E.E.O.C. v. Erection Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-35131,89-35131
• Citation: 900 F.2d 168
• Parties: 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 786, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,790, 58 USLW 2635, 17 Media L. Rep. 1667 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ERECTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 168

900 F.2d 168

52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 786,

53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,790, 58 USLW 2635,

17 Media L. Rep. 1667

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ERECTION COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-35131.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 5, 1990.

Decided March 27, 1990.

Estelle D. Franklin, E.E.O.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.

Michel M. Sales, Oles, Morrison & Rinker, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before WRIGHT, REINHARDT and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This appeal challenges the sealing of a consent decree. Because the district court failed to articulate any basis for the sealing of the decree, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to the court to articulate its reasoning and findings.

FACTS

In May, 1986, appellant, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), filed an employment discrimination action against appellee Erection Company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. The EEOC alleged that the employer had misused name request referral procedures in its collective bargaining agreement with Ironworkers Local Union No. 86 in discriminating against black workers.

In October 1988, following substantial settlement negotiations, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement in the form of a consent decree. That decree contained a nondisclosure provision.

The nondisclosure provision was unacceptable to the EEOC Office of the General Counsel in Washington, D.C. The parties agreed to strike the provision and have the question of sealing decided on motion by the district court. ¹

On October 27, 1988, following oral argument on the issue, the court granted the motion to seal. The court stated:

I ... agree that this is an appropriate case for accepting the suggestion that the order of confidentiality be entered. So I am ... granting the motion for an order sealing the consent decree and order.

RT at 6. The court's Order of October 27, 1988 stated that the sealing of the decree was "in the interests of the justice" and stated in relevant part:

No person may have access to [the Consent Decree] without further order of this Court. Any interested party seeking inspection of the Decree or its contents must give 21 days written notice to The Erection Company and the Commission of the desire to review the file and demonstrate to the Court and to the parties full and adequate justification supporting the request.

Order at 1-2.

The EEOC then moved to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), seeking to unseal the consent decree. On December 15, 1989, the court denied the motion by minute order without explanation.

ANALYSIS

The EEOC contends on appeal that the court's sealing of the consent order violates the public's common law right of access. We cannot determine that issue given the court's failure to articulate any reasoning or findings underlying its decision to seal the decree. Our decision in Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States District Court, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.1986), compels us to remand.

In Valley Broadcasting, we addressed this issue in the context of a criminal trial. Although it might be argued that civil proceedings present considerations different than those in criminal prosecutions, case authority provides no enlightenment or support for this distinction. Accordingly, we apply the reasoning set forth in Valley Broadcasting.

In Valley Broadcasting, we addressed the public's right of access to records in a criminal trial for the purposes of copying various audio and videotaped exhibits from a criminal trial. Id. After consideration of the court's reasons for denying access, we concluded that the articulated concerns were insufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of copying access. Id. at 1294 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978)).

In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that " 'it is vital for a court clearly to state the basis of its ruling, so as to permit appellate review of whether relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight.' " Valley Broadcasting, 798 F.2d at 1294 (quoting United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir.1982)). Such relevant factors may include public interest in understanding the judicial process and whether disclosure of the material could result in improper use of the material for scandalous or libelous purposes or infringement upon trade secrets. Valley Broadcasting, 798 F.2d at 1294.

In the present case, the EEOC claims that public policy reasons support the allowing of unfettered public access to the consent decree. For example, the EEOC argues that the requirement that interested parties seeking access must wait three weeks and present justification to the court will deter access by other similarly aggrieved persons and runs counter to the prophylactic scheme of Title VII.

The Erection Company counters that the waiting and justification requirements reasonably protect its interest in avoiding additional lawsuits. It argues also that disclosure of the monetary figures of the settlement could harm its competitive bidding status.

"We review a district court's denial of access to its records for abuse of discretion." Id. Here, however, we cannot tell if there was an abuse of discretion because the record gives no hint whether the court considered any or all of these factors and arguments. We express no opinion as to the merits of these arguments and remand for the district court to state its reasoning and findings. This panel will retain jurisdiction over any future appeals in this case.

Attorney's fees requested by the Erection Company are denied.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The order of remand constitutes an idle judicial act. It requires the district court and the parties to spend unnecessary time and energy revisiting an issue that deserves no further judicial attention. Moreover, a remand may lead to future appeals by one of the parties, resulting in a further waste of judicial resources. To put it bluntly, there is simply no justification in this case for anything but an outright reversal.

In Valley Broadcasting v. United States District Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir.1986), we discussed the strong presumption in favor of access to judicial documents. The district court in Valley Broadcasting denied a television station access to certain audio and video tape exhibits presented in the course of the trial. It explained that the station's request to copy the tapes caused substantial inconveniences, created the risk of loss or erasure of the original copies, complicated the selection of an unbiased jury in the upcoming trials, and might taint empaneled jurors. We examined at length the merits of each of the articulated reasons and rejected all of them. We held that "[w]ithout articulable facts, such speculation was conjecture," and "reemphasize[d] that the district court must articulate the factual basis for the danger without relying on hypothesis or conjecture." Id. at 1295, 1297. We also said, "[w]e stress that it is vital for a court clearly to state the basis for its ruling, so as to permit the appellate review of whether relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight." Id. at 1294 (citing United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir.1982)). Thus, the lower court must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate that reason clearly; equally important the reason must be supported by sufficient facts.

Here, the district court failed on both counts. In response to The Erection Company's assertion that sealing the decree was "very important and significant" and would serve to end "the litigation and all of the animosity and all of the difficulties," the court issued an order sealing the consent decree. It offered no reason for its actions. Nor was there any factual basis in the record that could have supported the district court's action. In announcing its sealing decision, the district judge merely stated that "this is an appropriate case for accepting the suggestion that the order of confidentiality be entered."...