E.E.O.C. v. Clear Lake Dodge
| Decision Date | 26 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 92-2679,92-2859,s. 92-2679 |
| Citation | 60 F.3d 1146 |
| Parties | 68 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 663, 33 Fed.R.Serv.3d 104 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, Rhonda L. Goerlitz, Intervenor-Plaintiff Appellee-Cross Appellant, v. CLEAR LAKE DODGE, et al., Defendants. Gulf Coast Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Clear Lake Dodge, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Walter R. Grimes, Appellant, v. Rhonda L. GOERLITZ, Intervenor-Plaintiff Appellee, v. CLEAR LAKE DODGE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John J. Browne, Walter R. Grimes, Houston, TX, for appellant in 92-2679.
Margaret A. Harris, Katherine L. Butler, Butler & Harris, Houston, TX, for Goerlitz.
Lamont N. White, Washington, DC, for EEOC.
Sharon R. Vinick, Richard T. Seymour, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Lawyers Committee.
William C. Isbell, Janette Johnson, Dallas, TX, for amicus curiae NELA.
John J. Browne, Houston, TX, for appellant in 92-2859.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOHNSON, GARWOOD and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION ON RECONSIDERATION
This panel's original opinion in this case was issued June 24, 1994, and was reported at 25 F.3d 265. Goerlitz filed a petition for rehearing, and the EEOC filed a suggestion for rehearing en banc. In response to the petition for rehearing, we withdraw our earlier opinion and substitute the following opinion.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of Rhonda Goerlitz, brought this sex discrimination action--in which Goerlitz later intervened personally to raise state law issues--against Gulf Coast Dodge, Inc., claiming that Gulf Coast fired Goerlitz because of her pregnancy. The jury returned a defendant's verdict in favor of Gulf Coast on all state law issues. The jury also decided in favor of Goerlitz on the Title VII claims, but its ruling in this respect was advisory only. The district judge disregarded the advisory verdict, however, and ruled in favor of Goerlitz on her Title VII claims. We affirm both the jury and the judge.
We affirm the district court's decision to award attorneys' fees, but hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of fees to be awarded. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for reconsideration of the fees in the light of this opinion. Finally, we affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions on Gulf Coast's attorney in connection with post-trial matters. 1
Gulf Coast hired Rhonda Goerlitz to be a customer service representative ("CSR"). Goerlitz was hired in probationary status for the first ninety days at $1400 a month with a raise after that to $1500 a month if given permanent status. When she began work on July 15, 1990, Goerlitz was about one month into a pregnancy.
She worked with automobile purchasers to assure that the vehicle was clean when delivered, to demonstrate how to operate various features on the automobile like the cruise control and the radio, and to show the location of the spare tire. In the case of a van purchase, her job included demonstrating how to fold down the sofa bed.
After about one and a half months on the job, and several weeks after she revealed her pregnancy, Goerlitz was taken out of her job as a CSR and was assigned temporarily as a dispatcher to fill in for vacationing employees. Goerlitz's supervisor, Don McMillan ("McMillan"), made this change in Goerlitz's assignment after he had observed her demonstrating vehicles. McMillan stated that Goerlitz was "too big" to enter vehicles properly. When McMillan transferred Goerlitz from the CSR position, he told her that when she was no longer needed as a dispatcher, he would look into finding her a clerical position.
After a few weeks as a dispatcher, on September 10, 1990, when McMillan was on vacation, Goerlitz slipped and fell on the service driveway. She was taken by ambulance to an emergency room, where it was determined that she had sprained her ankle. She returned to work the same day, but Harry McGinty, who was filling in for McMillan, instructed Goerlitz to stay home for the rest of the week and to contact McMillan upon his return the next Monday.
On September 17, Goerlitz called McMillan to ascertain her employment status. McMillan told her that he did not need anyone to work in dispatch that day. In response to Goerlitz's inquiry about her status, McMillan replied that it had not changed since their conversation in August when he had transferred her from her position as a CSR. According to McMillan, he told Goerlitz that he thought they could put together a job for her doing filing and possibly keypunch. Goerlitz asked several times during the conversation if she had been fired; McMillan answered that she had not.
