence under state law, and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (2) that prison staff had used no more than reasonable force on Dzana; and (3) that the procedures followed by Orleans prison officials before disciplining Dzana met the due process requirements set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendation that all of Dzana's claims be dismissed with prejudice.

Dzana appeals only the district court's denial of his due process claim.

II. DISCUSSION

A prisoner has a claim under section 1983 for placement in segregation only if he possessed a "liberty interest" in remaining among the general prison population. Helms, 459 U.S. at 466, 103 S.Ct. at 869; McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 866 (5th Cir.1983). The due process clause, by itself, does not grant a prisoner the right to be free from segregation. Helms, 459 U.S. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869; McCrae, 720 F.2d at 866. However, local statutes and regulations, if they significantly limit prison authorities' discretion and carry mandatory force, can create a liberty interest. Helms, 459 U.S. at 469, 103 S.Ct. at 870; Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1125 (5th Cir.1986); McCrae, 720 F.2d at 866; Martin v. Foti, 561 F.Supp. 252, 258 (E.D.La.1983).

In the instant case, Dzana's rights as to the severity of his confinement were governed by federal statutes and regulations, because Dzana was a federal prisoner. ¹ See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 500.1(d) (1986) (defining the "institutions" to which the regulations apply as including metropolitan jails). The federal Bureau of Prisons regulations provide: "Disciplinary action may not be capricious or retaliatory" (Id. Sec. 541.10(a)(4)); "Specific sanctions are authorized for each category.... Imposition of a sanction requires that the inmate first is found to have committed a prohibited act" (Id. Sec. 541.13(a)). The regulations then establish four offense categories, with specific sanctions for each. Id. Sec. 541.13. These regulations resemble statutes and regulations found by previous courts to be clear and mandatory enough to create a liberty interest. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 2195, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985); Helms, 459 U.S. at 470, 103 S.Ct. at 870-71; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); McCrae, 720 F.2d at 867 (Louisiana state penitentiary regulations).

The second step in the inquiry is a determination of what level of process is due the prisoner. In making this determination, the courts balance the needs of prison administration against the deprivation suffered by the prisoner. Helms, 459 U.S. at 473, 103 S.Ct. at 872. A key consideration is the type of sanction imposed on the prisoner and any collateral consequences that sanction may carry with it. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner punished by solitary confinement and loss of good-time credits must receive: (1) "advance written notice," at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, of the charges against him; (2) a "written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken"; and (3) the opportunity "to call witnesses and present documentary evidence," so long as this right does not create a security risk. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80. See also Ponte v. Real, 105 S.Ct. at 2194 (reaffirming the validity of Wolff after Helms ). However, when a prisoner faces only a few days of administrative segregation pending a hearing, with no effect on parole, "informal nonadversary evidentiary review" will suffice, with "some notice" to the prisoner and an "opportunity to present a statement." Helms, 459 U.S. at 476-77, 103 S.Ct. at 874.

Thus, the Supreme Court has established at least two levels of due process in prison disciplinary proceedings: the elevated Wolff standard requiring an adversary proceeding, advance written notice, and other safeguards; and the lower Helms standard. This Court has held that a prisoner facing disciplinary segregation for slightly less than a month fell under the Helms rather than the Wolff standard. McCrae, 720 F.2d at 866. This Court has not, however, drawn a clear boundary between the two standards.

The sanctions faced by Dzana in the instant case were unique. Like McCrae, Dzana was placed in disciplinary segregation for approximately a month. Unlike McCrae, however, Dzana's discipline had further consequences. The INS, at its request, was sent the records concerning disciplinary actions taken against Dzana in the Orleans Parish prison. The magistrate found that this was standard practice for INS prisoners held on a contractual basis. The INS explicitly cited Dzana's disciplinary record as a reason for withdrawing bond. ²

The key question in the instant case is whether Dzana, in facing disciplinary segregation and loss of bond, resembles more closely the prisoners in Wolff, who faced segregation and loss of good time, or the prisoners in Helms and McCrae, who faced only segregation. We hold that Dzana falls more naturally into the Wolff group. Loss of bond, like loss of good-time credits, can affect the amount of time the prisoner spends behind bars under confinement. To hold that deprivation of good-time credits triggers the Wolff guarantees, but deprivation of bond does not, would be to place pretrial detainees in a much worse and more oppressive situation than that applicable to convicted prisoners. ³ Dzana was being held pursuant to an initial denial of asylum which was later reversed. Whatever the formal characterization of the sanctions Dzana received, these sanctions had a more severe practical effect than segregation coupled with loss of good time would have had on a convicted prisoner. It is therefore clear that the prison authorities should have accorded Dzana the process mandated by Wolff.

The record reveals that the process actually given Dzana fell short of the Wolff standard in at least one respect. Dzana received only oral notice of his disciplinary hearings and the charges against him, usually just before the hearing. Thus, Dzana had little chance to prepare a defense. Wolff clearly requires twenty-four hour written notice. 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-79. In...