E.E.O.C. v. American Home Products Corp., C 00-3079-MWB.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C 00-3079-MWB.,C 00-3079-MWB. |
| Citation | 144 F.Supp.2d 1084 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and Jean Black, Plaintiffs, and Carolyn Penny Lewis and Joyce Gitch, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION d/b/a Fort Dodge Animal Health, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Jean P. Kamp, Regional Attorney, EEOC Milwaukee District Office, Miwaukee, WI, for plaintiffs.
Neven J. Mulholland, Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, P.C., Fort Dodge, IA, Mark S. Dichter, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.
What must a party do to obtain a continuance to pursue additional discovery before a court rules on a pending motion for summary judgment, and has the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) done it in this case? Those are the questions presented following the court's "conversion" of the defendant's motion for partial dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 and the EEOC's reassertion of a motion for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). The court determined that the EEOC's first motion for a Rule 56(f) continuance, filed before the court's formal "conversion" of the defendant's dispositive motion into a motion for partial summary judgment, failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(f) and applicable case law. Under the circumstances, however, the court also concluded that the EEOC should be given the opportunity to reassert its Rule 56(f) motion in light of the formal "conversion" of the underlying dispositive motion. That reasserted motion for a continuance to pursue discovery is now before the court, but the defendant contests its adequacy. The defendant asserts, instead, that the time is ripe for a ruling on its "converted" motion for partial summary judgment.
The procedural background of this case up to the "conversion" of the dispositive motion filed by defendant American Home Products Corporation, doing business as Fort Dodge Animal Health (AHP), is recounted in some detail in the court's ruling formally "converting" AHP's motion for partial dismissal into a motion for partial summary judgment. See EEOC v. American Home Prods. Corp., 199 F.R.D. 620 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (American Home Products I). However, a few points require reiteration and a few additional steps in the process leading to consideration of the present Rule 56(f) motion must be outlined.
This is an action, filed September 29, 2000, by the EEOC pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, seeking "to correct" unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation by defendant AHP and "to make whole" five individuals who have allegedly suffered from such unlawful employment practices. The EEOC asserts sexual harassment claims on behalf of Patty L. Parker, Amy Kolacia, and Carolyn Penny Lewis, and retaliation claims on behalf of Parker, Craig Wood, and Joyce Gitch. Lewis and Gitch have intervened in the action to assert their own claims, pursuant to Title VII and Iowa common law, against AHP. By order dated April 13, 2001, a similar action filed on June 8, 2000, by individual plaintiff Jean Black against AHP was consolidated with this action, with all subsequent filings to be filed in this case.
Before consolidation of the cases, on December 6, 2000, AHP moved to dismiss the EEOC's complaint as to claims for relief for Craig Wood and Joyce Gitch, on the ground that these two individuals have released AHP from all of their individual claims for relief, in return for severance packages, so that the EEOC cannot now recover on their claims on their behalf. AHP contends further that an Iowa state court has upheld the validity of Wood's release, so that the question of the validity of his release cannot be relitigated here. The EEOC and the intervening plaintiffs separately resisted the motion to dismiss. Incorporated into the EEOC's resistance was an assertion that the dispositive motion should be converted into a motion for summary judgment and, further, that discovery should be permitted pursuant to Rule 56(f) before the court ruled on AHP's dispositive motion as a motion for partial summary judgment.
By order dated April 4, 2001, the court formally "converted" AHP's dispositive motion, but the court found that the EEOC's first Rule 56(f) motion failed to satisfy the pertinent requirements for a continuance to pursue discovery. See American Home Prods. I, 199 F.R.D. at 632-33. Nevertheless, the court also concluded that, because there was no "strict compliance" with the notice requirement for conversion of AHP's dispositive motion, not only was it appropriate for the parties to be given "a reasonable opportunity" — after adequate notice — "to present all material made pertinent to [the converted] motion by Rule 56," see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b), but that such an opportunity should include giving the EEOC an opportunity to reassert its motion for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). American Home Prods. I, 199 F.R.D. at 632-33. Therefore, the court gave the EEOC until April 18, 2001, within which to reassert a motion for a continuance to pursue discovery, in full compliance with Rule 56(f) and applicable authorities. That reasserted Rule 56(f) motion was filed as required on April 18, 2001. AHP resisted the reasserted motion on May 4, 2001, and the EEOC did not file a reply. Therefore, this matter is now fully submitted.
Prior to filing its reasserted Rule 56(f) motion, the EEOC filed on April 11, 2001, a First Amended Complaint pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. None of the parties asserts that the First Amended Complaint has any effect upon AHP's dispositive motion or the adequacy or inadequacy of the EEOC's Rule 56(f) motion. Therefore, the court need not address the First Amended Complaint further at this time. Similarly, on May 18, 2001, Craig Wood filed a motion to intervene as an individual plaintiff in this action. AHP resisted that motion on June 6, 2001. However, Wood's motion to intervene is not before the court at this time, but has instead been assigned to a magistrate judge. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that its disposition of the EEOC's Rule 56(f) motion may have some impact on Wood's motion to intervene.
The first question before the court is whether or not the court should grant the EEOC's motion for a continuance, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to allow the EEOC to pursue discovery before responding to AHP's motion for partial dismissal, now "converted" to a motion for partial summary judgment. If the Rule 56(f) motion is granted, the next question is, how much discovery should be allowed? If the Rule 56(f) motion is denied, the next question is, instead, should partial summary judgment in favor of AHP be entered at this time as to the EEOC's claims for relief on behalf of Craig Wood and Joyce Gitch?1
In American Home Products I, this court explained the purpose and requirements of a Rule 56(f) motion, as follows:
Rule 56(f) provides as follows:
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained that
"Rule 56(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to seek a continuance and postpone a summary judgment decision until adequate discovery has been completed." [Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1997).] When seeking a continuance, however, the party opposing summary judgment is required to file an affidavit with the district court showing what specific facts further discovery might uncover. See id.; Humphreys v. Roche Biomed. Lab., Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993).
Roark v. City of Hazen, Ark., 189 F.3d 758, 762 (8th Cir.1999); Stanback v. Best Diversified Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir.1999) () (quoting Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1238). Thus, the opposing party must "demonstrate how discovery will provide rebuttal to the movant's claims."
Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc., 189 F.3d 735, 744 (8th Cir.1999).
The party seeking a Rule 56(f) continuance must do more than simply assert that it may discover additional...
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