Goerlitz went to see McMillan the next day, on September 18, and they once again discussed the file clerk job. On the day before the meeting occurred, however, McMillan had prepared a Personnel Action Report and had dated it effective September 12, 1990. On the form, the box labeled "TERMINATION" was checked and the following comment was written: "unable to perform her duties properly due to pregnancy." McMillan testified at trial that this report was not a termination notice, but merely a transfer slip indicating to the company's payroll clerk which department was responsible for the employee's pay.
The EEOC originally brought this action against Gulf Coast, alleging that Goerlitz was terminated from her position at Gulf Coast because of her sex (pregnancy). The suit was commenced on April 1, 1991, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 et seq.
Some six months later, on October 29, 1991, Goerlitz intervened. She alleged, in addition to the Title VII action, causes of action under the Texas Human Rights Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1991); the Texas Workers Compensation Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp.1991); intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Goerlitz demanded a jury.
The district court granted Goerlitz a binding jury for her state law claims, but the court determined that it would submit interrogatories under Title VII to the jury only as an advisory jury, under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The trial began on January 6, 1992. On January 15, the jury returned its answers to the interrogatories in favor of the defendants on all claims.
On February 18, 1992, the district court made findings of facts and conclusions of law on Goerlitz's claims under Title VII. 2 It concluded that the "EEOC and Goerlitz established through direct testimony and documentary evidence that Goerlitz's pregnancy was a substantial factor in Gulf Coast's decision to reassign her." The court held that "Gulf Coast had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to reassign Goerlitz and then discharge her would have been made absent her pregnancy," or that "Goerlitz's pregnancy interfered with her ability to perform either her job as [CSR] or her job in Dispatch."
Accordingly, the district court found that Goerlitz was entitled to back pay, prejudgment interest thereon, and attorneys' fees. The court, however, accepted the jury's finding against Goerlitz on her state law claims, and denied Goerlitz's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on her state law claims.
On August 10, 1992, Goerlitz had Gulf Coast served with a writ of execution. On the same day, Gulf Coast filed a motion to approve the supersedeas bond. Goerlitz opposed the motion to approve the supersedeas bond and sought sanctions for submitting a defective bond. On September 24, the trial court held a hearing on both motions, and the court ordered sanctions against Gulf Coast's attorney, Grimes, on October 19.
Gulf Coast filed its notice of appeal on August 25, and on October 30, Grimes filed a notice of appeal from the court's order of sanctions.
On appeal, Gulf Coast argues that the district court erred by entering a judgment in favor of Goerlitz on her Title VII claim when that judgment was contrary to the jury verdict in favor of the defendant on identical state law claims. Goerlitz, on the other hand, asserts that, according to the agreement of the parties, the jury verdict was not binding on the district court and that any argument to the contrary has been waived. On cross-appeal, Goerlitz argues further that the jury verdict was unsupported by the evidence, and that the district court should have granted her motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial.
In addition to these "merits" issues, Gulf Coast also appeals two ancillary rulings. Gulf Coast argues that the trial court abused its discretion, first, in awarding attorneys' fees to Goerlitz's attorney, and, second, by imposing sanctions on Gulf Coast's attorney, Walter Grimes. We will address each of these issues in turn.
(1)
Gulf Coast's first claim is that the district court erred when it found in favor of Goerlitz on her Title VII claim. It argues that the jury verdict on the state law claims, which decided all relevant issues against Goerlitz, was binding on the district court. In support, Gulf Coast cites the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983), which stated:
An action for reinstatement and backpay under Title VII is by nature equitable and entails no rights under the seventh amendment. An action for damages under Sec. 1981, however, is by nature legal and must be tried by a jury on demand. When legal and equitable actions are tried together, the right to a jury in the legal action encompasses the issues common to both. When a party has the right to a jury trial on an issue involved...
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