E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:04CV01359 ERW.,4:04CV01359 ERW. |
| Citation | 458 F.Supp.2d 980 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff(s), v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
C. Felix Miller, Jr., Melvin D. Kennedy, Robert G. Johnson, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff(s).
Michael M. Godsy, Sonnenschein and Nath, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs/Defendants).
Donald R. Livingston, Nathan J. Oleson, Akin and Gump, Washington, DC, Donna
M. Welch, Khara A. Coleman, Richard C. Godfrey, Sallie G. Smylie, Kirkland and Ellis, Chicago, IL, for Defendant(s).
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability [doc. # 42] and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. # 52].
The Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Plaintiff), is suing the Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company ("Defendant"), for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's rehire policy associated with the Preparing for the Future Group Reorganization Plan ("Reorganization Plan"), had an adverse impact on former employee-agents who were members of the protected age group, and that these former employee-agents were barred from rehire. PI. Comp., 3-4. Plaintiff further alleges the reasons for the rehire policy articulated by the Defendant were not reasonable. Id. Defendant denies these allegations. Prior to seeking relief in federal court, the Plaintiff attempted conciliation in accordance with the terms of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Following discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
Prior to November, 1999, the Defendant had a business structure which included the employment of approximately 6,300 employee-agents, who sold Allstate property and casualty insurance. These agents were employed primarily under either a R-830 or R-1500 employment contract. In November, 1999, the Defendant announced its Reorganization Plan, which would terminate the employment contracts of its employee-agents, effective June 30, 2000.2 Concurrent with the announcement of the Reorganization Plan, the Defendant gave each employee-agent four options upon termination of their contracts. The first two options allowed an employee-agent to become an Exclusive Agent (referred to as an independent contractor agent), the third provided enhanced severance pay on condition of signing a release of legal claims against the Defendant, and the fourth provided base severance pay without requiring the employee agent to sign a release of liability. Under the first two options the employee agent would receive a bonus payment of at least $5,000 and would continue working for the Defendant as an independent contractor agent. One of the conditions of entering a new contract with the Defendant as an independent contractor was that the former employee agent would be required to sign a release of liability. Former employee-agents were given until June 1, 2000, to choose between the four options.
In association with their Reorganization Plan, the Defendant also adopted a rehire policy that was implemented in September, 2000. The policy provided that former employee-agents, who were subject to the Reorganization Plan, would be ineligible for rehire for a period of one year after their termination, or after all payments of any severance benefits had been received. This prevented any former employee-agent from being rehired in a non agent position as all employee-agent positions had been eliminated, for a period of at least one year and at longest two years from the date of termination, in most cases June 30, 2000. Some former employee-agents were rehired by the Defendant, between their termination date on June 30, 2000, and the implementation of the rehire policy on September 26, 2000. The rehire policy was developed and implemented by Karleen Zuzich, who is Assistant Vice President for Human Resources at Allstate Insurance Company, and was adopted by Allstate Insurance Company. The policy was distributed to the Defendant's regional human resources managers, but the policy was not communicated generally to former employee-agents. This policy applied to all former employee-agents, regardless of age.
Although neither party has raised the question, this Court is obligated to examine whether the Plaintiff had standing, within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (); Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 488 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a court shall dismiss the action "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (2006). "As a jurisdictional requirement ... standing can be raised by the court sua sponte at any time during the litigation." Delorme v. U.S., 354 F.3d 810 (8th Cir.2004). This Court will address the question of whether the plaintiff, representing former employees, as opposed to current employees, at the time the adverse employment action was taken, has standing under the ADEA, as required by Article III of the United States Constitution.
Under the ADEA, "[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such employee under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (emphasis in original). The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the language "any person aggrieved" to require only the threshold standing requirements for a case or controversy. Home v. Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 235 (8th Cir.1995) (). The Supreme Court has held that to meet the threshold case or controversy requirement, the plaintiff must show that he has sustained an actual injury, that it is the result of the challenged conduct, and that a favorable decision by the court will redress the alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); see also Bill M. ex rel. William M. v. Nebraska Dept. Of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 408 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.2005) ().
Due to the expansive reading that has been given to the ADEA's aggrieved person language, it is clear that the Plaintiff has standing to sue. The Plaintiff, the EEOC, represents a group of former employees that allege an injury as a result of the Defendant's "rehire policy;" that they were barred from obtaining an alternate position within Allstate. The Plaintiff challenges the rehire policy, which caused the alleged injury, as violating the ADEA. If the Plaintiff is successful in proving that the Defendant's rehire policy violates the ADEA, and that the violation caused the claimants' injuries, this Court can redress that injury by providing damages to the claimants. As provided in the ADEA, the EEOC may bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved person. 29 U.S.C. at 626(c)(1).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has noted that "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to `secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). "By its terms, [Rule 56(c)(1)] provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a genuine material fact is one such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Further, if the non-moving party has failed to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, ... there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
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